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Abstract
Current Security Information and Event Management systems (SIEMs) constitute the central plat-
form of modern security operating centers. They gather events from various sensors (intrusion de-
tection systems, anti-virus, ﬁrewalls, etc.), correlate these events, and deliver synthetic views for
threat handling and security reporting.
Research in SIEM technologies has traditionally focused on providing a comprehensive inter-
pretation of threats, in particular to evaluate their importance and prioritize responses accordingly.
However, in many cases, threat responses still require humans to carry out the analysis and deci-
sion tasks e.g., understanding the threats, deﬁning the appropriate countermeasures and deploying
them. This is a slow and costly process, requiring a high level of expertise, and remaining error-
prone nonetheless. Thus, recent research in SIEM technology has focused on the ability to automate
the process of selecting and deploying countermeasures.
Several authors have proposed automatic response mechanisms, such as the adaptation of secu-
rity policies, to overcome the limitations of static or manual response. Although these approaches
improve the reaction process (making it faster and/or more eﬃcient), they remain limited since
these solutions do not analyze the impact of the countermeasures selected to mitigate the attacks.
In this thesis, we propose a novel and systematic process to select the optimal countermeasure from
a pool of candidates, by ranking them based on a trade-oﬀ between their eﬃciency in stopping the
attack and their ability to preserve, at the same time, the best service to normal users. In addition,
we propose a model to represent graphically attacks and countermeasures, so as to determine the
volume of each element in a scenario of multiple attacks.
The coordinates of each element are derived from a URI. This latter is mainly composed of
three axes : user, channel, and resource. We use the CARVER methodology to give an appropriate
weight to each element composing the axes in our coordinate system. This approach allows us to
connect the volumes with the risks (i.e. big volumes are equivalent to high risk, whereas small
volumes are equivalent to low risk). Two concepts are considered while comparing two or more
risk volumes : Residual risk, which results when the risk volume is higher than the countermeasure
volume ; and Collateral damage, which results when the countermeasure volume is higher than the
risk volume.
As a result, we are able to evaluate countermeasures for single and multiple attack scenarios,
making it possible to select the countermeasure or group of countermeasures that provides the
highest beneﬁt to the organization.
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Résumé
Les SIEMs (systèmes pour la Sécurité de l'Information et la Gestion des Evénements) sont le coeur
des centres opérationnels de sécurité actuels. Les SIEMs corrèlent les événements en provenance
de diﬀérents capteurs (anti-virus, pare-feux, systèmes de détection d'intrusion, etc), et oﬀrent des
vues synthétiques pour la gestion des menaces ainsi que des rapports de sécurité.
La recherche dans les technologies SIEM a toujours mis l'accent sur la fourniture d'une in-
terprétation complète des menaces, en particulier pour évaluer leur importance et hiérarchiser les
réponses. Toutefois, dans de nombreux cas, la réponse des menaces a encore besoin de l'homme
pour mener l'analyse et aboutir à la prise de décisions, p.ex. compréhension des menaces, déﬁnition
des contremesures appropriées ainsi que leur déploiement. Il s'agit d'un processus lent et coûteux,
nécessitant un haut niveau d'expertise, qui reste néanmoins sujet à erreurs. Ainsi, des recherches
récentes sur les SIEMs ont mis l'accent sur l'importance et la capacité d'automatiser le processus
de sélection et le déploiement des contremesures.
Certains auteurs ont proposé des mécanismes automatiques de réponse, comme l'adaptation
des politiques de sécurité pour dépasser les limites de réponses statiques ou manuelles. Bien que
ces approches améliorent le processus de réaction (en le rendant plus rapide et/ou plus eﬃcace), ils
restent limités car ces solutions n'analysent pas l'impact des contremesures choisies pour atténuer
les attaques.
Dans cette thèse, nous proposons une nouvelle approche systématique qui sélectionne la contre-
mesure optimale au travers d'un ensemble de candidats, classés sur la base d'une comparaison entre
leur eﬃcacité à arrêter l'attaque et leur capacité à préserver, simultanément, le meilleur service
aux utilisateurs légitimes. Nous proposons également un modèle pour représenter graphiquement
les attaques et les contre-mesures, aﬁn de déterminer le volume de chaque élément dans un scénario
de multiples attaques.
Les coordonnées de chaque élément sont dérivés d'un URI. Ce dernier est composé principale-
ment de trois axes : l'utilisateur, le canal et le ressource. Nous utilisons la méthodologie CARVER
pour donner un poids approprié à chaque élément composant les axes de notre système de coor-
données. Cette approche nous permet de connecter les volumes avec les risques (p.ex. des grands
volumes sont équivalents à des risques élevés, tandis que des petits volumes sont équivalents à
des risques faibles). Deux concepts sont considérés en comparant deux ou plusieurs volumes de
risques : le risque résiduel, qui résulte lorsque le volume du risque est plus élevé que le volume de
la contre-mesure, et le dommage collatéral, qui en résulte lorsque le volume de la contre-mesure
est supérieur au volume du risque.
En conséquence, nous sommes en mesure d'évaluer les contre-mesures pour des scénarios d'at-
taques individuelles et multiples, ce qui permet de sélectionner la contre-mesure ou groupe de
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contre-mesures qui fournit le plus grand bénéﬁce à l'organisation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is nothing more diﬃcult to take in
hand, more perilous to conduct, or more
uncertain in its success, than to take the
lead in the introduction of a new order of
things
The Prince
N. Machiavelli - 1513
A
ttacks in Information Security are techniques used by intruders, script kiddies or crack-
ers to exploit existing misconﬁguration or vulnerabilities in systems, networks and applica-
tions [Aki10]. These attacks have multiple motivations, such as stealing an organization's in-
tellectual property, leaking on-line bank accounts and conﬁdential business information, creating
and distributing viruses, worms and other malware on target computers, or simply breaking the
organization's infrastructure.
Back in the early 80's, hacking was only considered as a simple attempt to gain government or
enterprise networks access. The image of a regular hacker was typiﬁed by a young teenager willing
to obtain more knowledge than ﬁnancial gain. It was not until the dot com boom that the threat
landscape idea changed drastically, due to the fact that worms and viruses scaled and became the
order of the day [CW08].
Over the years, attacks have moved up on the architectural layer to become content-based. Most
of the new infections come either through social engineering1 or zero-day exploit2 [CW08]. The
Phishing attack [GPGL11b,GPGL11a] is a typical example of infection that uses social engineering
techniques. An example of 0-day attacks is the recent exploit that aﬀects the latest version of
Oracle Java (version 7 update 10), which exposes all Windows computers running Java to malware
infections [Seg13].
Attacks against Information Systems have grown in sophistication and complexity, making the
detection and reaction process a challenging task for security administrators. In addition, network
and system devices are designed to support heterogeneous environments, with diﬀerent character-
istics and functionalities that increase the diﬃculty of this task. The deﬁnition of security policies
to protect these systems is a process that requires a great expertise and knowledge. Inappropriate
1Social engineering lures legitimate users into revealing their conﬁdential information or downloading and in-
stalling viruses and malware
2Zero-day attacks are targeted at systems or applications with unknown vulnerabilities that are undetectable
from security applications
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security policies may result in disastrous consequences for the organization. Security Information
and Event Management (SIEM) systems have been developed in response to help administrators
to design security policies and manage events from diﬀerent sources.
SIEM platforms provide real time analysis of security events generated by network devices and
applications [MHH+10]. These systems acquire high volumes of information from heterogeneous
sources and process them on the ﬂy. Their deployment thus focuses, ﬁrstly, on writing ad-hoc
collectors and translators to acquire information and normalize it, and secondly, on writing corre-
lation rules to aggregate the information and reduce the amount of data. This operational focus
leads SIEM implementers to prioritize syntax over semantics, and to use correlation languages poor
in features. However, as the number of attacks, and thus the diversity of alerts received by SIEMs
increases, the need for appropriate treatment of these alerts has become essential.
In addition, even though the new generation of SIEMs provides response ability to automate
the process of selecting and deploying countermeasures, current response systems select and de-
ploy security countermeasures without performing a comprehensive impact analysis of attacks and
response scenarios.
This research on automated reaction considers two main aspects: on the one hand, the large
volume of data that represents the events in a SIEM environment, and on the other hand, the
deﬁnition of security policies in heterogeneous enforcement points. In order to cope with the
aforementioned limitations, we propose a decision support and reaction model to be integrated
into a SIEM platform for the evaluation, ranking and selection of security countermeasures to
mitigate a given attack. The model evaluates the impact of a given security incident versus the
implementation of security countermeasures.
1.1 Basic Deﬁnitions
Research on attack reaction is a domain where terminology is the subject of ongoing discussions.
For a better understanding, it is important to use a consistent terminology along the dissertation.
The introduction begins therefore with basic deﬁnitions, most of which have been taken from
[Kis11]. The rest of the deﬁnitions are found in the Glossary of Terms of this dissertation.
Information security is the protection of information based on three key factors: Conﬁdentiality,
Integrity and Availability. Conﬁdentiality ensures that the information is accessible only to autho-
rized users; integrity ensures the accuracy and completeness of the information; and availability
assures that the information is accessible by authorized users whenever it is required.
In Information Security, a threat is a circumstance or event with the potential to adversely
impact organizational operations (e.g., mission, functions, reputation), as well as organizational
assets, individuals, other organizations, or even the Nation through unauthorized access, destruc-
tion, disclosure, modiﬁcation of information, and/or denial of service. A vulnerability is a weakness
in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that
could be exploited by a threat source. A risk is the level of impact on organizational operations,
assets, or individuals resulting from tampering with the operation of the information system. The
notion of risk covers two aspects: the potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of such a
threat occurring.
An attack is the instance or the realization of a potential threat. An attack is deﬁned as the
attempt to gain unauthorized access to system services, resources, or information, or an attempt
to compromise the integrity of a system. The Attack Surface refers to the subset of resources
used to attack a system (i.e. methods such as get, read, write, print, etc.; channels such as TCP,
SSL, Unix sockets, etc.; and untrusted data items such as ﬁles, cookies, database records, registry
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entries, etc.). The Attack Surface Area refers to the system's total surface exposed to a given
attack. This surface includes tangible assets (e.g. PCs, mobile phones, network components, etc.),
as well as intangible assets (e.g. conﬁdential information, business reputation, etc.).
To mitigate the eﬀects of a given attack, we need to implement security measures. Counter-
measures are security actions required to oppose an attack, either by eliminating or preventing it,
by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that corrective action
can be taken [Kis11]. A combined countermeasure results from the simultaneous implementation of
two or more countermeasures to mitigate a given attack. A combined countermeasure is therefore
analysed as a single solution with a combined cost and a combined eﬀectiveness.
In this research we assume that the implementation of a countermeasure always results into a
security policy. A Security Policy deﬁnes and constrains the activities of components processing
data in order to maintain security properties for systems and data. Security policies are enforced
by Policy Enforcement Points (PEP) [YPG00,WSS+00]. A PEP is a logical entity or place on a
server that enforces policies for admission control and decisions in response to a request from a
user wanting to access a resource or a service on a computer or network server.
1.2 Problem Statement, Objectives and Contributions
This thesis proposes a simple and well-structured approach to select optimal countermeasures by
maximizing its cost-eﬀectiveness ratio. In addition, we compare previous mathematical models and
study their limitations, which lead to the creation of a new model that evaluates, ranks and selects
optimal countermeasures. This model represents the decision support framework that allows a
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system to evaluate and select the optimal
reaction strategy for a particular attack scenario.
Problem statement:
Current Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems select and deploy
security measures without performing a comprehensive impact analysis of attacks and response
scenarios.
Thesis statement:
The selection of countermeasures to mitigate the eﬀects of a given attack requires the use of
cost-sensitive metrics. Deﬁning a quantitative model that maximizes the cost-eﬀectiveness
ratio of countermeasures contributes in the selection of the appropriate alternative. In addition,
the model allows the evaluation of combined countermeasures in a scenario of multiple attacks.
In order to solve the problem and validate the thesis statement, we have set-up the following
objectives:
 Objective 1.1: deﬁning a quantitative model based on the costs and beneﬁts of applying
particular countermeasures for a given attack.
 Objective 1.2: selecting optimal countermeasures based on their individual and combined
evaluation.
 Objective 1.3: suggesting a complete methodology to evaluate, rank and select optimal
countermeasures (individuals and/or combined) to mitigate individual and multiple attacks.
 Objective 1.4: providing several real world case studies to show the applicability of the
3
CHAPT 1. INTRODUCTION
model over diﬀerent attack scenarios.
 Objective 1.5: proposing an implementation of the cost-sensitive model using a standard
and widely deployed formalism.
Contributions: The proposed model relies on the optimization of cost sensitive metrics based on
the Return On Response Investment (RORI) index. The optimized metric compares the expected
impact of the attacks when no response is enacted against the expected impact after applying coun-
termeasures. Moreover, since a single countermeasure is not generally suﬃcient to mitigate the
impact of current attacks, we propose a methodology that assesses each countermeasure individu-
ally and evaluates their union and intersection with the objective of determining the overlapping
area among multiple solutions. We verify all possible combinations of countermeasures and deter-
mine the solution (individual or combined) that provides the highest return to the organization.
Finally, for complex attacks, we study the attack surface in order to deﬁne an approach that eval-
uates and selects countermeasures in a scenario of multiple attacks, while managing conﬂicts that
may originate from the implementation of the selected security policies.
The contributions on this dissertation are summarized as follows:
 A RORI-based model for evaluating and ranking individual countermeasures in a single attack
scenario (Objective 1.1),
 A combination approach to evaluate and select combined countermeasures to mitigate the
eﬀects of individual attacks (Objective 1.2),
 A process that selects optimal countermeasures. The process evaluates all possible combina-
tions of security measures to select the one that provides the highest beneﬁt (Objective 1.3),
 The use of the attack surface notion to evaluate multiple attacks and multiple countermea-
sures (Objective 1.3),
 The deployment of our model over real case studies provided by several telecommunication
companies in Europe (Objective 1.4),
 The evaluation of our cost sensitive model in a multiple attack scenario (Objective 1.4),
 The implementation of our model for reaction, using the OrBAC formalism to deploy new
security policies (Objective 1.5).
1.3 Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. Basic deﬁnitions regarding attack reaction were presented
in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 describes the state of the art in intrusion and threat response as well
as cost sensitive models. It proposes a countermeasure taxonomy to fulﬁl the lack of structured
information available in this ﬁeld. In addition, this section presents a comparison of diﬀerent
cost-sensitive models and provides the advantages and disadvantages for each of them. The lim-
itations of the aforementioned models motivated our choice to improve the Return On Response
Investment (RORI) index. From this model, the dissertation is divided into 2 parts described below.
Part I - Countermeasure Selection for Individual Attack Scenarios introduces the
evaluation, ranking and selection of optimal countermeasures in a scenario of individual attacks.
We describe the process to select individual and combined countermeasures and propose axioms
to calculate approximations of the costs and beneﬁts of combined solutions. We demonstrate the
applicability of our proposed model by deploying two case studies: a Mobile Money Transfer Ser-
vice and a Critical Infrastructure Process Control. Part I comprise three chapters:
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Chapter 3 - Individual Countermeasure Selection explores the advantages and disadvan-
tages of current cost-sensitive models to propose an improved model that overcomes the limitations
of existing solutions. This model fulﬁls Objective 1.1. A sensitivity analysis is performed on the
proposed model to evaluate the inﬂuence of each variable on the selection of security measures.
As a result, it is possible to identify which parameters have the highest impact on the selection
of countermeasures. In addition, a countermeasure selection process is proposed to evaluate, rank
and select individual countermeasures to react over single attacks [GDJ+12,Con11c].
Chapter 4 - Combined Countermeasure Selection addresses the limitations of current
solutions that only implement single countermeasures as a strategy to mitigate complex attacks.
Based on these limitations and to fulﬁl Objective 1.2, an approach , adapted from Chapter 3, that
performs all possible combinations of countermeasures is proposed as a way to evaluate the cost-
eﬀectiveness ratio of these combinations. A countermeasure selection process for the combined
approach is suggested as a methodology to compute each parameter of the model and to calculate
the index for each combination [GDJC12,Con11c].
Chapter 5 - Application of the Countermeasure Selection Model in Single Attack
Scenarios deploys the aforementioned approaches in two real case studies deﬁned in partner-
ship with two European Telecommunication Companies. The ﬁrst case study discusses an ac-
count takeover attack scenario in a Mobile Money Transfer Service (MMTS). The second use case
discusses a control station hacking attack over a critical infrastructure process control (speciﬁ-
cally a scenario of a dam). Both case studies perform the complete process for the evaluation,
ranking and selection of individual and combined countermeasures as introduced in Chapters 3
and 4. This chapter contributes to solving Objective 1.4 and shows the applicability of our im-
proved cost-sensitive model. Results demonstrate that in most cases, combined countermeasures
provide more interesting results than single security measures in the mitigation of individual at-
tacks [GDJ+12,GDJC12,Con11c].
Part II - Countermeasure Selection for Multiple Attack Scenarios proposes an ap-
proach based on the attack surface to evaluate and select optimal countermeasures in a multiple
attack scenario. Unlike Part I of the dissertation, we do not use approximations to calculate the
cost and mitigation levels of multiple countermeasures. Instead, we compute the union and inter-
section of the diﬀerent volumes (i.e. system, attacks, and countermeasures) by using geometrical
operations. We deploy a use case on malware with two attack scenarios in order to show the
applicability of our model. Part II comprises three chapters:
Chapter 6 - Attack Volume formalizes the measurement as a volume of the impact that a
given attack has over a system. In relation with the notion of attack surface, we provide a geometric
approach to identify several attack dimensions in a scenario of multiple attacks; making it possible
to calculate the intersection and union of two or more attacks that occur simultaneously. As a
result, we are able to identify the volume of each attack and the coverage of the selected security
solutions. These results are useful in the evaluation of our quantitative model for multiple-attack
scenarios. Chapter 6 contributes to Objective 1.3
Chapter 7 - Multiple Attacks Evaluation provides a comprehensive approach to evaluate
and select appropriate countermeasures in a scenario of two or more attacks. The approach dis-
cusses the procedure to evaluate the impact of multiple attacks over a given target and the counter-
measures to implement. The approach details the process based on three categories: independent
attack surface, totally-covered attack surface and partially-covered attack surface. Chapter 7 fulﬁls
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Objective 1.3. In addition, we present a case study that describes two famous malware infection
scenarios (Conﬁcker, and Zeus). This example deploys the process for evaluating and analysing
countermeasures as described in previous chapters, and contributes to Objective 1.4.
Chapter 8 - Conclusions and Perspectives concludes the dissertation with a summary of
contributions and presents the perspectives for future work.
From the Appendixes, Appendix A provides a French summary of the dissertation. Appendix
B presents examples of inference rules used in one of the use case scenarios. Appendix C details
the URI General Structure. Appendix D fulﬁls Objective 1.5 by presenting a Python implemen-
tation of the Mobile Money Transfer Service (MMTS) use case (described in Chapter 5) using the
Organization-Based Access Control (OrBAC) formalism to model concrete entities (e.g., subjects,
actions, objects), as well as abstract entities (e.g., roles, activities, views) in order to allow the
MMTS organization to deﬁne its own security policies.
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Intrusion and Threat
Response Models and Techniques: a state
of the art analysis
Whenever a theory appears to you as the
only possible one, take this as a sign that
you have neither understood the theory
nor the problem which it was intended to
solve
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary
Approach
Karl Popper - 1972
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nformation Technology Risks can be optimally mitigated by the appropriate selection of
countermeasures. Cost-sensitive metrics help in assessing and selecting optimal countermea-
sures for a given attack. Several approaches (e.g. Net Present Value (NPV) [Pua09], Return on
Investment (ROI) and all its variants [Sch11,Sch04]) have been used over the last two decades as
ﬁnancial metrics for quantifying the costs and beneﬁts of security investments.
Security metrics (e.g. ROA [CM05], ROSI [SAS06], RORI [Khe10], etc.) have been proposed
to assess risks and select countermeasures accordingly. However, current approaches are limited
and evaluate countermeasures individually (no attempt has been made to evaluate multiple coun-
termeasures simultaneously), a great level of subjectivity is necessary while estimating parameters
composing the metric.
This chapter presents a state of the art in intrusion and threat response models and tech-
niques. Section 2.1 proposes a countermeasure taxonomy based on the attacks, services, layers
and techniques used to perform the attack. Section 2.2 describes ﬁnancial and information secu-
rity approaches in cost sensitive models and compares their beneﬁts and constrains. Section 2.3
discusses the diﬀerent methodologies proposed to date on the evaluation and selection of security
measures. Section 2.4 concludes by analysing the current state of the art in intrusion and threat
response models and techniques.
2.1 Countermeasure Taxonomy
The appropriate mitigation of a given attack depends on the optimal selection of security measures.
In order to select a countermeasure, it is important to identify its attributes and properties as well
as the consequences of its application. A great eﬀort has been done to deﬁne and classify threats
and attacks. While some authors have just listed categories of attacks [Kum95,LJ97], others have
formally developed taxonomies [Lou01, HH04,MR04]. However, countermeasure taxonomies are
less well developed than attack taxonomies [TAAA12].
Current intrusion response taxonomies do not include response strategies, timing response, and
other factors related to the actual relevance and eﬃciency of chosen countermeasures [Tho07].
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In addition, none of the existing response taxonomies to date distinguish between temporary
responses (countermeasures that only deal temporarily with threat e.g. server port ﬁltering), and
permanent response (countermeasures that stays active for long periods of time e.g. application
security patches); nor they classify security measures according to their deployment time-frame
(i.e. immediate action, deferred action).
This section presents a countermeasure taxonomy based on four dimensions: the countermea-
sure's strategy (i.e. prevention, reaction); the type of service they protect (i.e. conﬁdentiality,
integrity, availability), the response time (i.e. duration, deployability), and the countermeasure's
eﬃciency (i.e. high, medium, low).
2.1.1 Background on Countermeasure Taxonomy
The following authors have proposed countermeasure's taxonomies as a strategy to analyze and
evaluate security mechanisms to mitigate intrusions and attacks.
Irvine and Lewin [IL99] provide a taxonomy based on security goals (e.g. conﬁdentiality, in-
tegrity, availability) that is used as a framework to deﬁne the costs associated to the network
security services. However, there are some inconsistencies in the proposed taxonomy. For instance,
data conﬁdentiality as well as audit and intrusion detection are considered in the same group of
criteria. The former is a security service, whereas the latter are security technologies.
Venter and Eloﬀ [VE03] propose a taxonomy for information security technologies that is used
to secure information at application, host and network levels. The taxonomy is divided into two
main sections: proactive, which groups measures that are used as a preventive strategy (before
the security breach occurrence); and reactive, which groups measures used as a response strategy
(as soon as the security breach is detected). However, some concepts are ambiguous (e.g. access
control and passwords are considered as reactive measures).
Wang and Wang [WW03] present a countermeasure taxonomy based on the attack target (e.g.
application layer, platform layer) and it is categorized along 4 dimensions: standards and policies,
library and tools, administration and system management, and physical tools. The authors present
an evaluation of each security technology and its eﬀectiveness in dealing with the applicable threats
and risks. However, the taxonomy lacks of important concepts such as encryption, and some general
concepts like biometrics are mixed with products such as Tripwire and SQLnet.
Schumacher [Sch03], Kim et al. [KLK05], and Talib et al. [TAAA12] have proposed the deﬁnition
of a countermeasure taxonomy through the use of security ontologies, in order to maintain a
knowledge base of security patterns. However, most of the existing works lack of some concepts
or do not clearly express the link between threats, assets and countermeasures. In addition, the
deﬁnition of some concepts such as threat and attack remain ambiguous in some of the ontologies
while in others, such concepts are not even developed.
According to Thomas [Tho07], there is not a response taxonomy that includes response strategy,
timing response, and other factors related to actual relevance and eﬃciency of chosen countermea-
sures. In addition, it is suggested to distinguish between short-term response (countermeasures
that only deal temporarily with a threat e.g. server port ﬁltering), and long-term response (coun-
termeasures that stays active for long periods of time e.g. application security patches).
2.1.2 Proposed Countermeasure Taxonomy
Considering the limitations of current security response taxonomies, we propose in this section
a countermeasure taxonomy based on 4 dimensions: the countermeasure's strategy, the type of
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service they protect, the time at which the countermeasure is applied and remains active in the
system, and the countermeasure's eﬃciency, as depicted in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 - Countermeasure Taxonomy
2.1.2.1 Strategy-based Classiﬁcation
Based on the response strategy or the objective to which the security measure has been designed,
countermeasures in our taxonomy are classiﬁed as proactive or reactive.
2.1.2.1.1 Proactive Countermeasures They cover all security controls that are employed
to protect the infrastructure (assets, information, reputation, etc), from intrusions or attacks orig-
inated internally and/or externally, in order to provide detailed information of the incidents to the
security analysts. The main objective of a proactive countermeasure is to secure the infrastructure
to make it more robust. Examples of proactive countermeasures are the use of Policy Enforcement
Points such as: IDS, Network Monitoring, Anti-virus, etc., and also, the activation of security
policies and procedures, e.g. keeping traﬃc for longer periods, monitoring conﬁguration changes
within a predeﬁned threshold, etc.
According to the countermeasure's objective, proactive countermeasures are further classiﬁed
as detective, preventive, deterrence and deﬂective. Since deterrence and deﬂective countermeasures
can be either proactive or reactive, they will be deﬁne at the end of this section.
Detective Countermeasures are security controls that detect and report unauthorized or
undesired events. They include equipments or techniques whose mission is the surveillance of
the target system to analyze data by comparing against signatures of known attacks, anomalous
behavior, or speciﬁc outcomes of interest. Examples of these countermeasures are log monitoring
and review, system audit, IDS, motion detection, etc.
Preventive Countermeasures are security measures designed to be implemented before an
intrusion or attack occurs. Preventive countermeasures seek to thwart intruders from succeeding
in their objectives, making it possible to reduce the likelihood of success of a particular intrusion.
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Halme and Bauer [HB95] consider that preventive countermeasures ensure that a system is well
conceived, designed, implemented, conﬁgured, and operated that the opportunity for intrusion
is minimal. Examples of preventive countermeasures are access control mechanisms, encryption,
applicative ﬁrewall, etc. [TK00].
2.1.2.1.2 Reactive Countermeasures As opposed to preventive countermeasures, reactive
countermeasures are security controls that aim at stopping or delaying attackers in reaching their
objectives. They are further classiﬁed as responsive and recovery countermeasure according to
their ﬁnal goal. These controls require the activation or deactivation of security policies such as:
deny access, block users/ports/IP addresses, disable services.
Responsive Countermeasures are security controls used to respond to an attack and correct
the incident. This strategy is deployed after the attack has been detected and aim at mitigating the
eﬀects and consequences of a given attack by delaying it or reducing further damage. Responsive
countermeasures include procedures to eliminate a virus from an infected system, updating ﬁrewall
rules to block a given IP address, disconnect the network from the outside, etc.
Recovery Countermeasures are security measures that re-stablish the system after an in-
cident or a disaster has occurred. Examples of this strategy include Disaster Recovery Systems,
backup procedures, restoring ﬁles, and systems, etc.
Due to their nature, some countermeasures are both proactive and reactive. Two types of
countermeasures fall into this deﬁnition: deterrence and deﬂective.
Deterrence Countermeasures are less strong than preventive countermeasures since they
do not attempt to preclude an intrusion, instead, they are designed to discourage attackers by
making them move to a diﬀerent system with a more interesting reward. For instance, hiding the
system target through camouﬂage may deter some intruders; displaying warnings e.g. stating that
access to servers is monitored, could deter internal unauthorized users; establishing obstacles to
increase the eﬀort of unauthorized users from succeeding may discourage attackers.
Deﬂective Countermeasures aim at luring intruders by making them believe they have
succeeding in accessing system resources whereas they have been attracted to a controlled envi-
ronment for observation. Examples of this technique include quarantined faux systems, controlled
faux accounts, honey-pot, etc [HB95].
2.1.2.2 Property-based Classiﬁcation
Countermeasures in our taxonomy are further classiﬁed based on the compromised service property
(i.e. conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability).
2.1.2.2.1 Conﬁdentiality Conﬁdentiality is the protection of information from unauthorized
users in a given system [TK00]. An important aspect of this property is user authentication,
therefore, appropriate identiﬁcation of users is essential to ensuring the eﬀectiveness of policies
that specify who access what. Countermeasures to protect or increase conﬁdentiality in a system
include the use of privacy and unpredictable passwords, multiple factor authentication, biometrics,
data encryption, etc.
2.1.2.2.2 Integrity Integrity is a service property that protects the system data from inten-
tional or accidental unauthorized modiﬁcations. Data integrity covers data in storage, during
processing, and while in transit. As with conﬁdentiality policy, authentication of users is a key ele-
ment of information integrity. Countermeasures to protect information integrity include encryption
procedures, ﬁrewall, password policies, etc [ASM06].
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2.1.2.2.3 Availability Availability is the property of being accessible and usable upon demand
by an authorized entity [Kis11]. Two facets of availability are general discusses: Denial of service,
and loss of data processing capabilities [TK00]. The former refers to actions that renders computing
services unusable to authorized users, the latter originates generally as a result of natural disasters
such as ﬁre, ﬂood, earthquakes; or human actions (e.g. terrorism, strikes, etc). Countermeasures
to protect system's availability include the allocation of limited access to data for unauthorized
users, backup emergency process, and connection management.
2.1.2.3 Time-based Classiﬁcation
In order to properly mitigate a given attack, countermeasures should be implemented as quickly as
possible. Thus time is a key factor in determining the appropriate mitigation strategy. However,
few of the existing security response taxonomies consider time in their design. Stakhanova et
al. [SBW07b] for instance, consider the time instance of response as proactive, which allows to
foresee the incoming intrusion before the attack has occurred; and delayed, which delays the
response action until the attack has been conﬁrmed.
None of the existing works have dealt with the period of time at which a countermeasure is
intended to be active, nor the time they can be deployed on the system. Countermeasures in our
taxonomy are classiﬁed based on their duration and deployability.
2.1.2.3.1 Countermeasure Duration: Based on the time they are active on the system,
countermeasures are classiﬁed as either temporary or permanent responses.
Temporary Responses are countermeasures that are active for a limited period of time (gen-
erally some days or some hours). They protect temporarily the system from threats or attacks
and get deactivated once the danger is completely mitigated. Examples of this kind of counter-
measures are temporarily activation/deactivation of user accounts, quarantining hosts/accounts,
blocking suspected IP addresses or Ports, etc.
Permanent Responses are countermeasures that are active for long or an unlimited period
of time. Once they get activated, there is no need to deactivate them. Examples of permanent
countermeasures are OS hardening, application security patches, etc.
2.1.2.3.2 Countermeasure Deployability: Based on the their capability to be implemented
on the system, countermeasures in our taxonomy are classiﬁed as immediate or deferred.
Immediate Activation includes all security controls that are activated immediately after the
detection of a security incident. This classiﬁcation covers independent countermeasures, or those
dependent solutions whose pre-requisite for their activation -installation of Policy Enforcement
Points e.g. Firewall, IDS, Database, etc - has been already met. Examples of this countermeasures
are; update ﬁrewall rules, block suspicious incoming/outgoing network connections, block ports/
IP addresses/ user accounts, deny/allow transactions, and all other actions that are possible to be
executed at the moment they are required.
Deferred Activation requires a given period of time (e.g. hours, days or system restart)
to be activated. This classiﬁcation includes countermeasures that generally demand substantial
modiﬁcations in the system, changes in the topology design of the network, purchase of new
hardware, software, and other related actions. Examples of deferred countermeasures are: hardened
OS, anti-virus installation, implementation of new biometric system, etc.
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2.1.2.4 Eﬃciency-based Property
The eﬃciency of a given countermeasure is measured as the level of reduction of the total risk, or
the ability to mitigate the attack. According to Norman [Nor10], the risk (R) is determined as the
product of:
 The degree of vulnerability `V' (given by the probability of a given set of vulnerabilities
existing),
 The level of threat `P' (given by the probability of a given set of attacks being able to hit
the former vulnerabilities), and
 The impact or consequence `C' (given by intrusions caused by the successful combination of
the two clauses above)
As a result, the risk is calculated as R = V × P × C, and the eﬃciency level (E) is computed
as the risk reduction percentage that results from the application of a given countermeasure. For
instance, if the risk of a given attack before countermeasure is R1 = 10 × 7 × 7 = 490 and the
resulting risk after the application of a particular countermeasure is R2 = 7 × 6 × 6 = 252, then
the eﬃciency level is E = 100− (R2×100R1 ) = 51.43% As a result, countermeasures in our taxonomy
are classiﬁed as high, medium and low level eﬃciency.
2.1.2.4.1 High-level Eﬃciency: These countermeasures are more aggressive than the rest
of the solutions since their mission is to stop the service degradation as soon as possible at the ex-
pense of possible side-eﬀects. Examples of high level eﬃciency countermeasures are: blocking user
accounts/IP addresses/Port numbers, stopping compromised processes, implementing IDS/IPS,
updating ﬁrewall rules, etc.
2.1.2.4.2 Medium-level Eﬃciency: They are generally less aggressive and therefore less
expensive than high-level impact countermeasures since their objective is to prevent the propaga-
tion of a given attack. Medim-level eﬃciency countermeasures considers not only the beneﬁt, but
also the cost of the countermeasure in mitigation a security incident. Examples of medium-level
impact countermeasures are: monitoring systems, trace back network ID and lock all associated
accounts, slow system response, etc.
2.1.2.4.3 Low-level Eﬃciency They are the least aggressive countermeasures from the list,
since their main focus is to secure the infrastructure, and observe the event(s) in order to analyse the
danger and provide statistical results to help security administrators in the appropriate reaction.
The application of low-level eﬃciency countermeasures general results into no disruption or other
side-eﬀects. Examples of low-level impact countermeasures are: camouﬂage, quarantined faux
systems, library control systems, honey-pot, historical traﬃc ﬂow analysis, etc.
Without a working classiﬁcation of security measures, identifying the possible candidates to
mitigate a given attack and estimating their costs and beneﬁts in a particular scenario becomes
unrealistic, making the countermeasure selection process a very complicated task. The design of
a countermeasure taxonomy helps in the decision process of analyzing and selecting candidate
solutions based on cost-sensitive metrics. The next section discusses some examples of usage of a
countermeasure taxonomy.
2.1.3 Countermeasure Taxonomy Usage
The proposed taxonomy is ideal to be used in the design of security ontologies. We develop an
ontological knowledge base that deﬁnes the classes and properties of Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM) systems [GMHD11,GMHD12], as depicted in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2 - Security Ontology Model
The Ontology is composed of two main classes: Information and Operations. The Information
Class models all the data related to the system and network conﬁguration, as well as security
related data (e.g. vulnerabilities, threats, events, impacts, policies). The Operation Class models
the treatments (correlation, simulation, enforcement) needed to provide security policies in order
to mitigate the impact of intrusions or attacks. Our security taxonomy can be included in the
Policy subclass that belongs to the Information Security class, making it easier the identiﬁcation
and selection of countermeasures.
Intrusion Response Systems may also beneﬁt from this taxonomy to handle malicious activities
by applying eﬀective countermeasures to protect the system. Following the 4 dimensions of our
proposed taxonomy, we provide examples of countermeasures for each category. The classiﬁcation
considers ﬁrstly the time during which a countermeasure is active (i.e. temporary, permanent).
Secondly, it proposes a classiﬁcation based on their response strategy (i.e. proactive, reactive).
Thirdly, countermeasures are classiﬁed according to the compromised service (i.e. conﬁdentiality,
integrity, availability); and they are further classiﬁed based on the reduction impact (i.e. low,
medium, high). Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarizes these examples.
2.1.4 Other Approaches
It is also important to consider other approaches in order to react against a given attack. One
approach that has slowly emerged during the past decade is the Intrusion Tolerance [VNC03,
SBC+07, DP06, SND09,KRZ+98, VNC+06]. Verissimo et. al [VNC03, VNC+06, SBC+07] deﬁne
the Intrusion Tolerance as the notion of handling (react, counteract, recover, mask) a wide set
of faults encompassing intentional and malicious faults (generally called intrusions), which may
lead to failure of the system security properties if nothing is done to counter their eﬀect on the
system state. Instead of trying to prevent every single intrusion, these are allowed, but tolerated
due to the fact that the system has the means to trigger mechanisms to prevent the intrusion from
generating a system failure.
Deswarte et al. [DP06] state that intrusion tolerance aims to organize and manage a system such
that an intrusion in one part of the system has no consequence on its overall security. To do that,
techniques developed in the traditional ﬁeld of fault tolerance (e.g. error handling -detection and
recovery-, and fault handling -diagnosis, isolation, repair, reconﬁguration-) can be used. However,
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there are two main problems: on the one hand, it should be made very diﬃcult for the same type
of attack to succeed in diﬀerent parts of the system; and on the other hand, an intrusion into a
part of the system should not allow the attacker to obtain conﬁdential data.
The intrusion tolerance approach assumes that systems remain to a certain extent vulnerable;
that attacks on components or sub-systems can happen and some will be successful; and ensures
that the overall system nevertheless remains secure and operational, with a quantiﬁable probability
[VNC03]. In other words, an AVI composite fault model should take place. The following elements
composed the AVI model:
 Vulnerability: fault in a computing or communication system that can be exploited with
malicious intention.
 Attack: malicious intentional fault attempted at a computing or communication system, with
the intent of exploiting a vulnerability in that system, which then leads to an intrusion.
 Intrusion: a malicious operational fault resulting from a successful attack on a vulnerability.
Intrusion tolerance strategies derive from a conﬂuence of classical fault tolerance and security
strategies. These strategies should consider the following [VNC03]:
 Fault Avoidance vs. Fault Tolerance
 Conﬁdential Operation
 Perfect Non-stop Operation
 Reconﬁgurable Operation
 Recoverable Operation
 Fail-Safe
Besides the several advantages associated to the intrusion tolerance model, the approach has
some limitations, for instance, strategies are conditioned by several factors, such as: type of op-
eration, classes of failures (i.e., power of intruder); cost of failure (i.e., limits to the accepted
risk); performance; cost; available technology. However, the intrusion tolerance remains an in-
teresting approach that can be combined with other approaches in the intrusion/attack detection
and reaction process. Our approach, for instance, concentrates in the domains of Reconﬁgurable
Operation and Recoverable Operation by proposing tools to improve reaction strategies.
2.1.5 Discussion
Some of the countermeasures in our taxonomy belong to all the security services (i.e. Conﬁdential-
ity, Integrity, Availability), due to the fact that the degree of granularity given in the example does
not allow to specify which type of service is aﬀected by the given countermeasure. For instance,
enabling additional ﬁrewall rules, implementing abnormal behavior rules, and cleaning a virus from
an infected ﬁle, are countermeasures that can be used to mitigate intrusions or attacks that aﬀects
all the services from the system.
It is important to note that due to the objective at which the security measure has been
designed, proactive countermeasures are typically thought of permanent solutions, whereas reactive
countermeasures are conceived as temporary solutions. This is why, in our taxonomy there are
more examples of long-term proactive countermeasures than long-term reactive countermeasures,
whereas for short-term countermeasures there are more examples on the reactive category than
what we can ﬁnd on the proactive category.
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Most of the countermeasures that fall into the temporary and reactive category (e.g., restrict
user activity, disable URL rewriting, deny/redirect requests, etc), also fall into the immediate
category, since they are meant to be implemented as soon as the security incident is detected.
Similarly, most of the countermeasures that fall into the permanent and proactive category (e.g.
vulnerability scanners, IDS/IPS, anti-virus protection, etc) also fall into the deferred category if
they are not deployed on the system at the time they are required.
Since countermeasures in our taxonomy are designed to be selected based on cost-sensitive
metrics (e.g. RORI index), there is no need to add a selection mechanism category (e.g. static,
dynamic, cost-sensitive) as proposed by Stakhanova et al. [SBW07b]. However, categories such as
ability to adjust, and cooperation ability are suitable to be used as an extension of our approach.
2.2 Cost Sensitive Models
Cost sensitive metrics are widely proposed as a viable approach to ﬁnd an optimal balance be-
tween intrusion damages and response costs, and to guarantee the choice of the most appropriate
response without sacriﬁcing the system functionalities. Measurements are either absolute or rel-
ative. Absolute measurements use precise values that scale with a given unit (e.g. hundreds,
thousands, millions, etc); whereas relative measurements are methods for deriving ratio scales
from paired comparisons represented by absolute numbers [Saa93]. Relative measurements are
useful in obtaining an overall ratio scale ranking of the alternatives. If the ratio produces re-
peatable and consistent results, the model can be used to compare security solutions based on
relative values [SAS06]. In this dissertation, we use the terms: metric, model, ratio, and index
interchangeably. The reminder of this section presents absolute metrics (e.g. Net Present Value-
NPV- [Pua09]) and relative metrics (e.g. Return On Investmenet -ROI- [Jef04]) classiﬁed into two
main groups: Financial models and Information Security models.
2.2.1 Financial Models
A Financial model is a measurement of two selected numerical values taken from a company's ﬁ-
nancial statement. The measure provides a valuable information to compare an enterprise progress
against pre-established goals, competitors, and the overall industry [BW00]. Examples of these
models include the Net Present Value (NPV), the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), and the Re-
turn On Investment (ROI). This section introduces the aforementioned models since they provide
valuable information related to our contribution.
2.2.1.1 Net Present Value (NPV)
The Net Present Value (NPV) is an absolute measure that compares costs and beneﬁts over a
period of time, making it possible to analyze long-term investments [Pua09]. The NPV allows
to discount all expected costs and beneﬁts from an investment to its present value, taking into
account the time value of money. The NPV is computed as the sum of the total present value of
beneﬁts and (operating) costs for each period of time minus the initially required (conﬁguration)
costs, as depicted in Equation 2.1.
NPV =
T∑
t=0
Bt − Ct
(1 + r)t
(2.1)
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Where:
Bt refers to all beneﬁts during period t,
Ct refers to all costs during period t,
r is the internal rate of discount,
T is the total number of periods for the project.
The resulting NPV is used in the decision making process. A project is proﬁtable, if the NPV
exceeds zero (i.e. the investment is at least as proﬁtable as an alternative investment). A positive
NPV indicates that the investment generates proﬁt and therefore should be accepted. A negative
NPV, on the contrary, means that the initial investment is greater than the present value of the
expected cash ﬂows. Investments in projects with negative NPVs should not be made, because
they do not add value to the ﬁrm and generate a loss [Jef04] .
2.2.1.2 Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is a relative measure of the anticipated performance of a project.
It considers the compounded annual rate of return the project is expected to generate [Cru08]. This
metric is related to the NPV of the project, since the NPV is the discount rate at which the NPV
of the project is zero. In other words, the IRR is the average discount rate where the cash beneﬁts
and costs exactly cancel [Jef04,Pua09]. Equation 2.2 depicts the formula to calculate the IRR.
NPV =
T∑
t=0
Bt − Ct
(1 + IRR)t
= 0 (2.2)
Where:
Bt refers to all beneﬁts during period t,
Ct refers to all costs during period t,
T is the total number of periods for the project.
IRR is the internal rate of return
As a result, an investment is accepted for projects oﬀering a rate of return greater than their
discount rate (equivalent to a positive NPV). An investment is discarded when the IRR is lower than
the project discount rate, since investing in the project will reduce the value of the organization.
The IRR is often used for long-term investments, hence this is only one factor to consider in a
technology investment decision.
2.2.1.3 Return On Investment (ROI)
The simplest and most used approach for evaluating ﬁnancial consequences of business investments,
decisions and/or actions is the Return On Investment (ROI) metric. The ROI index is a relative
measure that compares the beneﬁts versus the costs obtained for a given investment [Jef04,Sch11,
Pua09,Sch04].
ROI basically shows how much a company earns from invested money. This metric supports
decision makers to select the option(s) that have the highest return. ROI is calculated as the
present value of accumulated net beneﬁts over a certain time period minus the initial costs of
investment, then divided by the initial costs of investment, as shown in Equation 2.3.
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ROI =
Bt − Ct
Ct
× 100 (2.3)
Where:
Bt refers to all beneﬁts during period t,
Ct refers to all costs during period t
The decision rule is that the higher the ROI value, the more interesting the investment. How-
ever, Jeﬀery and Schechter [Jef04,Sch04] agree that the major problem with ROI is that the metric
does not include the time value of money, i.e. a 100% ROI realized 1 year from today is more
valuable than a 100% ROI realized in 5 years. Furthermore, the costs and beneﬁts of the project
may vary over time, meaning that the cash ﬂows are diﬀerent in each time period. As a result,
ROI is not a convenient way to compare projects when the costs and beneﬁts vary with time, and
it is also not useful for comparing projects that will run over diﬀerent periods of time.
2.2.2 Information Security Models
The economic approach for information security is closely related to the concepts of investment and
return. This latter is commonly referred to as the amount of losses that are avoided due to a security
investment; losses that were expected to occur had these investments not been applied [Khe10]. In
order to evaluate information security investments, several models have been proposed, i.e. Return
On Attack [CM05], Return On Security Investment [SAS06], Return On Response Investment
[KCBCD10]. This section details each of the aforementioned models as they are closely related to
our contribution.
2.2.2.1 Return On Attack (ROA)
The Return On Attack (ROA) is a relative measure that evaluates the gain the attacker expects
from a successful attack over the losses that he sustains due to the adoption of countermeasures by
his target [CM05]. It is important to highlight that the ROA ratio is the evaluation an organization
does about the eﬀectiveness of a countermeasure in preventing or discouraging certain class of
intrusion attempts assuming some proﬁles of potential attackers. Equation 2.4 shows this metric.
ROI =
GI
CA
× (1− EFF ) (2.4)
Where:
GI refers to the expected gain from the incident,
CA refers to the perceived cost sustained by the attacker to succeed,
EFF is the eﬃciency of the attacker to violate countermeasures
As a result, the lower the ROA value, the more interesting the security investment. By using
ROA, it is possible to select the most appropriate security investment, especially in situations
where diﬀerent technologies are combined or where the possible degradation of a security solution's
eﬃciency over time should be taken into account.
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2.2.2.2 Return On Security Investment (ROSI)
The Return On Security Investment (ROSI) is a relative metric that compares the diﬀerences
between the damages originated by attacks (with and without countermeasures) against the cost
of the countermeasure [Con04,Loc05,SAS06,BSB07,Pua09,Kos11]. To calculate ROSI, a formula
adapted from the ROI metric is presented in Equation 2.5.
ROSI =
(ALEb −ALEa)− CostCM
CostCM
× 100 (2.5)
Where:
ALEb refers to the annual loss expectancy before countermeasure,
ALEa refers to the annual loss expectancy after countermeasure,
CostCM is the cost of the countermeasure
The calculation of each parameter composing the ROSI equation has been widely discussed
by Lockstep Consulting [Con04], and Kosutic [Kos11]. The former proposes a methodology that
considers diﬀerent levels of likelihood and severity, which are then, respectively transformed into
frequency and direct cost; the latter considers on the one hand, parameters associated to the
incident (e.g. ﬁnancial losses, costs, frequency, etc.), and on the other hand, parameters associated
to the protection (e.g. cost, beneﬁts, life expectancy of the security measure, etc).
Similar to the ROI metric, the decision rule is that the higher the ROSI value, the more
interesting the investment.
ROSI variants: In the process of ﬁnding a metric that evaluates diﬀerent security investments
and provides accurate and meaningful results to be used in the selection process, the Return On
Security Investment (ROSI) has evolved to introduce other parameters in its calculation.
Kim et al. [KLI08] introduce the concept of a higher ROSI (maximizing the ROSI value) for
an eﬀective security investment by investigating the correlation between a particular threat and a
damage type. The process concentrates on ﬁnding the factors that contribute to eﬃcient control
of the security threats instead of focusing on the process of return on security investment. By
prioritizing security measures for selection, the ROSI metric is estimated more accurately, and
therefore the value of a security investment is maximized.
Mizzi [Miz05,Miz10] proposes an adaptation to ROSI called the Return On Information Security
Investment (ROISI), which introduces the concept of motivation to an attack, successfulness of an
attack, and viability of expenditure, making it possible to quantify the total cost of the portion
of information assets that may be lost due to intrusions or attacks. However, according to Locher
[Loc05], ROSI would lead to proper results, if the risk mitigation eﬀects are calculated properly with
scenario analysis and expected values. It has been matured in various models trying to consider
qualitative variables, but it is doubtful, if variables like criticality, exposure, and vulnerability, help
to improve the ROSI concept.
2.2.2.3 Return On Response Investment (RORI)
The Return On Response Investement (RORI) is a service dependency model for cost sensitive
response based on a ﬁnancial comparison of the response alternatives [KCBCD10,Khe10]. RORI
is an adaptation of the ROSI index that provides a qualitative comparison of response candi-
dates against an intrusion. The parameters that constitute this index are derived from the ROSI
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parameters by drawing an analogy between costs for intrusion prevention and response.
The RORI index considers not only response collateral damages but also response eﬀects on
intrusions, as depicted in Equation 2.6.
RORI =
[ICb −RC]−OC
CD +OC
× 100 (2.6)
Where:
ICb represents intrusion impacts when no response is enforced,
RC refers to the combined impact of intrusion and response,
OC are operational costs that cover low level investments such as response setup and deployment
costs
CD refers to collateral damages, which are costs that are added by a new response, and are not
related to intrusion costs
In contrast with the OC parameter, both ICb, RC and CD parameters are directly associated
with the intrusion and response impacts on the security objectives of the target system. The
values of these parameters, for the same intrusion and response combinations, depend on the
current service conﬁguration. They must be evaluated during system runtime, as soon as new
intrusions are detected and new candidate responses are proposed. The ultimate goal is to select
the candidate response set that provides a maximal positive RORI index.
2.2.3 Discussion
Each of the aforementioned cost-sensitive metrics provides its own beneﬁts and limitations, which
are summarized in Table 2.3. We discuss in this section the characteristics of the diﬀerent cost-
sensitive models presented in this chapter based on 5 factors: accuracy, time value of money,
payback period, collateral damage, and corner cases such as the strategy of applying no operation
(NOOP).
Accuracy: A main limitation in most of the studied metrics is accuracy. There are many as-
sumptions taken while analyzing the investment. It is therefore practically impossible that all
assumptions will be exactly correct. Results are as accurate as the forecasts of loss event fre-
quencies on which they rely, and today these forecasts use best guesses rather than quantitative
models. Estimating soft beneﬁts parameters (e.g., fewer errors, reduced processing time, improved
customer satisfaction, etc) to calculate the Net Present Value or the Internal Rate of Return of a
given project is extremely diﬃcult to accurately quantify [Jef04].
In addition, a great level of subjectivity is considered while estimating parameters such as
beneﬁts and importance of the investment in the Return On Investment (ROI) model. Furthermore,
it is very diﬃcult to be accurate in predicting the attackers's behavior, an important parameter to
calculate the Return On Attack (ROA). Similarly, the ROSI and RORI metrics rely on parameters
such as the costs and beneﬁts of a security solution. In general, the costs of countermeasures are
rather easily deﬁned, in contrast with their beneﬁts, since it requires predictions of an event that
has not yet occurred. However, this issue is of less importance when the ratio is used for relative
comparisons.
Time value of money: While the Return On Investment (ROI) presents a percentage of return
of an investment over a deﬁned period of time, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) does not inform
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about the absolute value of such investment. The Net Present Value (NPV) is the only approach
informing about the absolute value of a project. The ROA, ROI, ROSI and RORI models face
a problem in the case of long-term investments because they do not consider the time value of
money. A return of 100% of the investment realized 1 year from today is more valuable than the
same return realized in 5 years; therefore a decision maker would need the NPV as well to justify
investment opportunities.
Although NPV covers the time value of money, this latter has limited information, since it
only considers the interest or inﬂation over a given period of time. IRR has a doubtful assumption
because it assumes the same rate of return for the whole period of time. NPV has advantages within
pre-investment analysis while all variants of the ROI metric are best for the ongoing assessment of
investment proﬁtability [Loc05].
Payback period: The payback period is calculated by cumulatively summing the net cash ﬂows
of a project. When the sign of the cumulative sum of the net cash ﬂows changes from negative to
positive the project has paid back the initial investment. In making investment decisions, projects
with high IRR and short payback periods are more often selected. [Jef04]
The NPV and IRR models depend directly on the time period of the evaluation (results change
if the time period of the analysis is reduced or extended). For instance, the Internal Rate of Return
may increase signiﬁcantly if the time period of the project is extended to 5 years instead of 2 years.
The payback period for these metrics is directly aﬀected by the selected period of time of the whole
project.
Since the time value of money is not considered in metrics such as ROA, ROI, ROSI and RORI,
they are not useful for comparing projects that run over diﬀerent periods of time. Gordon and
Loeb [GL02] support the use of the IRR, since this latter incorporates discounted cash ﬂows for
investments that have diﬀerent costs and beneﬁts in diﬀerent years. However, Gordon and Loeb
state that rates of return should not be used when comparing two investments, as an investment
may have a greater net beneﬁt but lesser rate of return. If enough cash is available to invest in
either of the options, but an organization can only invest in one of them, it would be less proﬁtable
to choose the investment with the higher IRR over that with the greater NPV.
Collateral damage: None of the cost-sensitive metrics described in this section, except for the
Return On Response Investment, consider collateral damage as a parameter in their calculation.
Collateral damages depend on both response mechanism and the current state of the target system.
By modifying conﬁgurations, the response aﬀects users of the target system, and thus resulting in
collateral damages. Although they provoke mostly negative costs, response collateral damages are
unlikely to be avoided when reacting against an intrusion attempt [Khe10].
The collateral damage parameter proposed to calculate the RORI index [KCBCD10, Khe10]
is directly associated with the intrusion and response impacts on the security objectives of the
target system. However, due to diﬃculty in its calculation, collateral damage is combined with
parameters that consider intrusion impacts which are not contained by the selected response.
No operation (NOOP): A reasonable strategy when the mitigation cost is greater than the
beneﬁts it provides to the system, is to accept the risk. Acceptance is the choice of executing
no operation (-NOOP- for short) against a security incident. From the previously described cost
sensitive metrics, none of them are useful in evaluating NOOP.
All the ﬁnancial metrics deﬁned in this chapter (i.e. NPV, IRR, ROI) consider the fact that at
least one security measure is chosen to be evaluated. The Return On Attack (ROA) focuses on the
attack behavior and therefore assumes that some gain and costs are associated to the incident. The
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Return On Security Investment considers the cost of the countermeasure in both, the numerator
and denominator of the equation, leading to an indetermination in case of NOOP.
Although the RORI index proposes a parameter that represents intrusion impacts when no
response is enforced, the formula execution leads to a result of −100% in all of the cases, meaning
that regardless of the studied attack, we should expect 100% of the losses while evaluating NOOP.
As a result, it is useless to compare NOOP against all other security options since it is not possible
to ﬁnd a countermeasure with a Return On Response Investment inferior to −100%.
Table 2.3 - Summary of Cost Sensitive Models
Models Main Focus Optimal
Solution
Advantages Disadvantages
NPV Benefits,
Costs, Rate of
discount, Length
of investment
NPV > 0 Good for long-term
projects
Useful if combined with
other metrics; Unable
to evaluate collateral
damage and NOOP
IRR Benefits,
Costs, Length
of investment,
Rate of return
IRR > Project
discount rate
Incorporate discounted
cash flows for
investment that have
costs and benefits in
different years
Same rate of return for
the whole investment
period; Unable to
evaluate collateral
damage and NOOP
ROI Security
Solution Cost,
Effectiveness
Highest ROI
value
Good for ongoing
assessment of
investment
profitability
Useless for long-term
investments; Time
value of money is not
considered; Unable to
evaluate collateral
damage and NOOP
ROA Attack Gain ,
Attack Cost ,
Losses due to
Security
Lowest ROA value Evaluate the impact
of security solutions
based on the attacker's
behaviour
Not accurate while
predicting attacker's
behaviour; Useless for
long-term investments;
Unable to evaluate
collateral damage and
NOOP
ROSI Security
Investment ,
Benefits and
Cost
Highest ROSI
index
Compare the difference
between damages
of IT incidents
(with and without
countermeasures)
against the solution
cost
Unable to evaluate
collateral damage
and NOOP; Useless for
long-term investments;
Time value of money is
not considered
RORI Collateral
Damage,
Operational
Costs and
Response Costs
Highest RORI
index
Determine the
benefit obtained in
a particular threat
scenario that applies a
given countermeasure
Useless for long-term
investments; Time
value of money is not
considered
2.3 Countermeasure Selection Methodologies
Research in the selection of appropriate countermeasures to mitigate the impacts of attacks is still
in progress. Bistarelli et al. [BFP07,BFPT08] have proposed qualitative methods (e.g. defense trees
and conditional preference networks), while Duan et al. [DCH06], Cavusoglu et al. [CMR04], and
Ferenc and Salim [FS09a], suggest quantitative methods (e.g. genetic algorithm , game theory) that
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use cost sensitive metrics (explained in Section 2.2) to evaluate, rank and select countermeasures.
This section details and classiﬁes these methods into two approaches: qualitative and quantitative.
2.3.1 Qualitative Approaches
Qualitative approaches (e.g. defense trees and conditional preference networks [BFP07,BFPT08])
have been proposed to evaluate and select countermeasures based on expert knowledge, organiza-
tion's objective, and other useful criteria. The selection process does not generally rely on cost
sensitive metrics, but they can use numerical data to decide upon several candidates. In addition,
the degree of automation is generally low, meaning that in most cases, these are stactic methods
that requires the human intervention to select the countermeasure. The reminder of this section
details some of these approaches.
2.3.1.1 Defense Trees and Conditional Preference Networks
Bistarelli et al. [BFP07,BFPT08] propose an approach that uses two qualitative instruments for
the selection of defense strategies to protect an IT system from the risk of attacks. The ﬁrst
approach is the use of defense trees to model attack/defense scenarios, and the second approach is
the use of Conditional Preference Networks (CP-nets) to model qualitative conditional preference
over attacks and countermeasures.
Defense tress are an extension of attack trees that represent an attack against a system and
the way it can be mitigated by a set of countermeasures. The main diﬀerence between attack and
defense trees is that the former represents only the action that an attacker can perform, while
the latter adds the set of countermeasures that can be introduced into the system to mitigate the
possible damages produced by an attack action.
Conditional preferences networks (CP-net for short) are a graphical formalism that speciﬁes
and represents qualitative conditional preference relations. CP-nets capture preference statements
that are able to express a conditional preference over some variables. The following deﬁnition is
proposed [BFP07]:
A CP-net is a directed graph N = (V,E), where V = x1, ..., xn is a set of variables and E =
(xi, xj) : xi, xjV is a set of edges between variables. The function Pa(x) gives for each node x
 V , the node x'  V s.t. (x', x)  E. The conditional preference table of the CP-net describes a
strict partial order (D(xi),ui ) where D(xi) is the domain of the variable xi, and ui represents
the conditional preference of the instantiations of variable xi given an instantiation u of the
variable Pa(xi).
The conditional preference table is speciﬁed by the system administrator based on expert
knowledge and statistical information. As a result, it is possible to determine, in a qualitative
manner, the attack strategies that an attacker may follow to damage a system, the diﬀerent actions
that compose each attack and the countermeasures that a system administrator can implement on
the system.
2.3.1.2 Multi-objective Selection
The multi-objective countermeasure selection approach proposed by Neubauer et al. [NSW06,
NP10] is an organizational process that provides a structured and repeatable methodology that
includes the following steps:
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 Evaluation criteria according to the organization's strategy
 Assessment of the existing IT security infrastructure
 Identiﬁcation of Stakeholder preferences
 Determination of the solution space of all eﬃcient countermeasures
 Selection of the individual best countermeasure
In addition, the approach takes into account interdependencies among security countermeasures
and provides an environment for multiple users. A moderator is required to provide advance and
professional support during the workshop and the interactive selection allows decision makers to
playfully explore the alternative that matches their preferences. The workshop is divided into two
sections that are performed in a full-day meeting. The ﬁrst section consists on the assessment of
the existing countermeasure portfolios and the subsequent generation of promising solutions. The
second section pretends to iteratively reduce the number of portfolios until identifying the portfolio
that best ﬁts the stakeholder's objective.
The portfolio presents the diﬀerent countermeasures or combinations of them according to
multiple criteria (e.g. monetary value, accept cost, setup costs, setup time, etc.) As a result, the
approach serves as a valuable tool to improve security awareness of top management as they may
run through diﬀerent scenarios and potential solutions which should decrease the probability to
overlook relevant risks.
2.3.1.3 Threat Tree
Bedi et al. [BGS+11] proposes an approach that uses threat tree to select optimal countermeasures.
Threat modeling involves understanding adversaries' goals in attacking a system based on system's
assets of interest. The process consists of decomposing the application, identifying, ranking, and
mitigating threats. In order to identify threats it is necessary to go through each of the security
critical entities and creating threat hypotheses that violate conﬁdentiality, integrity, or availability
of the entity. Threat trees are then designed for each threat requiring mitigation to analyze the
threat through attack paths. The root node of a tree is the threat, each leaf node is an attack to
accomplish the threat and the path from leaf to root is the way an attacker achieves the threat, as
depicted in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3 - Bedi et al. Threat Tree
In Figure 2.3, the AND reﬁnement means that in order to occur the root threat, all the cor-
responding attack must occur, whereas, the OR reﬁnement means that in order to occur the root
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threat, at least one attack should occur.
The approach to select optimal countermeasures needs to be adopted at the design phase
of software life-cycle. The threat that needs to be mitigated is at the root node. The attacks
at leaf nodes can not be reﬁned further as they are executed by the attacker to accomplish the
threat. Countermeasures are therefore applied against the attacks at leaf nodes to prune the attack
branches from the threat tree to avoid the threat at the root level.
The solution has been designed to generate a multi-threat attack graph by combining all the
individual threats responsible for the security compromise of the system and removing duplicate
nodes in multiple threat trees. This graph gives a unique set of attacks requiring mitigation as
output. In addition, the solution prioritizes the identiﬁed attacks for mitigation on the basis of
frequency and the expected damage the threats can generate to the system. Some of the attacks
having threat_index less than the associated threshold value are ignored for mitigation, making
this approach economical for software security. As a result, the mechanisms is proven to optimally
save the system from being compromised.
2.3.2 Quantitative Approaches
Quantitative approach consists of those studies in which the data concerned is analysed in terms of
numbers. Quantitative methods (e.g. genetic algorithm [DCH06], game theory [CMR04,FS09a])
generally use one or several cost sensitive metrics (explained in Section 2.2) to perform the evalua-
tion and selection of countermeasures. They are typically dynamic, and the degree of automation
is higher than the one presented in qualitative methods. The reminder of this section explains
some of these approaches.
2.3.2.1 Game Theory
Cavusoglu et al. [CMR04] and Ferenc et al. [FS09a] have used Game Theory to evaluate and select
countermeasures for a given attack. Game theory is used to analyze problems in which the payoﬀs
to players depend on the interaction between players' strategies. The analogy in the IT security
investment environment is that ﬁrms and hackers are players. The ﬁrm's payoﬀ from security
investment depends on the extent of hacking it is subjected to. The hacker's payoﬀ from hacking
depends on the likelihood of being caught, which, in turn, depends on the level of investment the
ﬁrm makes in IT security. The ﬁrst step in using game theory to analyze such strategic interactions
among players is to develop a game tree that depicts the strategies of players.
The game starts by selecting the type of traﬃc to the system, which can be external (with
probability ε) or internal (with probability 1 − ε). A given node represents external users that
can be either authorized or unauthorized. Similarly, one node characterizes internal users that
can be either honest or dishonest. A dishonest user can take two actions: hack or not to hack.
If the hacker decides to hack, the game moves to the following node. The ﬁrm makes decisions
about whether or not to monitor based on the state (signal or no-signal). The ﬁrm must make
decisions without knowing exactly which node the game has reached. However, it can determine
the probability of intrusion in the signal and no signal states using Bayes Rule as illustrated in
Equation 2.7.
P (i, s) = P (s,i)P (i)
P (s,i)P (i)+P (s,¯i)P (¯i)
P (i, s¯) = P (s¯,i)P (i)
P (s¯,i)P (i)+P (s¯,¯i)P (¯i)
(2.7)
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Where:
P (i, s) Probability of intrusion given signal,
P (i, s¯) Probability of intrusion given no-signal,
P (i) Probability of intrusion
P (s) Probability of signal
P (s, i) Probability of signal given intrusion
P (s¯, i) Probability of no-signal given intrusion ,
P (s¯, i¯) Probability of no-signal given no-intrusion
As a result, the model can be used in a variety of ways, for instance, it can be used to select a
speciﬁc security measure. Similarly, the model is used as a what-if analysis tool to explore diﬀerent
options and evaluate the eﬀect of a given parameter in the countermeasure selection.
2.3.2.2 Genetic Algorithms
Genetic Algorithms have been shown to work in many large complex search problems with aﬀord-
able space and time requirement [DCH06]. The idea of this approach is inspired on a biological
metaphor that searching could be viewed as a competition among a population of evolving candi-
date problem solutions (represented by chromosomes). Therefore, through operations analogous to
gene transfer in sexual reproduction, solutions from one population are taken and used to form a
new population by means of operators such as crossover and mutation. A ﬁtness function evaluates
each solution to decide whether it is capable of contributing to the next generation. The underlying
hope is new population is better than the old one, thus suﬃcient evolution would ultimately lead
to an optimized solution.
The approach evaluates the performance of selected security measures through Equation 2.8
NPV = Costdev + (ALS − Costop)×
n∑
i=1
1
(1 + r)i−1
(2.8)
Where:
NPV represents the Net Present Value,
Costdev refers to development costs,
ALS is the Annual Loss Savings that results of deploying a set of countermeasures,
Costop refers to operational costs,
n is the number of periods under consideration,
r represents the discount rate
The genetic algorithm approach allows to specify an upper limit on acceptable unmitigated
ALE; and the countermeasure failure, to ﬁnd a solution that provides enough protection even
under failure conditions. As a result, the genetic algorithm is able to ﬁnd the best countermeasure
combination in all studied cases.
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2.3.2.3 Decision Matrix
Whenever several solutions are presented to mitigate a given threat or attack, a decision must be
taken to select the most convenient countermeasure, whether the organization prefers the solution
with the lowest cost or the most eﬀective one, it is not always easy to reach a consensus. Norman
[Nor10] proposes a decision matrix to help security administrators in deciding upon the most
appropriate countermeasure to implement. This tool was designed to prevent terrorism attacks
and other physical attacks, but it can be extended to other domains such as the Information
Technology. The decision matrix lays out the goals, risks, costs, and several other factors. In
addition, countermeasures are scored based on their costs, their ability to achieve goals, and to
mitigate threats, as depicted in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4 - Norman T. Decision Matrix
The matrix presented in Figure 2.4 shows the risks an organization is willing to accept if a
given countermeasure is selected. The construction of this matrix starts by listing the goals of
the countermeasures (e.g. access control, deterrence, detection, assessment, delay), numbered
from 1 to N. This is followed by listing the possible risks for the countermeasure to mitigate
(e.g. conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability), lettered from A to X. Then, we list the countermeasure
methods in rows as well as goals achieved, score, rank, accepted risks, estimated costs, eﬀectiveness
and convenience. As a result, security analysts are able to select, optimal countermeasures based
on a multi-factor evaluation matrix.
It is important to note that we can add as many goals and risks as possible to evaluate the
diﬀerent countermeasures. Scores are based on highest number of goals achieved and risks mitigated
or eliminated. The ranking column is bases on the highest score, and the columns for costs,
eﬀectiveness and convenience are estimations based on expert knowledge.
2.3.2.4 Conﬂicting Incentives Risk Analysis (CIRA)
The CIRA method models risk in terms of conﬂicting incentives between the risk owner and other
stakeholders in regards to the execution of actions [RS12, RS13]. The method uses a variety of
metrics to calculate the utility factor of the risk owner and the stakeholders (e.g. privacy, usability,
compliance, availability, wealth, etc). The whole process takes about 21 hours (in average), and is
performed as follows:
1. Identify the risk owner
2. Identify the risk owner's key utility factors
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3. Give an intuition of the scope/system-identify the kind of strategies/operations that can
potentially inﬂuence the above utility factors
4. Identify roles/functions that may have the opportunities and capabilities to perform these
operations
5. Identiﬁed the named strategy owner(s) that can take on this role
6. Identify the utility factor of interest to the strategy owner(s)
7. Determine how the utility factors can be operationalized
8. Determine how the utility factors are weighted by each of the stakeholders
9. Determine how the various operations result in changes to the utility factors for each of the
stakeholders
10. Estimate the utility of each stakeholder
11. Compute the incentives
12. Determine risk
13. Evaluate risk
As a result, the CIRA method is able to analyze risks in a non-trivial setting by helping analysts
to get a better understanding of the risks. A graph that shows acceptable and unacceptable risks
is drawn along with the channels considered as sensitive risk areas (Figure 2.5). Strategies are
executing in decreasing order of utility as perceived by each of the strategy owners.
Figure 2.5 - Rajbhandari and Snekkenes. The Incentive Graph
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In the example shown in Figure 2.5 risks `a' and `b' are acceptable, risk `c' does not provide
enough information to be assessed, and risks from `d' to `h' are unacceptable. The channel for risk
appetite is therefore drawn on quadrants 3 and 4 of the coordinate system.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented a state of the art in intrusion and threat response models and tech-
niques, which focuses on three main aspects: (i) a countermeasure taxonomy, that considers the
limitations of current response taxonomies to propose an approach based on four dimensions: the
countermeasure strategy, the service property, the response time, and the countermeasure's impact;
(ii) cost sensitive models, that separate ﬁnancial from information security models, and classiﬁes
them in absolute or relative measurements; and (iii) countermeasure selection methodologies, that
present the current research in the selection of appropriate countermeasures to mitigate the impacts
of intrusions or attacks, and classiﬁes them into two approaches: qualitative and quantitative.
Due to the multiple shortcomings, the existing methodologies to select appropriate countermea-
sures are still very limited. So far, they have been used to evaluate individual countermeasures, no
attempt has been made to evaluate multiple countermeasures simultaneously. Therefore, we will
ﬁrst propose a cost sensitive model to evaluate individual and combined countermeasures and to
select the candidate that provides the highest beneﬁt to the organization. For this purpose, we will
analyse several parameters related to the attack, the countermeasure, and the security infrastruc-
ture; and we will propose a complete methodology to estimate and evaluate them for individual
attack scenarios. We will further provide an approach to analyse and select countermeasures in a
scenario of multiple attacks, which takes into account the notion of the attack surface to study the
volume covered by each individual attack and the selected countermeasure.
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Part I
Countermeasure Selection for
Individual Attack Scenarios
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Chapter 3
Comprehensive
Individual Countermeasure Selection
Measurement is the ﬁrst step that leads
to control and eventually to improvement.
If you can't measure something, you can't
understand it. If you can't understand it,
you can't control it. If you can't control
it, you can't improve it.
H. James Harrington
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R
esearch in SIEM technologies has traditionally focused on providing a comprehensive
interpretation of threats, in particular to evaluate their importance and prioritize responses
accordingly. However, in many cases, threat responses still require humans to carry out the analysis
and make a decision e.g., understanding the threats, deﬁning the appropriate countermeasures and
deploying them. This is a slow and costly process, requiring a high level of expertise, and remaining
error-prone nonetheless. Thus, recent research in SIEM technologies has focused on the ability to
automate the process of selecting and deploying countermeasures.
Debar et al. [DTCCB07], and Riveiro et al. [RGF+10] propose automatic response mechanisms,
such as the adaptation of security policies, to overcome the limitations of static or manual response.
Although these approaches improve the reaction process (making it faster and/or more eﬃcient),
they remain limited since these solutions do not analyse the impact of the selected countermeasures.
Inappropriate selection of countermeasures result in disastrous consequences for the organization.
An impact analysis of all the security candidates is therefore essential in the decision process to
select appropriate countermeasures for a given attack.
In this chapter, we propose a novel and systematic process to select individual countermeasures
from a pool of candidates, by ranking them based on a trade-oﬀ between their eﬃciency in
stopping the attack observed by the SIEM, and their ability to preserve, at the same time, the
best service to normal users.
In order to quantitatively analyse the impact of the attack, our model considers two aspects
of security policies related to threat responses: ﬁrstly, the cumulative long term security policy
changes due to previous attacks; and secondly, the fact that security policies may need to be
automatically adapted to the current context.
Taking into account previous quantitative models [Jef04,Sch11,CM05,BSB07,SAS06,SBW07a,
KLI08, KCBCD10, Khe10], we propose a model that not only evaluates the cost and beneﬁt of
a given security solution, but also considers the impact of the attack over a given system, and
the organization infrastructure value. Our approach adjusts the metrics introduced by Kheir
et al. [KCBCD10, Khe10] to select the countermeasure that provides the highest beneﬁt to the
organization.
An overview of the approach is provided in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 presents a sensitivity
analysis performed to the RORI index; Section 3.3 describes the process for evaluating and select-
ing individual countermeasures; and Section 3.4 concludes by analysing the characteristics of the
proposed model.
3.1 Overview of the Approach
The Return On Response Investment (RORI) was ﬁrst introduced by Kheir et al. [KCBCD10,
Khe10] as an extension of the Return On Security Investment (ROSI) Index. RORI identiﬁes three
cost dimensions for intrusion response i.e. the response collateral damages (CD), the response
eﬃciency (RG = ICb − RC), and the response operational costs (OC). The RORI index formula
is depicted in Equation 3.1.
RORI =
[ICb−RC]−OC
CD +OC
(3.1)
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Where:
 ICb is the expected intrusion impact in the absence of security measures. It measures the
costs of the damages due to intrusions or attacks.
 RC is the combined impact for both intrusion and response. RC represents the sum of the
expected intrusion impacts after a response is enacted, with the cost that is added by the
selected response.
 OC is the operational cost that includes the response set-up and deployment costs such as
manpower and over provisioning.
 CD is the response collateral damage which represents the cost that is added by the security
measure.
3.1.1 Current RORI Limitations
The deployment of the Return On Response Investment (RORI) index into real world scenarios
has presented the following shortcomings:
1. The absolute value of parameters such as ICb and RC is diﬃcult to estimate, whereas a ratio
of these parameters is easier to determine, which in turn reduces errors of magnitude.
2. The RORI index is not deﬁned when no countermeasure is selected. Since the operational cost
(OC) is associated to the security measure, the RORI index will lead to an indetermination
when no solution is enacted (NOOP).
3. The RORI index is not normalized with the size and complexity of the infrastructure.
3.1.2 RORI Improvements
Equation 3.1 proposes to calculate the losses before and after countermeasures (i.e. ICb - RC),
which requires to consider the severity and likelihood of a given security incident. However, while
evaluating the diﬀerent possible combinations of countermeasures (detailed in Chapter 4), we
realized that it was neither easy nor practical to estimate the values of ICb and RC for a combined
solution. That is when the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) and Risk Mitigation parameters come
into play, making it possible to obtain the residual impact of the incident by multiplying the Annual
Loss Expectancy before countermeasure (ALE) with the risk mitigation percentage (RM).
We propose an improvement of the RORI index by taking into account not only the counter-
measure cost and its associated risk mitigation, but also the infrastructure value and the expected
losses that may occur as a consequence of an intrusion or attack. The improved RORI index
handles the choice of applying no countermeasure to compare with the results obtained by the im-
plementation of security solutions (individuals and/or combined countermeasures), and provides
a response that is relative to the size of the infrastructure. The improved Return on Response
Investment (RORI) index is calculated according to Equation 3.2.
RORI =
(ALE ×RM)−ARC
ARC +AIV
× 100 (3.2)
Where:
 ALE is the Annual Loss Expectancy and refers to the impact cost obtained in the absence
of security measures. ALE is expressed in currency per year (e.g., $/year) and will depend
directly on the attack's severity and likelihood.
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 RM refers to the Risk Mitigation level associated to a particular solution. RM takes val-
ues between zero and one hundred percent (i.e. 0% ≤ RM ≤ 100%). In the absence of
countermeasures, RM equals 0%.
 ARC is the Annual Response Cost that is incurred by implementing a new security action.
ARC = OC+CD from Equation 3.1. ARC is always greater than or equal to zero (ARC ≥ 0),
and it is expressed in currency per year (e.g., $/year).
 AIV is the Annual Infrastructure Value (e.g., Cost of equipment, Services for regular opera-
tions, etc.) that is expected from the system, regardless of the implemented countermeasures.
ARC is greater than zero (AIV > 0), and it is expressed in currency per year (e.g., $/year).
The improvements of the RORI index are summarized as follows:
 The ICb−RC parameters are substituted by ALE ×RM which can be used more easily to
evaluate response goodness of single and combined solutions, while reducing error magnitude.
 The AIV parameter also provides a response relative to the size of the infrastructure. AIV is
correlated to the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) of the system, and allows to compare the
RORI results of diﬀerent systems regardless of their size.
 The introduction of the Annual Infrastructure Value (AIV) parameter handles the case of
evaluating NOOP, which results into a value of zero, meaning that no gain is expected if no
solution is implemented.
3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
When analysing the investment in information security, we should not expect an increase in the
proﬁts, instead, we should expect a mitigation of the risk to which the organization is exposed.
RORI is a relative index that indicates the percentage of beneﬁt perceived if a given countermeasure
is implemented. Since the index produces repeatable and consistent results, the model is used to
compare security solutions based on relative values.
RORI ranges from −ARCARC+AIV (in its lower bound) to
ALE
AIV (in its upper bound). A positive
RORI means that we expect to diminish the risk up to a certain level and therefore it is beneﬁcial
to apply the security solution. For instance, a RORI of 50% means that we expect to mitigate half
of the risk to which the organization is exposed. However, when evaluating the NOOP option (no
countermeasure is evaluated to react against an attack), we should expect 0% of mitigation.
The worst scenario (the countermeasure cost is higher than the beneﬁts it provides) will have
ALE × RM << ARC, therefore RORI → −ARCARC+AIV . The best scenario (perfect mitigation) will
have RM=1, ARC=0, therefore RORI = ALEAIV . If the expected beneﬁt is equal to the countermea-
sure cost, RORI will tend to zero. However, if the expected beneﬁt is lower than the countermeasure
cost, RORI will attain a negative value. Only in these cases, where the beneﬁt is higher than the
cost of implementing a security measure, RORI will attain a positive value.
Two analyses were performed in order to evaluate the inﬂuence of each variable on the selection
of security solutions: A single-factor sensitivity analysis and a two-variable sensitivity analysis.
The following sections describe both studies.
3.2.1 Single-Factor Sensitivity Analysis
We used the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve [Fau06] to perform the single factor
sensitivity analysis. In order to identify which variables have the highest impact on the selection
of a security solution, we selected the account takeover attack from the Mobile Money Transfer
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Service use case (explained in Chapter 5) and we varied one parameter from Equation 3.2, keeping
all other variables at their base case values. Four experiments were performed:
Experiment 1: Variation of the AIV. Knowing that for an account takeover attack, ALE =
1200¿, we evaluated all the proposed countermeasures, keeping their Annual response Cost (ARC)
and Risk Mitigation (RM) values ﬁxed, while changing the Annual Infrastructure Value (AIV) from
0 to 200.000¿. Figure 3.1 depicts the results obtained for this evaluation.
Figure 3.1 - RORI index as a function of the AIV
The results show that RORI improves as the Annual Infrastructure Value (AIV) decreases. As
expected, AIV demonstrated to have a moderate inﬂuence on the variation of the RORI index.
The higher the AIV, the lower the RORI index. In some cases, the analysis showed that an AIV
inferior to 10% of the ALE may change the ranking of the evaluated countermeasure.
Experiment 2: Variation of the ALE. For the same scenario used in Experiment 1, we eval-
uated the inﬂuence of the ALE over the RORI index by changing ALE from 0 to 200000¿, while
keeping all other factors unchanged. Figure 3.2 depicts the results obtained for this evaluation.
Figure 3.2 - RORI index as a function of the ALE
Results demonstrate that the RORI index improves as the ALE increases. This is due to the
fact that in the RORI calculation, the ALE variable is multiplied by the Risk Mitigation metric
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(RM), which increases the RORI results as the ALE increases. However, ALE demonstrated to
have a low inﬂuence in the ranking and selection of the security solution. For all of the cases where
ALE changed, none of the countermeasures changed their original position on the ranking.
Experiment 3: Variation of the RM. For the same scenario used in Experiments 1 and 2, we
evaluated the inﬂuence of the Risk Mitigation (RM) factor over the RORI index by changing RM
from 0 to 100%, while keeping all other factors unchanged. Figure 3.3 shows the results obtained
for this evaluation.
Figure 3.3 - RORI index as a function of the RM
The analysis in terms of the Risk Mitigation (RM) variable shows that RM has a linear inﬂu-
ence on the selection of the security solution. For all studied attacks, the higher the RM value,
the higher the RORI index. It is important to highlight that for a RM inferior to 5%, the RORI
index decreases to take values below zero. Moreover, RM below 5% changes the ranking of the
countermeasures, which in some cases places in the last position a countermeasure that was ranked
ﬁrst originally. As a result, the RORI index is very sensitive to the changes of the RM variable.
Experiment 4: Variation of the ARC. For the same scenario used in Experiments 1, 2, and
3, we evaluated the inﬂuence of the Annual Response Cost (ARC) factor over the RORI index by
changing ARC from 0 to 20.000¿, while keeping all other factors unchanged. Figure 3.4 shows the
results obtained for this evaluation.
Figure 3.4 - RORI index as a function of the ARC
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The results demonstrate that the Annual Response Cost (ARC) parameter has a very high
inﬂuence on the selection of a security solution. The RORI index decreases as the ARC increases.
In addition, for those cases where the ARC is too high compared to the beneﬁt it provides, the
RORI index decreases to take values below zero; making the solution ﬁnancially less interesting to
be implemented. In such cases, the NOOP alternative appears as a better option.
3.2.2 Two-Variable Sensitivity Analysis
In order to evaluate the eﬀects on the RORI results, we conducted 6 experiments where two
variables were changed while the others kept their base case values. Table 3.1 describes the char-
acteristics of each experiment. A summary of the results obtained for each experiment is presented
in Table 3.2.
Table 3.1 - Characteristics of the Two-Variable Sensitivity Analysis
N Experiment Characteristics Objective
1 ALE vs AIV For a given countermeasure, the values
of RM and ARC are constant while ALE and
AIV vary from 0 to 100.000¿
Evaluate the influence of ALE
and AIV in the selection of
countermeasures
2 ALE vs RM For a given countermeasure ARC remains
constant and AIV=2600¿while ALE varies
from 0 to 100.000¿and RM varies from 0
to 100%
Analyse the effects of ALE and RM
over the RORI index
3 ALE vs ARC For a given countermeasure RM remains
constant and AIV=2600¿while ALE and ARC
vary from 0 to 100.000¿
Evaluate the influence of ALE
and ARC in the selection of
countermeasures
4 RM vs ARC A countermeasure is randomly selected,
ALE=1200¿, AIV=2600¿, RM varies from
0 to 100% and ARC varies from 0 to
100.000¿
Analyse the sensibility of the
RORI index over a variation of
the RM and ARC parameters
5 RM vs AIV For a given countermeasure, ARC remains
constant and ALE=1200¿, RM varies from
0 to 100% and AIV varies from 0 to
100.000¿
Evaluate the influence of RM
and AIV in the selection of
countermeasures
6 AIV vs ARC For a given countermeasure, RM remains
constant and ALE=1200¿while AIV and ARC
vary from 0 to 100.000¿
Evaluate the impact of AIV and
ARC over the RORI index
The main conclusions reached for this analysis are described as follows:
 If ARC is orders of magnitude below AIV (ARC  AIV ), then the impact of ARC on the
RORI is very weak. In this case, ARC + AIV ∼= AIV , therefore RORI ∼= (ALE×RMAIV ).
However, if ARC is orders of magnitude above AIV (ARC  AIV ), then the impact of
ARC on the RORI index is very strong. In this case, ARC + AIV ∼= ARC, therefore
RORI ∼= (ALE×RM)−ARCARC .
 If ALE is orders of magnitude below AIV (ALE  AIV ), then ALE negatively impacts the
RORI index, since ALE×RM ∼= 0, therefore RORI ∼= −ARCARC+AIV . However, if ALE is orders
of magnitude above AIV (ALE  AIV ), then the RORI index is positively impacted. In
this case, AIV ∼= 0, therefore RORI ∼= (ALE×RM)−ARCARC .
 If ALE is orders of magnitude below ARC (ALE  ARC), then ALE negatively impacts
the RORI index, since ALE ∼= 0, therefore RORI ∼= −ARCARC+AIV . However, if ALE is orders
of magnitude above ARC (ALE  ARC), then the RORI index is positively impacted. In
this case, ARC ∼= 0, therefore RORI ∼= ALE×RMAIV .
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 If RM increases compared to the AIV, ALE and ARC values, the RORI index will depend
on the magnitude of the ALE metric compared to ARC and AIV. In this case, ALE ×
RM ∼= ALE, therefore RORI ∼= ALE−ARCARC+AIV , making the solution more attractive as the ALE
increases.
Table 3.2 - Two-Variable Sensitivity Analysis Results
Variable Results
Parameters
ALE vs AIV The impact of the ALE parameter over RORI increases as the AIV decreases.
The higher the AIV, the less attractive the solution. As a result, a benefit
(ALE × RM) that is far greater than the infrastructure value (AIV) is
always preferable.
ALE vs RM The impact of ALE over RORI increases as the RM increases. The higher
the ALE and RM values, the more attractive the solution. Thus, the ideal
solution should provide the highest benefit to the system.
ALE vs ARC The impact of ALE over RORI increases as the ARC decreases. The lower
the annual response cost, the higher the RORI results. Consequently, a
countermeasure that is far less expensive than the benefits it provides is
preferable.
RM vs ARC The impact of ARC over the RORI index decreases as the RM increases. A
countermeasure that costs more than the benefits it provides should be
discarded. Thus, the ideal solution should have the highest risk mitigation
value and the lower response cost.
RM vs AIV The impact of the AIV over RORI decreases as the RM increases. The
higher the RM and the lower the AIV, the more attractive the solution.
Consequently, the ideal solution should have the highest risk mitigation
and the lowest infrastructure value.
AIV vs ARC The impact of ARC over RORI increases according to its relative significance
compared to the AIV parameter. As a result, an alternative that is far less
expensive than the infrastructure value is preferable.
3.3 Countermeasure Selection Process
The process for selecting optimal countermeasures is performed in two steps: The RORI Calculation
and The Countermeasure Evaluation. The following sections detail each step of the process.
3.3.1 RORI Calculation
The Return On Response Investment metric proposed in Section 3.1.2 is used as a quantitative
approach to evaluate and rank a set of countermeasures, which allows to select the one that best
mitigates the eﬀects of a given attack. The input parameters for the RORI calculation are of two
types: ﬁxed parameters, which depend on the system (AIV), and the intrusion or attack (ALE);
and variable parameters, which depend on the countermeasure (RM, ARC).
The calculation of the parameters presented in Equation 3.2 follows the approaches proposed
by Kosutic [Kos11] and Lockstep Consulting [Con04] for the ROSI model, as well as the approach
proposed by Kheir et al. [Khe10] for the RORI model. The rest of this section details each
parameter.
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3.3.1.1 Fixed Parameters:
3.3.1.1.1 Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) ALE refers to the Impact Cost that is produced
in the absence of countermeasures. ALE is expressed in currency per year (e.g. $/year) and
includes loss of assets (La), Loss of data (Ld), Loss of reputation (Lr), Legal procedures (Lp), Loss
of revenues from clients or customers (Lrc), other losses (Ol), Contracted insurance (Ci), and the
annual rate of occurrence (ARO), as depicted in Equation 3.3.
ALE = (La+ Ld+ Lr + Lp+ Lrc+Ol − Ci)×ARO (3.3)
Where:
 Loss of assets (La), expressed in currency (e.g. $), refers to the value of the physical assets that
would be aﬀected by an intrusion or attack (e.g. hardware, furniture, physical infrastructure,
and other assets).
 Loss of data (Ld), expressed in currency (e.g. $), refers to the value of the non-physical
assets that would suﬀer a damage or modiﬁcation as a consequence of an intrusion or attack
(software, databases, electronic documents, and other kind of information loss).
 Loss of reputation (Lr), expressed in currency (e.g. $), refers to the loss of image or credibility
as a consequence of not providing the products or services at the expected levels.
 Legal procedures (Lp), expressed in currency (e.g. $), refers to the losses due to legal penalties
that may arise as a consequence of not accomplishing the contracted obligations with clients.
 Loss of revenues from existing clients (Lrec), expressed in currency (e.g. $), are the losses
occurred during the incident as a consequence of not providing the products or services to
the clients at the expected levels.
 Loss of revenue from potential clients (Lrpc), expressed in currency (e.g. $), refers to the
losses of not acquiring new clients as a consequence of the occurred incident.
 Other losses (Ol), expressed in currency (e.g. $), considers all other losses that may occur
during the incident (e.g. recovering time, external services, etc.)
 Contracted insurance (Ci), expressed in currency (e.g. $), if the organization has an insurance
that covers part of the losses, this value is subtracted from the total amount of losses.
 Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO), expressed in times per year, refers to the estimated
frequency of the attack.
3.3.1.1.2 Annual Infrastructure Value (AIV) AIV corresponds to the ﬁxed costs that
are expected on the system regardless of the implemented countermeasure. AIV is greater than
zero (AIV > 0), and it is expressed in currency per year (e.g. $/year). AIV includes the following
costs: Equipment Costs (Ec), Personnel costs (Pc), Service costs (Sc), Other costs (Oc), and Resell
Value (Rv), as shown in Equation 3.4. This is a one time investment and remains constant on the
evaluation of all the diﬀerent countermeasures.
AIV = Ec+ Pc+ Sc+Oc−Rv (3.4)
Where:
 Equipment cost (Ec), expressed in currency per year (e.g. $/year), refers to the annual cost
of security equipments, products or materials (e.g. purchasing, renting, leasing, licensing,
etc) required for the regular operations of the infrastructure.
 Personnel cost (Pc), expressed in currency per year (e.g. $/year), includes the cost of employ-
ees required for the regular operations of the infrastructure (e.g. salaries, bonuses, overtime
payment, etc).
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 Service cost (Sc), expressed in currency per year (e.g. $/year), includes the costs of regu-
lar services (e.g. electricity, infrastructure costs, contracted insurance, etc), related to the
business unit for its regular operations.
 Other costs (Oc), expressed in currency per year, (e.g. $/year), refers to all other costs
required for the regular operation of the system's infrastructure.
 Resell costs (Rv), expressed in currency per year (e.g. $/year), refers to the value of the
security equipments after their usage.
3.3.1.2 Variable Parameters:
3.3.1.2.1 Risk Mitigation (RM) RM refers to the risk mitigation associated with a given
countermeasure. RM is calculated as the countermeasure Surface Coverage (SC) times its Eﬀec-
tiveness Factor (EF), as depicted in Equation 3.5. RM takes values between zero and one hundred
percent (0% ≤ RM ≤ 100%). In the absence of countermeasures, RM equals 0%. The calculation
of a combined RM is detailed in Chapter 4.
RM = SC × EF (3.5)
Where:
 Surface Coverage (SC), is the percentage of the attack surface that is covered and controlled
by a given countermeasure.
 Eﬀectiveness Factor (EF), considers the percentage of reduction of the total incident cost
that is given from the enforcement of a security measure.
3.3.1.2.2 Annual Response Cost (ARC) ARC refers to the costs associated to a given
countermeasure. ARC is always greater than or equal to zero (ARC ≥ 0), and it is expressed
in currency per year (e.g., $/year). It includes direct costs: e.g., Cost of implementation (CoI),
Cost of maintenance (CoM), Other direct costs (Odc); and indirect costs (e.g., consequences that
may originate the adoption of a particular countermeasure to a legitimate user), as shown in
Equation 3.6.
ARC = CoI + CoM +Odc+ Ic (3.6)
Where:
 Cost of implementation (Ci), expressed in currency per year (e.g. $/year), refers the cost
of deployment, installation and/or implementation of security measures to mitigate a given
attack.
 Cost of maintenance (Cm), expressed in currency per year (e.g. $/year), includes the cost
of regular services (e.g. electricity, consulting, analysis, testing, etc.) that are needed for
normal operations of the implemented countermeasures.
 Other direct costs (Odc), expressed in currency per year (e.g. $/year), refers to all other
direct costs (e.g. suppliers and partners) that are needed to put in place countermeasures.
 Indirect costs (Ic), expressed in currency per year (e.g. $/year), include all other costs, such
as consequences that may originate the adoption of a particular countermeasure to legitimate
users.
ALE and AIV parameters are deﬁned statically and depend on the system, as well as the
intrusion or attack detected. RM and ARC parameters depend on the proposed security measures.
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Their calculation requires the system to determine the countermeasure surface coverage, which
includes the probability of the union of events.
3.3.2 Quantiﬁcation of the RORI parameters
The quantiﬁcation of the parameters composing the RORI model proposed in Equation 3.2 is a
task that requires expert knowledge, statistical data, simulation and risk assessment tools. Our
experience in quantifying impact losses, as well as countermeasure costs and beneﬁts for diﬀerent
security systems demonstrate that within 3 to 4 hours of discussions with use case providers and
simple simulation runs, we are able to estimate each parameter composing the RORI model. In
addition, the quantiﬁcation of the RORI parameters only requires accuracy in their relative values
(not in their absolute values). If all the parameters are estimated by a standard methodology, the
RORI evaluation should produce repeatable and consistent results. The remaining of this section
proposes a simple and well structure methodology to help security analysts in the estimation of
such parameters.
3.3.2.1 Quantiﬁcation of the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE)
For the estimation of the ALE, we adopted the approach proposed by Lockstep [Con04] to use the
scale values of severity, which convert qualitative estimations into quantitative values of costs. For
instance, a `minor' loss of asset (La) represents a cost of $1,000; whereas a `serious' loss of asset
(La) represents a cost of $1,000,000. The estimation of all other losses (i.e. Ld, Lr, Lp, Lrec, Lrpc,
Ol) follows the same approach.
The likelihood of an incident is transformed into a frequency value, which results into the Annual
Rate of Occurrence (ARO) parameter. For instance, a `low likelihood' means that the incident is
likely to occur once every year, and represents therefore, a value of ARO = 1.0; whereas, a `high
likelihood' means that the incident is likely to occur once per month or less, and represents a value
of ARO = 12.0.
Both parameters (i.e. severity and likelihood) are estimated using a survey and scoring system,
which combine expert knowledge and statistical data to quantify risk exposure. In order to handle
uncertainty, we use the Monte Carlo simulation approach as proposed by ROI and ROSI imple-
menters [?,?,Con04,SAS06]. The approach represents the solution of the problem as a parameter
of a hypothetical population, and uses a random sequence of numbers to construct a sample of the
population, from which statistical estimates of the parameter are obtained [Hal].
To run our simulation, we chose triangular distributions [EHP00] to evaluate the most likely
values assigned to each level of security and likelihood, with minimum and maximum possible
values of each level (Tables 3.3 and 3.4). This type of statistical computations can be easily
achieved using basic statistical software or spreadsheet editors (e.g. Quadrant1, XLSim2).
After 250 iterations, we are able to obtain a value of the losses and frequency that compose the
ALE parameter, which represents the expected annual loss as a consequence of the realization of
a given threat.
1Quadrant: The Quick and dirty risk analysis tool, available at: www.qdrnt.com/home.htm
2Monte Carlo simulation for excel featuring distribution strings, available at: http://xlsim.com/xlsim/index.html
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Table 3.3 - Severity transformed to probabilistic Costs
Severity Min
Cost($)
Most
Likely
Cost ($)
Max Cost
($)
Insignificant 0 0 0
Minor 0 1,000 2,000
Significant 5,000 10,000 20,000
Damaging 50,000 100,000 200,000
Serious 500,000 1,000,000 2,000,000
Grave 5,000,000 10,000,000 20,000,000
Table 3.4 - Likelihood transformed to Probabilistic ARO
Likelihood Min
ARO
Most Likely
ARO
Max
ARO
Negligible 0.0 0.10 0.05
Very Low 0.1 0.8 0.5
Low 0.8 1.5 1.0
Medium 1.5 2.5 2.0
High 2.5 20.0 12.0
Very High 20.0 120.0 50.0
Extreme 120.0 1,000.0 500.0
3.3.2.2 Quantiﬁcation of the Annual Infrastructure Value (AIV)
This parameter is calculated as the sum of the annual value of all the equipments - i.e. Policy
Enforcement Points (PEP) - that are needed to be deployed in the preliminary phase of the
system architecture in order to guarantee a desired level of security. The AIV includes the cost of
purchasing, licensing, and/or leasing the security equipments in a given organization.
It is important, however, to answer the following questions while estimating the AIV parameter:
 What kind of PEPs and which quantity is required for the system security (e.g. Firewalls,
IPS, IDS, SIEM, etc.)?
 What is the lifetime expectancy of the PEP?
 What is the annual cost of purchase, licensing or leasing of the PEP?
 How many employee-hours are required for the operation of the PEP?
 How many hours/year is the PEP expected to be active?
 Is there an insurance contracted for the PEP? If so, how much does it cost per year?
 How many times per year does the PEP need to be checked or maintained?
 Is there any other cost associated with the operation of the PEP in the security infrastructure?
 What is the resell value of the PEP?
If for instance, a PEP that is purchased at $10,000 and has an estimated lifetime of 5 years,
will have an Equipment cost (Ec = 2,000$/year). The same PEP that requires 36 employee-hours
a year to operate appropriately, and knowing that the cost of each employee-hour is equivalent to
$10, will have a Personnel cost (Pc = 360$/year). Similarly, the same PEP that needs an insurance
of $250 per year and which is active 24/7 consuming in average $250 per year on operational costs,
will have a Service cost (Sc = 500$/year). In addition, the PEP needs to be maintained twice per
year at a cost of $200, will have Other costs (Oc = 400$/year). And ﬁnally, the PEP resell value
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is estimated to be (Rv = $500/5 years = 100$/year). As a result, the annual cost of the selected
PEP is equivalent to 3,160$/year. If the security infrastructure is composed of several PEPs, the
same procedure is applied to estimate the cost of each PEP. The resulting Annual Infrastructure
Value (AIV) represents the sum of all the PEP's costs.
3.3.2.3 Quantiﬁcation of the Risk Mitigation (RM)
In order to calculate the risk mitigation of a given countermeasure we need to ﬁrst measure the
portion of the attack the countermeasure covers and then, the level of eﬀectiveness of such solution
in mitigating the attack.
The countermeasure surface coverage is a value inherent to the type of attack and the system
that it aﬀects, making it possible to obtain diﬀerent surface coverage values for the same counter-
measure applied in diﬀerent attack scenarios. For instance, blocking a suspected user might cover
85% of the attack surface, while increasing the surveillance to punctually block operations covers
only 60% of the attack surface. To obtain these ﬁgures, it is necessary to perform a risk assessment
following any of the international standards (e.g. NIST [oST70], ISO [Org08]), or any of the risk
management methodologies (e.g. MEHARI [Clu10], EBIOS [ANS10], CRAMM [Ent05]), which
allows the identiﬁcation of assets, threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, controls, and consequences.
Organizations such as Microsoft [Mic12] have released tools to assist security administrators in
the identiﬁcation and analysis of the attack surface. The percentage of assets and threats that are
controlled by a given countermeasure represents the surface coverage.
In order to quantify the Eﬀectiveness Factor (EF), we follow the Norman's methodology [Nor10],
which deﬁnes the risk of an attack (R) as the product of its vulnerability (V), likelihood or prob-
ability (P), and severity or consequence (C), (i.e., R = V × P × C). A risk can be mitigated by
decreasing the vulnerability, probability, and/or consequence. Each factor is estimated in a range
from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the least likely value, and 10 represents the most likely value for
a given parameter. Therefore, the Eﬀectiveness Factor (EF) is calculated as the risk reduction
percentage that results from the application of a given countermeasure. For instance, if the risk of
a given attack before countermeasure is R1 = 10×7×7 = 490 and the resulting risk after the appli-
cation of a particular countermeasure is R2 = 7×6×6 = 252, then EF = 100−(R2×100R1 ) = 51.43%
3.3.2.4 Quantiﬁcation of the Annual Response Cost (ARC)
Starting from the point that the cost of a countermeasure is not just its purchase price, we identify
direct and indirect costs to be considered while estimating the Annual Response Cost (ARC)
parameter. Based on educated expert knowledge and statistical data it is possible to determine
each element composing the ARC.
In contrast to the AIV parameter, the ARC is a variable cost associated with the implementation
of a given countermeasure. For instance, let us suppose that the user authentication information
of a Web service is stored in a database. Whenever users want to access the system, they need
to provide their corresponding login and password. However, for suspected users, the organization
wants to implement a countermeasure that asks for a two-factor authentication (e.g. a challenge
question, a security pin, etc.). The implementation of this countermeasure requires the organization
to expend additional employee-hours which in turn represents a given cost. This latter is deﬁned
as the cost of implementation (Ci).
In addition, the countermeasure is going to be active only for suspected users for a given period
of time, which means that the system will turn the countermeasure from `on' to `oﬀ' according to the
security tests and analysis performed. These tests and analysis represent the cost of maintenance
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(Cm) to the organization.
The activation/deactivation of a given countermeasure engenders other direct and indirect costs.
For instance, requesting an additional authentication method to legitimate users may cause these
users to unsubscribe from the service and search for another one. This collateral damage represents
an indirect cost (Ic) to the organization. Collateral damages can be quantiﬁed as the variation
between the current and the projected productivity that an organization experiences due to a side
eﬀect of a given solution [SAS06].
3.3.3 Countermeasure Evaluation
We initialize the process of countermeasure evaluation with a default RORI value equal to zero
(RM and ARC parameters equal 0, since no countermeasure is implemented). The countermeasure
evaluation process starts by selecting the ﬁrst countermeasure on the list and calculating its RORI
index (Step 1). The obtained RORI is compared with the one by default (Step 2), as depicted in
Figure 3.5.
If the resulting RORI is diﬀerent to the one by default (Step 3), the system checks if the current
RORI is greater to the default value, in such a case, the countermeasure becomes the selected one,
and it overrides the default RORI value (Step 3a). However, if the resulting RORI value is lower
than the one by default, the system checks for another countermeasure to evaluate and the default
RORI remains unchanged (Step 3b).
If the resulting RORI is equal to the default value (Step 4), the system checks for the annual
response cost (ARC) and selects the one with the lowest cost value (Step 4a) since it is always
preferred to implement a security solution that costs the least and provides the highest beneﬁt. In
case the ARC of the evaluated solution is higher than the ARC of the default countermeasure, the
system checks for another countermeasure to evaluate and the default RORI remains unchanged
(Step 4b). It may happen that, when comparing the costs of two countermeasures, they are exactly
the same. In such a case, the system keeps the current RORI value as the default one and checks
for another solution to evaluate.
The process is repeated to evaluate the second countermeasure on the list, then the third, and
so on, until no countermeasure is left (Step 5a). The system selects the last countermeasure taken
as default, since it is the one that provides the highest RORI index (Step 5b).
3.3.4 Remaining Limitations of the RORI-based Countermeasure Selec-
tion
The evaluation and selection of countermeasures depends on the appropriate estimation of the
infrastructure value, attack impact and the deﬁnition of the security policies needed to mitigate
the attack. Such deﬁnition should include the costs and beneﬁts associated to a particular security
policy in a given attack scenario.
The main limitation of the RORI-based model is the accuracy in the estimation of the diﬀerent
parameters that compose the formula. Estimating the Annual Loss Expectancy of an attack to
occur on a given system and the Risk Mitigation level of a particular countermeasure is diﬃcult and
requires a considerable eﬀort. An objective estimation of these two factors is rather infeasible, since
it requires predictions of an event that has not yet occurred. However, a qualitative estimation of
RM and ALE remains possible, making the RORI evaluation an interesting tool to help security
analysts in the decision making process.
In addition, the RORI model presented in this chapter does not consider interdependence among
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Figure 3.5 - Countermeasure Evaluation Flowchart
countermeasures (i.e., how the application of a countermeasure aﬀects the eﬀectiveness of others),
nor it discusses the restrictions and/or conﬂicts that may originate with the implementation of the
selected countermeasure (e.g., partially or totally restrictive countermeasures).
Finally, the model limits the action to only one countermeasure over a given attack, and does
not discuss neither the eﬀects that one or multiple countermeasures may have on several risks, nor
the eﬀects of applying multiple countermeasures at a time.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we introduced a quantitative approach to select optimal security countermeasures
based on the Return On Response Investment (RORI) index, making it possible to evaluate re-
sponse collateral damages and response eﬀects on intrusions.
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Our solution is split into two steps: the calculation of the Return on Response Investment
(RORI) index, which evaluates the expected losses that result for a particular attack versus the
beneﬁts that can be obtained if a countermeasure is implemented; and the process of selection and
ranking of individual countermeasures. Within the process, the countermeasure with the highest
RORI index is selected as the one that provides the highest beneﬁt to the organization. The RORI
index takes into account not only the cost and the risk mitigation value associated to a particular
solution, but also the losses and operational cost of the infrastructure.
As a result, we are able to evaluate, rank and select the countermeasure that provides the
highest beneﬁt to the organization (the highest RORI index). The next chapter addresses some
limitations from Section 3.3.4 by studying the eﬀect of combining two or more security solutions
for a single attack scenario, and proposes a methodology to evaluate and select optimal group of
countermeasures.
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Chapter 4
Combined
Countermeasure Selection
So their combinations with themselves
and with each other give rise to endless
complexities, which anyone who is to give
a likely account of reality must survey.
PLATO, The Timaeus
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C
ountermeasures have been deﬁned in Chapter 1 as security actions required to oppose an
attack by eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering
and reporting it so that corrective actions can be taken [Kis11]. A combined countermeasure results
from the implementation of two or more security measures applied simultaneously to mitigate a
given attack. A combined countermeasure is therefore analysed as a single security measure with a
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combined cost and a combined eﬀectiveness. Determining the combined cost and eﬀectiveness for
multiple countermeasures requires a considerable eﬀort in the estimation of the surface coverage
for each security candidate and their overlapped area.
Most solutions suggest the deployment of multiple countermeasures as a single treatment to
mitigate the eﬀects of modern attacks [NLSO11, HDGKJ06, HTRM10, DCH06]. However, the
methodology to evaluate and select combined countermeasures is either hardly explained or very
complicated to implement.
This chapter therefore proposes a simple and well-structured model to select the optimal com-
bination of countermeasures based on the Return on Response Investment (RORI) index. This
latter compares the expected impact of the attacks when no action is enacted (NOOP), against the
expected impact after applying countermeasures. Our solution is built upon the process deﬁned in
Chapter 3, and performs a systematic analysis of all possible combinations of countermeasures to
select the one that returns the highest RORI value.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 brieﬂy presents the limitations
of current approaches regarding combined countermeasures. Section 4.2 introduces the notion of
probability, and the diﬀerent combination approaches to be used in the proposed model. Section
4.3 presents the combinatorial axioms, and the methodology to calculate the surface coverage of
multiple countermeasures. The process for selecting optimal combination of countermeasures is
explained in Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes regarding the combination approach.
4.1 Limitations of Current Solutions
None of the existing cost-sensitive models has been designed to evaluate the implementation of
combined countermeasures against a given attack. Although the literature in the domain suggests
that the implementation of multiple countermeasures provides more interesting results in the miti-
gation of attacks, most metrics only consider the evaluation of a single countermeasure for a single
attack scenario.
For instance, the RORI index proposed by Kheir et al. [KCBCD10] presents limitations in
the estimation of some parameters of the formula. Estimating the impact after countermeasure
is a diﬃcult task that may result in inaccurate values and requires in most of the cases expert
knowledge and/or statistical data. In Chapter 3 we propose an improvement of the model by
substituting the aforementioned parameter for the risk mitigation (RM) value associated to each
security solution. This improves accuracy on the RORI calculation and provides a model that does
not need to be fed by historical or statistical data and that can be used to evaluate single and
combined countermeasures.
Nakatsu et al. [NLSO11] and Harwood et al. [HTRM10] already propose an approach to combine
multiple countermeasures, but it is neither practical nor easy to perform due to the complexity
in calculating the diﬀerent parameters. In addition, the selection of countermeasures is performed
manually. In comparison, our approach is relatively simple and does not require the intervention
of a security analyst to evaluate and rank all possible security measures.
4.2 Combinatorial Parameters
Implementing multiple countermeasures simultaneously requires the calculation of their union and
intersection area. Since the surface coverage of multiple countermeasures generally overlap, the
use of several parameters (i.e. probability of events, combinatorial models and approaches), is
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important to estimate the exact mitigation value of a combined solution. This section details each
parameter and provides the means to calculate this mitigation value.
4.2.1 Event Probability
The probability of an event is a numerical value (between 0 and 1) that describes the likelihood or
relative frequency of the event to occur [GS97,RH98] . In the occurrence of multiple events, two
cases are distinguished: mutually exclusive and non-mutually exclusive events.
4.2.1.1 Mutually Exclusive Events
For mutually exclusive events (no outcomes in common), the probability that at least one of the
events occurs is equal to the sum of their individual probabilities [Olo05,Wan04], as shown in
Equation 4.1
n⋃
i=1
P (Ei) =
n∑
i=1
P (Ei) (4.1)
In a more explicit way, we have in Equation 4.2 the probability of the union of n" mutually
exclusive events.
P (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ ... ∪ En) = P (E1) + P (E2) + ...+ P (En) (4.2)
However, the probability that all the mutually exclusive events occur at the same time is equal
to zero, since the the occurrence of any one of them automatically implies the non-occurrence of
the remaining n-1 events. Equation 4.3 shows this relation.
P (E1 ∩ E2 ∩ ... ∩ En) = 0 (4.3)
4.2.1.2 Non-Mutually Exclusive Events
For non-mutually exclusive events, the probability that at least one event occurs is expressed as
the inequality depicted in Equation 4.4.
n⋃
i=1
P (Ei) ≤
n∑
i=1
P (Ei) (4.4)
In a more explicit way, we have in Equation 4.5 the probability of the union of n" non-mutually
exclusive events.
P (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ ... ∪ En) ≤ P (E1) + P (E2) + ...+ P (En)−
∑
1≤i<j≤n P (Ei ∩ Ej) +∑
1≤i<j<k≤n P (Ei ∩ Ej ∩ Ek) + ...+ (−1)n+1
∏n
i=1 P (Ei) (4.5)
However, the probability that all non-mutually exclusive events occur at the same time is equal
to the product of their individual probabilities [Olo05,Wan04], as shown in Equation 4.6
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n⋂
i=1
P (Ei) =
n∏
i=1
P (Ei) (4.6)
In a more explicit way, we have in Equation 4.7 the probability of the intersection of n"
mutually exclusive events.
P (E1 ∩ E2 ∩ ... ∩ En) = P (E1)× P (E2)× ...× P (En) (4.7)
4.2.2 Combination Approaches
To determine the maximal number of combined solutions that can result from a set of individual
countermeasures, we deﬁne a set of elements where the order is not important and repetitions are
not allowed. This section describes the two approaches (e.g., restrictive and non-restrictive), that
are considered in the combination of security countermeasures based on the aforementioned set of
elements.
4.2.2.1 Non-restrictive Combination Approach
Non-restrictive countermeasures are those that can be perfectly combined (e.g., no restrictions
exist in their combination). The maximum number of combined countermeasures is calculated as
the sum of the nth row (counting from zero) of the binomial coeﬃcients [Gri85,Ros94], as expressed
in Equation 4.8, where 'n' is the total number of elements to be combined and 'k' is the set of
combined elements (from zero to 'n').
∑
0≤k≤n
(
n
k
)
= 2n − 1 (4.8)
For instance, for a group of 4 countermeasures, the maximum number of combined solutions is(
4
k
)
= 24 − 1 = 15, as shown in Table 4.1.
4.2.2.2 Restrictive Combination Approach
Three cases may appear when one or more countermeasures are restrictive and cannot be combined
with other countermeasures.
4.2.2.2.1 Mutually Exclusive Countermeasures In probability, two events are mutually
exclusive if they cannot occur simultaneously (i.e., they have no outcomes in common) [RH98,
Olo05]. Considering the case of having four countermeasures (C1, C2, C3, C4), and knowing
that C1 and C3 are mutually exclusive (they cannot be combined), the total number of possible
combinations is given in Equation 4.9 [And,ML].
∑
0≤k≤n
(
n
k
)
=
[
(k + 1)(2n−k)
]− 1 for k ≥ 2 (4.9)
Where 'n' is the total number of elements to be combined and 'k' the number of mutually exclu-
sive countermeasures. In this case, we will have n=4 and k=2, therefore
(
4
2
)
=
[
(2 + 1)(24−2)
]−1 =
11 possible combinations, as shown in Table 4.1.
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4.2.2.2.2 Partially Restrictive Countermeasures One countermeasure can be implemented
along with some other countermeasures but not with all of them. For instance, let us assume that
from the set of 4 countermeasures (C1, C2, C3, C4), C1 can only be combined with C4 (the com-
binations of C1 with C2 and C1 with C3 creates a conﬂict on the system). The total number of
possible combinations is given in Equation 4.10 [FS09b].
∑
0≤k≤n
(
n
k
)
=
[
(2k−1 + 1)(2n−k)
]− 1 for k ≥ 2 (4.10)
Where 'n' is the total number of elements to be combined and 'k' the number of partially restric-
tive countermeasures. In this case, we will have n=4 and k=3, therefore
(
4
3
)
=
[
(23−1 + 1)(24−3)
]−
1 = 9 possible combinations can be generated, as shown in Table 4.1.
4.2.2.2.3 Totally Restrictive Countermeasures From the group of selected countermea-
sures, one or more of them cannot be combined with any other countermeasure. In order to know
the exact number of combinations, we apply Equation 4.11 [Ros94,War07].
∑
0≤k≤n
(
n
k
)
= 2n−k + (k − 1) for k ≥ 1 (4.11)
Where 'n' is the number of elements to be combined and 'k' the number of totally restrictive
countermeasures. For instance, having 4 countermeasures (C1, C2, C3, C4) and knowing that C1
is totally restrictive, we will have
(
4
1
)
= 24−1 +(1− 1) = 8 possible combinations as shown in Table
4.1.
Table 4.1 - Combinations generated from a group of 4 countermeasures
Type Non- Mutually Partially Totally
Restrictive Exclusive Restrictive Restrictive
Single C1, C2, C3, C4 C1, C2, C3, C4 C1, C2, C3, C4 C1, C2, C3, C4
Double C1+C2, C1+C3,
C1+C4, C2+C3,
C2+C4, C3+C4,
C1+C2, C1+C4,
C2+C3, C2+C4,
C3+C4,
C1+C4, C2+C3,
C2+C4, C3+C4,
C2+C3, C2+C4,
C3+C4,
Triple C1+C2+C3,
C1+C2+C4,
C1+C3+C4,
C2+C3+C4,
C1+C2+C4,
C2+C3+C4
C2+C3+C4 C2+C3+C4
Quadruple C1+C2+C3+C4
Total 15 11 9 8
4.3 Proposed Methodology
When two or more countermeasures are implemented to mitigate a given attack, their combination
aﬀects the estimation of the Risk Mitigation (RM) and the Annual Response Cost (ARC). These
two parameters are required to calculate the improved RORI index proposed in Section 3.1.2.
In addition, RM requires the estimation of the countermeasure surface coverage. This section
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proposes two combinatorial axioms (one for the calculation of the combined RM, and another for
the calculation of the combined ARC) and a methodology to estimate the surface coverage for joint
and disjoint countermeasures, as an approach to evaluate multiple countermeasures.
4.3.1 Combinatorial Axioms
The following axioms have been deﬁned in order to calculate the cost and risk mitigation level that
results from the combination of two or more countermeasures:
Axiom 1 The cost of a combined countermeasure is equal to the sum of all individual counter-
measure's cost, e.g., ARC(C1 ∪ C2) = ARC(C1) + ARC(C2), where ARC is the countermeasure
cost and C1, C2 are the individual countermeasures. Equation 4.12 shows a more general case.
ARC(C1 ∪ ... ∪ Cn) = ARC(C1) + ...+ARC(Cn) (4.12)
This axiom is used for both, joint and disjoint countermeasures, since the enforcement of mul-
tiple countermeasures generally implies higher costs of implementation, consulting, maintaining,
etc, compared to the costs incurred out of the enforcement of a single solution. In addition, with
a pessimistic approach, we are able to estimate the return on response investment for a combined
solution in the worst of the cases, meaning that if the solution is eﬀective for a higher cost, it will
still be eﬀective if the cost is lesser than the one estimated.
Axiom 2 The Risk Mitigation (RM) for a combined solution is calculated as the probability of
their combined surface coverage SC(C1∪C2∪ ...∪Cn) times the eﬀectiveness factor (EF). For two
mutually exclusive countermeasures (C1, C2), the risk mitigation is calculated as RM(C1 ∪ C2) =
SC(C1)× EF (C1)+ SC(C2)× EF (C2). However, for two non-mutually exclusive countermeasures,
the risk mitigation can be calculated in two ways:
1. As the sum of their individual surface coverage times the Eﬀectiveness Factor minus the sur-
face coverage of their intersection times the minimum eﬀectiveness factor, e.g., RM(C1∪C2)
= SC(C1)× EF (C1)+ SC(C2)× EF (C2)− SC(C1∩C2)×min(EF (C1), EF (C2)). Equation
4.13 shows a more general case.
RM(C1 ∪ ... ∪ Cn) = SC(C1)× EF (C1) + ...+ SC(Cn)× EF (Cn)
−∑1≤i<j≤n(SC(Ci ∩ Cj)×min(EF (Ci), EF (Cj)))
+
∑
1≤i<j<k≤n(SC(Ci ∩ Cj ∩ Ck)×min(EF (Ci), EF (Cj), EF (Ck)))
+...+ (−1)n+1∏ni=1 SC(Ci)×min(EF (C1), ..., EF (cn)) (4.13)
2. As the diﬀerence between the two partially covered countermeasure surfaces times their
eﬀectiveness factor plus the surface coverage of their intersection times the maximum eﬀec-
tiveness factor, e.g., RM(C1∪C2) = [SC(C1)− (SC(C1)×SC(C2))]× EF (C1) + [SC(C2)−
(SC(C1)× SC(C2))]× EF (C2) + SC(C1 ∩ C2)× max(EF (C1), EF (C2).
4.3.2 Countermeasure Surface Coverage
In Chapter 6 we will introduce the attack volume to determine the space of the infrastructure that
is exposed to multiple attacks, as well as the portion of such infrastructure that is covered by each
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attack and countermeasure. In this section, we study a single attack scenario, therefore we propose
an approximation of the countermeasure coverage based on the attack surface notion.
In information security technology, the concept of surface coverage is related to the attack
surface, deﬁned by Manadhata [MW10] as the subset of the system's resources that a malicious
entity may use to send/receive data into/from the system to attack the system. Thus, the more
exposed the system's surface, the more attack opportunities and hence, the more likely the system
will be the target of an attack [HW07].
Intuitively, a countermeasure surface coverage represents the level of action that a security
solution may have on a system's attack surface. In other words, the surface coverage is the
percentage of the attack surface that is covered and controlled by a given countermeasure. The
surface coverage is required to calculate the risk mitigation level (RM) for a single and combined
countermeasure.
The union of two or more surfaces is an index that ranges from the maximum surface coverage
of the group of countermeasures (e.g., max SC(C1, ..., Cn)) in its lower bound, to the sum of the
individual surfaces (e.g.,
∑
SC(C1), ..., SC(Cn)) in its upper bound. The intersection of two or
more surfaces is an index that ranges from zero in its lower bound, to the minimum surface coverage
of the group of countermeasures in its upper bound (e.g., min SC(C1, ..., Cn)). Two cases can be
distinguished in the calculation of a surface coverage for a combined countermeasure (e.g., joint
and disjoint surfaces). Figure 4.1 depicts these cases.
Figure 4.1 - Countermeasure Surface Coverage
 Disjoint Surfaces: The surface of one countermeasure is disjoint from the surface coverage
of another countermeasure if they have no elements in common. Therefore, having two dis-
joint countermeasures (C1, C4), the surface coverage of the union is calculated as SC(C1∪C4)
= SC(C1) + SC(C4), and the surface coverage of the intersection is equal to zero.
 Joint Surfaces: The surface of one countermeasure is partially or totally covered by an-
other countermeasure. For partially covered countermeasures (e.g., C1, C2), the union of the
combined solution is calculated as the sum of the individual surfaces minus their intersection
(Equation 4.14), and the surface coverage of the intersection is calculated as the average of
the lower and upper bounds (Equation 4.15).
SC(C1 ∪ C2) = SC(C1) + SC(C2)− SC(C1 ∩ C2) (4.14)
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SC(C1 ∩ C2) = SC(C1 ∩ C2)LOW + SC(C1 ∩ C2)UP
2
(4.15)
It is important to highlight that in the practice, an accurate value of the intersection of
two or more countermeasures is diﬃcult to estimate. This is a time consuming process that
requires the technical deﬁnition of each countermeasure and a great expertise in the domain.
However, we propose an approximation of this value that is computed as the average between
the minimum (LOW) and the maximum (UP) possible values that may result from the
intersection of multiple countermeasures.
The lower bound of the intersection between two countermeasures SC(C1 ∩C2)LOW is equal
to zero if the sum of their surfaces is lesser or equal to one; and it gets the value of (SC(C1)+
SC(C2)− 1) otherwise.
The upper bound of the intersection between two countermeasures is equal to the total
coverage of the smallest surface.
For a general case, the union and intersection of combined solutions is calculated using
Equation 4.16, Where x = SC(C1) + ...+ SC(Cn)− (n− 1), and `n' is the maximal number
of countermeasures to combine.
SC(C1 ∪ ... ∪ Cn) =
∑n
i=1 SC(Ci)−
∑
1≤i<j≤n SC(Ci ∩ Cj) +∑
1≤i<j<k≤n SC(Ci ∩ Cj ∩ Ck) + ...+ (−1)n+1
∏n
i=1 SC(Ci)
SC(C1 ∩ ... ∩ Cn) ∼= SC(C1∩...∩Cn)LOW+SC(C1∩...∩Cn)UP2
SC(C1 ∩ Cn)LOW =
{
0 if SC(C1) + ...+ SC(Cn) ≤ n− 1
x if SC(C1) + ...+ SC(Cn) > n− 1
SC(C1 ∩ ... ∩ Cn)UP = min {SC(C1), ..., SC(Cn)} (4.16)
For totally covered surfaces (e.g., C1, C3), the union of the combined surface is calculated
as SC(C1 ∪ C3) = SC(C1), and the surface coverage of the intersection is calculated as
SC(C1 ∩C3) = SC(C3). A variant of this case is produced when both countermeasures have
the same surface values, in which the surface coverage of the union and the intersection are
calculated as SC(C4 ∪ C5) = SC(C4 ∩ C5) = SC(C4) = SC(C5).
4.4 Countermeasure Selection Process
The process for selecting optimal countermeasures is performed in two steps: Individual Counter-
measure Evaluation, which determines the parameters associated to the intrusion or attack (e.g.,
ALE and AIV) and evaluates the RORI index for all individual solutions (using equation 3.2);
and Combined Countermeasure Evaluation, which determines the parameters associated to the
combined solutions (e.g., ARC and RM) and evaluates the RORI index for all combined solutions.
4.4.1 Requirements
A combined countermeasure results from the simultaneous implementation of two or more coun-
termeasures to mitigate a given attack. A combined solution is therefore analysed as a single
countermeasure with a combined cost and a combined eﬀectiveness. The combination of security
solutions is allowed if the following requirements are met:
1. The countermeasures are not mutually exclusive,
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2. The total surface coverage of one countermeasure is totally covered by another countermea-
sure with an equal surface coverage.
4.4.2 Process Description
The process for the selection and ranking of combined security solutions is depicted in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 - Countermeasure Combination Flowchart
The process takes as input the results obtained from the evaluation of individual countermea-
sures (step 1), as described in section 3.1.2. The system then eliminates those countermeasures for
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which the RORI index is below the average or below a predeﬁned threshold (step 2). This action
helps the system optimize the evaluation process.
Once we have the list of combinable countermeasures (step 3), we calculate the total number of
possible combinations from the list of candidate countermeasures. Then, it is possible to generate
groups of 2, 3, ..., n countermeasures, where n" is the total number of elements to be combined
(step 4).
The RORI metric is then calculated for each combination (step 5), taking into account that for
a combined solution, the cost is calculated as the sum of all the individual countermeasure costs
(Axiom 1) and the risk mitigation of a combined solution is calculated as the probability of the
union of events (Axiom 2). The Annual Infrastructure Value and the Annual Loss Expectancy
remains unchangeable for all combined solutions.
In order to evaluate all the combined countermeasures, it is necessary the use of axioms 1 and
2 described in section 4.3.1. In step 6, the obtained RORI value is compared with the value by
default (the highest RORI value obtained in the Single Countermeasure Evaluation).
If the resulting RORI is equal to the default value, the system checks for the countermeasure
cost (ARC) and selects the one with the lowest value (step 6a). Otherwise, the system compares
if the current RORI is greater to the default value (step 6b), in such a case, the countermeasure
becomes the selected one, and it overrides the default value (step 7a). However, if the resulting
RORI is lower than the default value (step 7b), the system checks for another combination to
evaluate (step 8a).
When no other combination is left to be evaluated (step 8b), the system selects the default
countermeasure as the best solution, since it is the one that provides the highest RORI index.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we introduced an approach to select optimal security countermeasures based on the
Return On Response Investment (RORI) index, making it possible to evaluate combined counter-
measures to mitigate the eﬀects of intrusions or attacks.
Our solution is divided into two phases: The Evaluation of Individual Countermeasures, which
determines the parameters associated to the intrusion or attack (e.g., ALE and AIV) and evaluates
the RORI index for all individual solutions; and The Evaluation of Combined Countermeasures,
which determines the parameters associated to the combined solutions (e.g., ARC and RM) and
evaluates the RORI index for all possible combinations of security measures. As a result, the system
is able to rank and select the individual or combined countermeasure that provides the highest
cost-eﬀectiveness ratio, thus the highest beneﬁt to the organization. Even if the countermeasures
overlap, our solution provides an approximation of the area covered by all countermeasures.
In order to show the applicability of our model, the next chapter provides a deployment of
the RORI index and the operations required to evaluate and select optimal countermeasures over
two real case scenarios. The ﬁrst one, a Mobile Money Transfer Service is provided by a large
telecommunication company based in France, and the second one, a Critical Infrastructure Control
Process (Dam) is provided by a medium-sized telecommunication company based in Italy.
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T
he evaluation of multiple countermeasures in complex systems generally requires the
implementation of a prototype to simulate the system and deploy the model over a real
case study. This chapter addresses the deployment in two use cases provided by the MASSIF
Consortium [Con11] to show the applicability of the Return on Response Investment (RORI)
model in real world scenarios. In addition, we provide examples on how to evaluate the RORI
parameters in order to select optimal countermeasures. Section 5.1 introduces a Mobile Money
Transfer Service (MMTS) case study, and discusses an account takeover attack scenario, as well as
the evaluation and selection of individual and combined countermeasures. Section 5.2 describes a
Critical Infrastructure Process Control case study, and discusses a Control Station Hacking Attack
scenario, as well as the evaluation and selection of individual and combined countermeasures. More
information regarding the two use cases can be found in [Con11c]. Finally, Section 5.3 concludes
61
CHAPT 5. APPLICATION OF THE COUNTERMEASURE SELECTION MODEL IN SINGLE
ATTACK SCENARIOS
with a discussion regarding the deployment of the use case scenarios.
5.1 Case Study: Mobile Money Transfer Service (MMTS)
The Mobile Money Transfer Service (MMTS) is a system where virtual money, called mMoney
(for mobile money), is used to carry out ﬁnancial operations such as purchasing goods, cashing
salaries, paying bills, taking loans, paying taxes or receiving social beneﬁts. Each actor of the
system (e.g., customer, retailer, merchant, bank, etc.) has an mWallet where the virtual money is
stored. mWallets are not stored locally inside the mobile phone but in a platform maintained by
a central authority.
The MMTS responds to the need of improving the security infrastructure of a service that uses
a mobile telephone to perform various types of money transfers and transactions. This use case
discusses an account takeover attack and evaluates all possible countermeasures for its mitigation.
The data related to this use case, as well as all numeric values used to estimate costs and beneﬁts,
have been provided and validated by France Telecom - Orange Group1.
5.1.1 Regular Operation
For this service to work, the operator is associated with a bank which issues mMoney. The operator
and its associated bank have to report speciﬁc data and activities to the central bank and they must
ascertain that the amount of mMoney circulating in the system remains constant. The number
of transactions carried out in a day is roughly estimated to 200,000 transactions per day. This
type of service provides a new payment system which could be misused for money laundering and
terrorist funding. Figure 5.1 describes the work-ﬂow of this scenario.
Figure 5.1 - Mobile Money Transfer Service Work-ﬂow
In Figure 5.1, Alice (1) is a customer of the Mobile Money Transfer System (MMTS), who
generally uses the system two or three times per month in order to pay some bills (e.g., electric-
ity, telephone). The operation service (2) receives all the transactions requested by the MMTS
1http://www.orange.com/en/group
62
5.1. Case Study: Mobile Money Transfer Service (MMTS)
customers. The service is composed by the account management server, the log server, and the
data warehouse. The account management server (3) keeps all the information regarding the user's
behaviour. The log server (4) registers data that are relevant to analyse abnormal activities such
as: failed authentications, requests for PIN modiﬁcation, transaction requests, etc. The data ware-
house (5) contains historical data about accounts, which is useful to analyse customer's behaviour
and detect frauds.
The system is able to detect abnormal behavior by analysing the logs and matching monitored
operations with logic rules for irregular behaviour [GMHD11,GMHD12,Con11b]. If the monitored
operation does not match the rules, it is allowed to be executed; on the contrary, the system
classiﬁes it as abnormal. A complete example of the inference rules used for the MMTS use case
scenario is given in Appendix B.
5.1.2 Attack Scenario: Account Takeover
An account takeover is a password-based attack that exploits vulnerabilities on the user's side (e.g.,
social engineering, key-loggers, etc.) and steals the mobile user account to perform transactions
in favour of the attacker. An increment in the number of transactions performed in a period of
time, or a raise in the amount of money being transferred for a particular user, as compared to
the normal user behaviour is interpreted as an account takeover attack (an attacker performs some
transactions on the MMTS platform using the credentials of a legitimate user).
In the example, Bob (6), the attacker, after a couple of attempts to get authenticated using
Alice's credentials, gains access to Alice's MMTS account. He then performs transactions, such
as purchasing items and transferring money to a bank account under his control. As a result, the
system (2) detects the anomalous behaviour from the logs: For the past two hours, the user Alice,
who has always had a regular behaviour (no more than 3 accesses to the system per month), has
already used the MMTS several times within a day to carry out several transactions.
According to France Telecom - Orange Group, an account takeover attack has an estimated
Minor" severity level2 (equivalent to 100 e) and a High" likelihood1 (once per month, equivalent
to 12). The Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) for this attack is expected to be 1200 e, and the Annual
Infrastructure Value (AIV) is calculated as the value of all the Policy Enforcement Points (PEP)
that are needed to be deployed in the preliminary phase of the system architecture. Table 5.1 lists
the PEP for this scenario and summarizes information regarding their type, costs and mitigated
threats 3. The AIV corresponds to the annual cost of purchasing, licensing, implementing and/or
maintaining a security equipment in the MMTS Infrastructure.
From the list of equipments proposed in Table 5.1, we select 1 Network Intrusion Detection
System (Snort), 1 Network Monitoring (FreeNATS), 1 Firewall (Comodo), 1 Intrusion Prevention
System (Cisco SA 500 Series), and a Strong Authentication Method (Software Token) as the
security solutions to be deployed in a regular system architecture for a Mobile Money Transfer
Service. A combination of all of them provide a wider and more complete coverage of the diﬀerent
threats to which the system is exposed. The AIV is therefore estimated as 2600e (the cost of all
the selected solutions).
2The estimated values for the severity and likelihood of an attack may vary from one country to another and
depend greatly on the standard of living of each country.
3More information about these threats can be found in Appendix B
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Table 5.1 - Security Equipments for a Mobile Money Transfer Service
PEP Type AIV Threats that mitigate
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8
E1 Intrust HIDS 800e X X X
E2 Tripwire HIDS 250e X X X
E3 Verisys HIDS 400e X X X
E4 Snort NIDS 400e X X X X X X X X
E5 NetCrunch Net. Monitoring 1500e X X X X X X X X
E6 FreeNATS Net. Monitoring 500e X X X X X X X X
E7 Comodo Firewall 300e X X X X X X
E8 Endian Firewall 150e X X X X X X
E9 Cisco IPS 1000e X X X X X X X X
E10 Kaspersky Antivirus 300e X X
E11 OS update OS Hardening 500e X X X
E12 Soft. Token Auth. Method 400e X X X X X X X
T1 Trafficking Collection T2 Hiding User Identity T3 Scams
T4 Account Takeover T5 Employee Complicity T6 Denial of Service
T7 Money Creation/Destruction T8 Other threats (e.g. malware, virus)
5.1.3 Individual Countermeasure Evaluation for the Account Takeover
Attack
In order to react to an intrusion attempt it is necessary to change/update access control policies or
implement new mitigation strategies. Following the methodology proposed in Chapters 3 and 4, we
evaluated the following 9 countermeasures to mitigate an Account Takeover Attack in the MMTS
platform. All countermeasures and the associated data have been validated by France Telecom -
Orange Group
Description of Candidates:
C1.1 NOOP: This solution considers to accept the risk and does not require any modiﬁcations.
The cost and risk mitigation level are equal to zero.
C1.2 Deny Transaction: This alternative allows the user to authenticate but he/she is not able to
perform any kind of transaction.
C1.3 Deactivate User Account: A temporarily deactivation of the user account (e.g., for a period
of 24, 48 or 72 hours) will prevent attackers from succeed.
C1.4 Reduce Transaction Amount: This candidate limits the use of the suspected user account to
perform transactions for a maximum amount of money (e.g., up to 30e, 50e, 100e).
C1.5 Reduce Number of Transactions: This alternative limits the user to perform a controlled
number of transactions per day (e.g., 2, 3, or 5 transactions per day), meaning that for this
speciﬁc account, MMTS users can only perform transactions that cannot exceed a predeﬁned
threshold.
C1.6 Active Alert Mode: This countermeasure ﬁres an alert indicating that the deﬁned user ac-
count is suspected to be under attack.
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C1.7 Keep the Account under Surveillance: This candidate will take the user account into quar-
antine in order to closely evaluate its behaviour and punctually block operations.
C1.8 Activate Two-factor Authentication: This alternative requests an additional authentication
(e.g., pass phrase, challenge response, PIN), in order to authenticate the user and authorize
him/her to perform the required transaction.
C1.9 Deactivate Multiple Transaction Requests: This security measure limits the user to emit only
one transaction at a time.
Table 5.2 shows the diﬀerent countermeasures that are proposed to react to an account takeover
attack and details information regarding the Policy Enforcement Points (PEP), the Annual Re-
sponse Cost (ARC), the countermeasure Surface Coverage (SC), the Eﬀectiveness Factor (EF), the
Risk Mitigation value (RM), the RORI index, and the restrictions (partial or total restrictions to
be combined with other solutions) associated to each countermeasure. These ﬁgures have been
provided by France Telecom - Orange Group.
Table 5.2 - Individual Countermeasure Evaluation (Account Takeover Attack)
Counter
Measure
PEP1 ARC2 SC3 EF4 RM5 RORI6 Restriction
C1.1 - 0e 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00% Totally Rest.
C1.2 E7 60e 0.85 0.85 0.72 30.34% Totally Rest.
C1.3 E9 55e 0.85 0.80 0.68 28.66% Totally Rest.
C1.4 E4 35e 0.70 0.75 0.53 25.77% C1.1,C1.2,C1.3
C1.5 E4 30e 0.70 0.85 0.60 22.81% C1.1,C1.2,C1.3
C1.6 E4 25e 0.60 0.70 0.42 18.25% C1.1,C1.2,C1.3
C1.7 E6 40e 0.60 0.70 0.42 17.58% C1.1,C1.2,C1.3
C1.8 E12 50e 0.85 0.90 0.77 32.75% C1.1,C1.2,C1.3
C1.9 E9 35e 0.80 0.80 0.64 27.82% C1.1,C1.2,C1.3
1Policy Enforcement Point 2Annual Response Cost 3Countermeasure Surface Coverage
4Effectiveness Factor 5Risk Mitigation Level 6Return On Response Investment
From the list of proposed countermeasures, the ﬁrst alternative (C1.1) is to accept the risk by
executing NOOP. This action does not require any modiﬁcations and therefore the risk remains the
same. C1.1 is totally restrictive and its associated cost is 0, since no countermeasure is implemented.
As a result, the RORI index for C1.1 is 0.00%.
The second and third options are totally restrictive and suggest to avoid the attack either by
denying the transaction (C1.2), or by deactivating temporarily the user account (C1.3). As a
result, the attack is greatly reduced (70 − 75%). The RORI index for C1.2 and C1.3 is 30.34%
and 28.66% respectively. Since the RORI index of C1.2 is greater than the one by default, C1.2
becomes the default countermeasure.
Alternatives four and ﬁve propose to reduce the transaction amount (C1.4) or to reduce the
number of transactions per day (C1.5), as part of a strategy to prevent attackers from stealing
large amount of money from their victims without deactivating the user account. As a result, the
attack is mitigated 53 − 60%. The RORI index for C1.4 and C1.5 is estimated to be 25.77% and
22.81% respectively. The default countermeasure remains unchanged since the RORI index for
C1.4 and C1.5 is lower than the one by default.
Countermeasures six and seven recommend to activate the alert mode (C1.6),or to keep the user
account under surveillance (C1.7) e.g., for a period of 24, 48 or 72 hours. Both countermeasures
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have a risk mitigation value of 42% and a RORI index of 18.25% and 17.58% respectively. The
default countermeasure remains unchanged since the RORI results for these two countermeasures
are lower than the one by default.
The two remaining countermeasures (C1.8, C1.9) recommend to activate additional authen-
tication methods (e.g., two-factor authentication request) and to deactivate multiple transaction
requests. By implementing these solutions, the risk is expected to be mitigated 64 − 77%. As a
result, the RORI index for C1.8 and C1.9 is 32.75% and 28.55% respectively.
The highest RORI index from the evaluation of the diﬀerent countermeasures to react against
an account takeover attack correspond to 32.75%, the risk is expected to be mitigated 77% with
an annual response cost of 50¿. As a result, countermeasure eight (C1.8), which recommends to
activate additional authentication methods (e.g., two-factor authentication request), becomes the
selected single countermeasure for an account takeover attack in the MMTS System.
5.1.4 Combined Countermeasure Evaluation for the Account Takeover
Attack
Since the average RORI for the previous list of countermeasures is 22.66%, we select C1.4, C1.5,
C1.8 and C1.9 as the candidates to combine (their RORI index is greater or equal to the average
and they are not totally restrictive). The maximum number of possible combinations is
(
4
2
)
=
24 − 1 = 15.
In order to perform the combined countermeasure evaluation, we discard totally restrictive
countermeasures (solutions that can not be combined because they create conﬂicts on the system).
These countermeasures present the ﬂag all in the restriction column from Table 5.2. We con-
sider, however, mutually exclusive and partially restrictive countermeasures while calculating the
maximum number of combinations. Table 5.3 summarizes these results.
Table 5.3 - Combined Countermeasure Evaluation (Account Takeover Attack)
N Candidates ARC1 SC2 EF3 RM4 RORI
1 C1.4 35e 0.70 0.75 0.53 25.77%
2 C1.5 30e 0.70 0.85 0.60 22.81%
3 C1.8 50e 0.85 0.90 0.77 32.75%
4 C1.9 35e 0.80 0.80 0.64 27.82%
5 C1.4+C1.5 65e 0.55 0.75 0.71 29.42%
6 C1.4+C1.8 85e 0.63 0.85 0.83 33.87%
7 C1.4+C1.9 70e 0.60 0.80 0.76 31.31%
8 C1.5+C1.8 80e 0.63 0.75 0.82 33.79%
9 C1.5+C1.9 65e 0.60 0.75 0.72 29.76%
10 C1.8+C1.9 85e 0.73 0.80 0.83 33.71%
11 C1.4+C1.5+C1.8 115e 0.48 0.75 0.83 32.39%
12 C1.4+C1.5+C1.9 100e 0.45 0.75 0.76 29.85%
13 C1.4+C1.8+C1.9 120e 0.53 0.80 0.83 32.15%
14 C1.5+C1.8+C1.9 115e 0.53 0.75 0.83 32.23%
15 C1.4+C1.5+C1.8+C1.9 150e 0.38 0.75 0.83 30.71%
1Combined Annual Response Cost 2Combined Countermeasure Surface Coverage
3Combined Effectiveness Factor 4Combined Risk Mitigation Level
From Table 5.3, ARC and RM are calculated using Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 respectively, as
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explained in Section 4.3.1. SC is calculated using Equation 4.15, EF follows Equation 4.13 that
suggest to select the minimum Eﬀectiveness Factor from the group of combined countermeasures.
The RORI index is calculated using Equation 3.2, as proposed in Section 3.1.2.
After comparing the RORI index on all the diﬀerent alternatives, we determined that the best
solution reduces 83% of the risk, and the RORI index is expected to be 33,87%. As a result,
alternative 2 (a combination of C1.4 and C1.8), which proposes to reduce the transaction amount
and to activate double authentication process becomes the selected combined countermeasure for
an account takeover attack in the Mobile Money Transfer Scenario.
5.2 Case Study: Critical Infrastructure Process Control
This section describes a use case provided by Epsilon Italy SRL4, a telecommunication enterprise
based in Naples (Italy), operating in the ﬁeld of Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
services. The case study responds to the needs of improving the security of a system whose mission
is to control a critical infrastructure, speciﬁcally a Dam. The following subsections describe the
case study and detail a scenario of attack, as well as the general operations required to rank, select
and deploy optimal countermeasures.
5.2.1 General Description
A dam is a barrier that impounds water or underground streams. Dams are generally used for
water supply, hydroelectric power generation, irrigation, and water activities [Con11]. There are
many diﬀerent parameters to be monitored to assess the safety of the dam and foresee possible
failures or anomalies. The reference system architecture involves SCADA5 components. Three
main groups of components are identiﬁed in the system: control devices (i.e. Control Station and
Visualization Station), input and output (I/O) devices (i.e. sensors and actuators components),
and a SCADA gateway (as shown in Figure 5.2).
As depicted in Figure 5.2, the supervisor gathers and delivers data from and to a Control
Station and a Visualization Station. The Control Station allows on-line and real time data analysis
as well as data and event storing. The Visualization Station presents historical data stored in a
database through a web server interface. Sensors and actuators are responsible for retrieving
measurements related to speciﬁc physics phenomena. The SCADA gateway is responsible for
evaluating, processing, storing retrieved measurements and elaborating proper commands for the
actual system.
Dam operations must be supported by continuous monitoring of the key parameters. The
adoption of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) provides means to monitor these parameters in a
relatively inexpensive way. A WSN is composed of several wireless enabled sensors that can be
deployed across the dam to monitor environmental, geophysical, and geotechnical parameters. The
sensors are able to self-organize, creating a wireless mesh network that allows measured data to
reach a data collection device.
In regular operations, when the water level of the dam exceeds an alerting threshold (max, min
or overﬂow thresholds), the monitoring station generates an alert, notifying the control station
about the corresponding alerting level and the water level growth rate. The control station triggers
the discharging operation speciﬁc for the alerting threshold until the monitoring station notiﬁes
that the water level has reached a regular level.
4www.epsilonline.com/index.php
5A SCADA system is an industrial control system targeted to monitor and control infrastructure, industrial, and
facility based processes.
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Figure 5.2 - Critical Infrastructure Process Control (dam) Scenario Compo-
nents
5.2.2 Control Station Hacking Attack
A machine connected to the visualization station succeeds in controlling remotely a machine in
the control station (through password theft, bug exploit, or other techniques). Consequently, the
malicious user modiﬁes sensor settings (e.g., policies and alerting thresholds) and sends commands
to the actuators, asking them to maintain the monitoring values under the new thresholds.
The hypothesis is that the attacker has access to the remote machine with a stolen password.
He does not install any malicious software, but he knows packet format, and generates well-formed
packets. The visualization station is located in a DMZ branch of the LAN, while the control station
is in a protected branch of the LAN. The traﬃc between the two subnets passes through a ﬁrewall.
A constraint of the system is that the commands to drive the actuators can be made only from
the control station.
According to Epsilon Italy SRL, a control station hacking attack has an estimated Serious"
severity (equivalent to 1,000,000e) and an estimated Negligible" likelihood (equivalent to 0.05
times per year), since the control station is supposed to be highly protected. The ALE for a
control station hacking attack is expected to be 50,000e/year and the annual infrastructure value
(AIV) is calculated as the sum of all the security equipments' costs that need to be deployed in the
preliminary phase of the system architecture. Table 5.4 proposes a list of security equipments for
this scenario and summarizes the information regarding their AIV and the threats they mitigate6.
Taking into account that a combination of security solutions provide a wider and more com-
plete coverage of the diﬀerent threats to which the system is exposed, we selected Sensor Tamper
Resistance, IDS/IPS, Firewall, Access Control Mechanisms, System Behaviour Monitoring and
Communication Protocols (e.g., DNP3, ICCP) as the security solutions to deploy for a Critical
Infrastructure Process Control . The Annual Infrastructure Value is therefore estimated at 8.700e
(the cost of all the selected solutions).
6All threats are deﬁned in the Glossary of Terms of this dissertation. The complete case study can be found in
MASSIF Deliverable 2.1.1 [Con11]
68
5.2. Case Study: Critical Infrastructure Process Control
Table 5.4 - Security Equipments for a Critical Infrastructure Process Control
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) AIV Mitigated Threats
(e) T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8
E1 Stronger Cryptography 2000 X X X X
E2 Sensor Tamper Resist. 1000e X X X X X
E3 Back-up Power Supply 1500 X
E4 IDS-IPS 2500 X X X X X X X X
E5 Firewall 2000 X X X X X X X X
E6 Anti-virus/malware 500 X X X
E7 Access Control 1500 X X X X X X X X
E8 System Monitoring 1200 X X X X X X X X
E9 Communication Protoc. 500 X X X X X
T1 Water Level Sensor Compromise T2 Tilmeter Compromise T3 Administration Password Theft
T4 Hazardous Water Release T5 Hydroelectric Power Plant Anti-Islanding Hacking
T6 Visualization Station Misuse T7 Control Station Hacking T8 Infectious threats
5.2.3 Individual Countermeasure Evaluation (Control Station Hacking
Attack)
In partnership with Epsilon Italy SRL, we deﬁned the following 7 countermeasures to mitigate a
control station hacking attack. All the data related to the cost and beneﬁts of countermeasures
have been validated by Epsilon Italy SRL [Con11c].
Description of Candidates:
C2.1 NOOP: This candidate considers to accept the risk by executing no operation. This action
does not require any modiﬁcations, therefore the cost and risk mitigation are equal to zero.
C2.2 Privilege Separation: Enforce separation of privileges is useful by preventing users to perform
actions they are not allowed.
C2.3 Active Alert Mode: This alternative proposes to ﬁre an alert indicating that the control
station is suspected to be under attack.
C2.4 Disable Remote Connections to the Control Station: Allow only local connections to the
control station to authorized users (Switch from remote to not-remote).
C2.5 Enable Multiple Monitoring Indication: This countermeasure activates two or more moni-
toring systems to verify the water level indication obtained by the sensors.
C2.6 Restart Sensor Settings: It erases the current sensor values and request for new thresholds.
C2.7 Activate Back-up Sensors: Switch oﬀ current sensors and switch on back-up sensors.
Table 5.5 summarizes the parameters for each individual countermeasure. The ﬁrst column
shows the diﬀerent alternatives proposed. The second column shows the Policy Enforcement Point
associated to each countermeasure. The third column details the estimated Annual Response Cost
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(ARC). The fourth and ﬁfth columns show the Surface Coverage (SC) and Eﬀectiveness Factor
(EF) associated to each solution.
Each countermeasure has an associated SC and EF factors that indicate the level at which
the countermeasure is expected to mitigate the eﬀects of a given attack. For instance, enforcing
separation of privilege (C2.2) covers around 60% of the Control Station Hacking Attack with an
eﬀectiveness of 80%. The application of this countermeasure results in a Risk Mitigation (RM)
of 48%. RM is shown in column sixth and represents the multiplication of SC and EF metrics.
RORI results are displayed in column seventh and ﬁnally, information regarding the restrictions
to combine the countermeasures is provided in column eighth.
Table 5.5 - Individual Countermeasure Evaluation (Control Station Hacking
Attack)
Counter
Measure
PEP1 ARC2 SC3 EF4 RM5 RORI6 Restriction
C2.1 - 0e 0.00 0.00 0.00 0% all
C2.2 E7 200e 0.60 0.80 0.48 267% C1
C2.3 E4 300e 0.45 0.60 0.27 147% C1
C2.4 E5 500e 0.85 0.70 0.60 318% C1
C2.5 E8 700e 0.75 0.85 0.64 332% C1
C2.6 E9 200e 0.55 0.70 0.39 214% C1
C2.7 E4 400e 0.70 0.90 0.63 342% C1
1Policy Enforcement Point 2Annual Response Cost 3Countermeasure Surface Coverage
4Effectiveness Factor 5Risk Mitigation Level 6Return On Response Investment
From the set of proposed countermeasures, the highest RORI value corresponds to C2.7 (Ac-
tivate Back-up Sensors), with a cost of 400e, a risk mitigation of 63%, and a beneﬁt of 342%.
This candidate solution becomes the selected single countermeasure for a Control Station Hacking
Attack.
5.2.4 Combined Countermeasure Evaluation (Control Station Hacking
Attack)
From the results obtained out of the individual countermeasure evaluation we know that all coun-
termeasures can be combined except for C2.1 (NOOP), since this is a totally restrictive solution.
Taking into account that the average RORI for the group of countermeasures is 231%, we select
C2.2, C2.4, C2.5 and C2.7 as the candidates for combination (their RORI index is greater than
the average).
In order to evaluate all possible combinations for the selected countermeasures, we apply Equa-
tion 4.8 for non-restrictive countermeasures, with n=4. The maximum number of possible com-
binations is
(
4
k
)
= 24 − 1 = 15. We consider only those countermeasures that do not present the
ﬂag all in the restriction column from Table 5.5, since they do not originate conﬂicts on the
system while implementing them simultaneously. Table 5.6 summarizes the results obtained on
the evaluation of all combined countermeasures for a Control Station Hacking Attack.
The ﬁrst two columns from Table 5.6 show the possible combinations from the list of suit-
able candidates. The third column shows the annual response cost (ARC) that results from the
combined solution. ARC is determined according to axiom 1 (section 4.3.1).
The fourth and ﬁfth columns show respectively the Surface Coverage (SC) and Eﬀectiveness
Factor (EF) associated to each combination. SC is calculated using Equation 4.15, EF follows
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Table 5.6 - Combined Countermeasure Evaluation for a Control Station Hack-
ing Attack
N Combination ARC1 SC2 EF3 RM4 RORI
1 C2.2 200e 0.60 0.80 0.48 267%
2 C2.4 500e 0.85 0.70 0.60 318%
3 C2.5 700e 0.75 0.85 0.64 332%
4 C2.7 400e 0.70 0.90 0.63 342%
5 C2.2+C2.4 700e 0.53 0.70 0.71 369%
6 C2.2+C2.5 900e 0.48 0.80 0.74 375%
7 C2.2+C2.7 600e 0.45 0.80 0.75 397%
8 C2.4+C2.5 1200e 0.68 0.70 0.76 372%
9 C2.4+C2.7 900e 0.63 0.70 0.79 401%
10 C2.5+C2.7 1100e 0.58 0.85 0.78 386%
11 C2.2+C2.4+C2.5 1400e 0.40 0.70 0.77 369%
12 C2.2+C2.4+C2.7 1100e 0.38 0.70 0.80 398%
13 C2.2+C2.5+C2.7 1300e 0.33 0.70 0.75 360%
14 C2.4+C2.5+C2.7 1600e 0.50 0.70 0.81 379%
15 C2.2+C2.4+C2.5+C2.7 1800e 0.25 0.70 0.78 355%
1Combined Annual Response Cost 2Combined Countermeasure Surface Coverage
3Combined Effectiveness Factor 4Combined Risk Mitigation Level
Equation 4.13 that suggest to select the minimum Eﬀectiveness Factor from the group of combined
countermeasures. The Risk Mitigation level (RM) is shown in column sixth and results after the
application of a combined solution. RM is calculated according to axiom 2 (section 4.3.1). RORI
results are displayed in column seventh. RORI is calculated as proposed in equation 3.2
After comparing the RORI index on all the diﬀerent alternatives, we determined that the
optimal solution to secure the control and visualization station network costs 900¿, reduces the
risk in 79%, and results in a RORI index of 401%. Alternative 5 (a combination of C2.4 and C2.7),
which proposes to disable remote connections and activate back-up sensors, becomes therefore the
selected combined countermeasure for a Control Station Hacking Attack in the scenario of critical
infrastructure process control.
5.3 Discussion
The deployment of our proposed cost sensitive model over a Mobile Money Transfer Service and
a Critical Infrastructure Process Control shows the applicability of the RORI model and demon-
strates that in most of the cases, combined countermeasures provide a higher RORI index and thus
a higher beneﬁt to the organization.
It is important to mention that the evaluation of countermeasures is performed in real case
scenarios where it is possible to select single or combined countermeasures as a reaction strategy.
Furthermore, performing an automatic evaluation of countermeasures is a key element to react
rapidly and appropriately to a given attack, especially for critical infrastructure processes (e.g. the
Dam scenario presented in the second part of this chapter).
In addition, the combination of two or more security policies covers a larger surface of the risk,
which results into a higher risk mitigation level. However, it is worth noting that a higher risk
mitigation value does not always mean a higher RORI index, nor the least expensive solution is
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always the most interesting one. Several parameters are taken into account in order to select the
solution that provides the highest cost-eﬀectiveness ratio to the system.
In Part II, we will propose a methodology to evaluate and select countermeasures in a scenario
of multiple attacks. For this purpose, the current approximation of the countermeasures overlap
becomes insuﬃcient. To solve this issue, we will study the total volume exposed to a given attack,
and the portion covered by each individual attack in the system, as well as their countermeasure
coverage.
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Countermeasure Selection for
Multiple Attack Scenarios
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Chapter 6
Attack Volume:
Formalization and Modeling
We ﬁnd no sense in talking about
something unless we specify how we
measure it; a deﬁnition by the method of
measuring a quantity is the one sure way
of avoiding talking nonsense...
Relativity and Common Sense
Sir Hermann Bondi - 1964
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I
n the first part of this dissertation, we proposed to use an estimation of the attack sur-
face to compute the surface coverage of one or multiple countermeasures. This approach allowed
us to obtain an approximation to the value of the Risk Mitigation (RM) parameter, making it pos-
sible to evaluate the Return On Response Investment (RORI) index in a scenario of individual
attacks. However for multiple attack scenarios, this approach is not accurate enough to determine
the equipment(s), subject(s) and/or action(s) that are included in the security incidents.
We, therefore, propose in this chapter, an approach that represents the volume of the system,
attacks, and countermeasures based on a three-dimensional coordinate system (i.e. user, channel,
and resource). We do not use approximations as we have already proposed in Chapter 4; instead,
we replace the estimation of the surface coverage (SC) by a qualitative value built on the system
speciﬁcations and infrastructure. As a result, the union and intersection of the diﬀerent volumes
(i.e. system, attacks, and countermeasures) is calculated using geometrical operations.
The coordinates of each element are derived from a URI. The URI is decomposed into three
dimensions along the following axes:
1. user - privilege - role
2. channel - protocol - parameter
3. resource - path - machine
We represent each element according to the 3 aforementioned axes. These axes are comple-
mentary to each other and relate to the OrBAC model, where the user account is modeled as a
subject (with a given role in the organization), that is assigned certain privileges; the channel is
modeled as an action (with the required parameters) that carry on protocols to identify resources
on the system ; and the resource is modeled as an object (machine) with a path in the URI.
Each URI is eventually represented as a parallelepiped in this space. We will deﬁne all the users,
channels and resources available in these 3 axes. We will then model these URI elements into the
corresponding axis in the coordinate system. We need, therefore, a bijection between the URIs
and the coordinate system in order to make the appropriate representations. The coordinates (i.e.
account, channel, resource) deﬁne a parallelepiped with a corresponding volume in our system.
The CARVER methodology, discussed in Section 6.2.3, is used to give an appropriate weight to
each element composing the axes in our coordinate system. Weights are associated to the criticality
of a given component in our system, making it possible to connect the volumes with the risks. For
instance, a regular user might be assigned one unit, whereas an administrator might be assigned 4
units (big volumes are equivalent to high risk, whereas small volumes are equivalent to low risk).
Once we determine the union and intersection of the attack volumes, we will be able to compare
their associated risks.
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Two concepts are considered while comparing two or more risk volumes: Residual risk 1, which
results when the risk volume is higher than the countermeasure volume; and Collateral damage 2,
which results when the countermeasure volume is higher than the risk volume.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.1 introduces the state of the art of
attack surface. It also introduces the uniform resource identiﬁer and the OrBAC model. Section
6.2 introduces the coordinate system and its attack dimensional vectors. Section 6.3 presents the
contribution of axes in the volume calculation. Section 6.4 details the calculation of the system,
attack, and countermeasure volume. Finally, a discussion is presented in Section 6.5.
6.1 State of the Art
This section introduces three concepts: ﬁrstly, the attack surface model, which presents a method-
ology to measure and compare diﬀerent attacks in a given system. Secondly, the Uniform Resource
Identiﬁer (URI), which identiﬁes the main components used in accessing a computing resource.
Lastly, the Organization-Based Access Control (OrBAC) model, which formalises the process to
deﬁne security policies in a given organization.
6.1.1 Attack Surface
This subsection presents the related work in the attack surface measurements, and highlights their
beneﬁts and constraints.
6.1.1.1 Operating Systems Attack Surface
According to Howard et al. [How04, HW07], the attack surface of an application is the union
of code, interfaces, services, protocols, and practices available to users. Their deﬁnition of the
attack surface focuses on the accessibility to unauthorised users. Intuitively, the more exposed the
system's surface, the more likely the system is to be attacked. Thus, mechanisms such as improving
access controls, having stronger encapsulation processes, improving authentication of users, etc.,
help in increasing the system's security while reducing its attack surface.
Three dimensions are considered to determine the attack surface of an operating system (e.g.
Linux, Windows):
1. Target and enablers: An attack target is a process or resource on a system that is subject
to be attacked, and that plays a critical role in the adversary's achieving his/her goal. The
term enabler identiﬁes any accessed process or data resource used as part of the means of
the attack.
2. Channels and protocols: Channels are the means by which an attacker gains access to the
target on the system, whereas protocols determine the rules of interactions among the parties
communicating in a channel.
3. Access rights: They refer to the privileges or rights (e.g., read, write, execute) that are
associated to each process or data resource of a state machine.
As a result, the more targets, the more channels and the more generous access rights, the larger
the attack surface. However, this method presents the following shortcomings:
1The risk that remains after the controls are taken into account.
2The damage to things that are incidental to the intended target.
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 The approach does not provide a systematic method to identify or assign weights to the attack
vectors. The measurement method requires therefore, a security expert to assign weights.
Non-experts can not use the method easily.
 The attack vectors have been identiﬁed based on the history of attacks on each operating
system (i.e. Windows, Linux). However, since the process is performed manually, it is not
possible to determine if all attack vectors have been identiﬁed.
 The approach focuses on measuring the attack surfaces of operating systems and cannot
be generalized to other software systems such as web servers, IMAP servers, and software
applications.
6.1.1.2 Software Systems Attack Surface
Manadhata et al. [MWFM06, MKW08, Man08, MW10], deﬁne a system's attack surface as the
subset of resources used to attack a system. Not all resources are part of the attack surface, nor all
of them equally contribute to the attack surface measurement. An attacker may use the system's
entry and exit points, channels, and untrusted data items to attack the target. The set of entry
and exit points are methods (e.g., get, read, write, print,...) that receive/send data items directly
from/to the system's environment. Channels (e.g., TCP, SSL, Unix socket,...) are used to connect
to the system and invoke a method. Data items (e.g., ﬁles, cookies, database records, registry
entries,...) are used by the system'users to send/receive data indirectly into/from the system.
The proposed approach measures the attack surface of a software system (e.g., IMAP server,
FTP daemons, Operating Systems) based on the analysis of its source code, through three dimen-
sions: methods, channels, and data. The system's attack surface measurement is quantiﬁed as the
triple shown in Equation 6.1.
AS =
〈 ∑
mMEs
derm(m),
∑
cCEs
derc(c),
∑
dIEs
derd(d)
〉
(6.1)
Where:
MEs is the system's set of entry and exit points;
CEs is the system's set of channels;
IEs is the system's set of untrusted data items;
derm(m) is the damage potential and eﬀort ratio for the methods;
derc(c) is the damage potential and eﬀort ratio for the channels;
derd(d) is the damage potential and eﬀort ratio for the data items.
Hence, the smaller the attack surface, the more secure the system. A small attack surface
mitigates the risk by making the exploitation harder and by lowering the exploitation's damage.
The method to calculate a system's attack surface is summarized as follows:
1. Given a system S1, and its environment E, identify a set of entry and exit points (MES1), a
set of channels (CES1), and a set of untrusted data items (I
E
S1) of A.
2. Estimate the damage potential-eﬀort ratio, derm(m), of each method m ∈MES1; the damage
potential-eﬀort ratio derc(c), of each channel c ∈ CES1; and the damage potential-eﬀort ratio
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derd(d), of each data item d ∈ IES1.
3. Calculate the attack surface using Equation 6.1.
4. The attack surface of a system S1 (MES1, C
E
S1, I
E
S1) is larger than the attack surface of a sys-
tem S2 (MES2, C
E
S2, I
E
S2) if either:
i MES1 ⊃MES2∧ CES1 ⊇ CES2∧ IES1 ⊇ IES2, or
ii MES1 ⊇MES2∧ CES1 ⊃ CES2∧ IES1 ⊇ IES2, or
iii MES1 ⊇MES2∧ CES1 ⊇ CES2∧ IES1 ⊃ IES2
A resource's contribution to the attack surface of a system depends on the potential damage
of resources (i.e., the level of harm the attacker causes to the system by using the resource and
the eﬀort the attacker expends to obtain the privileges in order to use the resources in an attack).
Thus, the higher the potential damage or the lower the eﬀort, the higher the resource's contribution
to the attack surface. Similar to the cost-beneﬁt ratio, the resource's contribution is quantiﬁed as a
damage-eﬀort ratio, where the damage is the beneﬁt of the attacker in using the system's resource
and the eﬀort is the cost to the attacker in using the resource.
The measurement of a system's attack surface over three dimensions allows system adminis-
trators to choose a dimension appropriate to their need. However, the method presents several
shortcomings:
 The approach is only used to evaluate the attack surface of a code source, in the absence of
source code, the proposed methodology is useless.
 The damage potential estimation includes only technical impact (e.g., privilege elevation)
and not monetary impact (e.g., monetary loss).
 The attack surface model only compares the level of attackability between two similar sys-
tems. No attempt has been made to compare the attack surface of diﬀerent system environ-
ments.
 The method does not make assumptions about the capabilities of attackers or resources in
estimating the damage potential-eﬀort ratio. Instead, it proposes to assign numeric values
to each attribute based on the expert knowledge on the system and its environment.
 The methodology does not allow the security administrator to evaluate multiple attacks
occurring simultaneously in a given system.
6.1.1.3 Other Attack Surface Approaches
Petajasoja et al. [PKTT11] propose an approach to analyse a system's attack surface using the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). As a result, it is possible to identify most critical
interfaces and help in prioritizing the test eﬀort. However, this approach limits the attack surface
to known vulnerabilities, it is not meant to be used as a reaction strategy and only compares
relative security of similar infrastructures.
Microsoft has recently realised an attack surface analyser tool [Fis12] that identiﬁes changes
made to an operating system attack surface by the installation of new software. However the
tool can be used only for Windows operating systems and is useless to measure a network attack
surface.
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Taking into account the aforementioned limitations, we propose a geometric approach to model
the information derived from a URI into a coordinate system following the OrBAC formalism. Each
axis in our coordinate system is assigned a weighting factor based on the CARVER methodology.
The remaining of this section details the CARVER approach, the URI, and the OrBAC model.
6.1.2 CARVER Methodology
Norman [Nor10] and the Federation of American Scientists [oAS91] propose a methodology to
measure the priority of each element in a given system, based on the following factors:
 Criticality (C) measures the impact that an asset has on carrying out the organization's
mission. A target is said to be critical when its destruction or damage has a signiﬁcant impact
on production or service. Criticality depends on several factors such as: time (e.g., the speed
at which the impact of a target aﬀects operations), quality (e.g., the level of damage caused
to output, production or service), surrogate (e.g., eﬀect in the output, production or service),
relativity (e.g., number of targets, position, relative value).
 Accessibility (A) refers to the ability and means to communicate or interact with a system,
use system resources to handle information, gain knowledge of the information the system
contains, or control system components and functions [Kis11].
 Recuperability (R) measures the time that a target needs to replace, repair, or bypass
destruction or damage. Recuperability varies with the available sources and type of targeted
components.
 Vulnerability (V) is a weakness in an information system, system security procedures,
internal controls, or implementation that can be exploited or triggered by a threat source
[Kis11]. A target is vulnerable if the operational element has the means and expertise to
successfully attack the target.
 Eﬀect (E)measures all signiﬁcant impact (whether desired or not), at the target and beyond,
that may result once the selected target is attacked.
 Recognizability (R) is the degree to which a target can be recognized by an operational
element. Factors such as the size and complexity of the target, the existence of distinctive
signatures, the presence of masking or camouﬂage inﬂuence the level of recognizability of a
given target.
The methodology assigns numerical values on a scale of 1 to 10 to each considered factor and
places them in a decision matrix. The sum of the values indicate the severity of a given dimension.
This methodology is used in Section 6.2.3 to assign a weight to each axis, and each element of the
axis composing the coordinate system.
6.1.3 Uniform Resource Identiﬁer (URI)
Today, the universal manner in which a computing resource is accessed is by using a Uniform
Resource Identiﬁer (URI). A URI is a compact sequence of characters that identiﬁes an abstract or
physical resource [JW04,BLFM05]. URIs constitute an agreement about how the Internet commu-
nity allocates names and associates them with the resources they identify. URIs are characterized
as follows:
 Uniform: by allowing diﬀerent types of resource identiﬁers to be used in the same context,
as well as uniform semantic interpretation of common syntactic conventions across diﬀerent
types of resource identiﬁers.
 Resource: by allowing abstract concepts (e.g., operators and operands of a mathematical
equation, types of relationships, or numeric values such as zero, one, inﬁnity); as well as
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concrete concepts (e.g., electronic documents, images, services) to be accessible.
 Identiﬁer: by giving a unique identiﬁcation (e.g., name, address, context) to distinguish a
resource among others
Considering that the information provided in a URI can be used to identify an attack, it is
therefore an essential element in the attack and risk evaluation. The generic URI syntax con-
sists of a hierarchical sequence of components referred to as scheme, authority, path, query, and
fragment [BLFM05], as shown in Listing 6.1. Appendix C provides more details on each URI
component.
Listing 6.1 - URI Generic Syntax
e . g . , f oo : // exemple . com:8042/ over / the re ?name=f e r r e t#nose
[ scheme ] [ author i ty ] [ path ] [ query ] [ fragment ]
6.1.4 OrBAC Model for Countermeasures
The Organization Based Access Control (OrBAC) is a model designed to specify security policies
at the organizational level. In our approach, the OrBAC model deﬁnes the countermeasures to
be implemented. OrBAC uses abstract entities (Role, Activity, View) instead of concrete entities
(subject, action, object) to reason on the roles that subjects, actions and objects play in an or-
ganization. These entities are deﬁned by Abou et al., [KBB+03] and Miege [Mie05], as shown in
Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 - OrBAC Entities
Concrete Abstract
Subjects: model either active entities (e.g.
user Alice, and Bob) or organizations
Roles: refer to groups of subjects with the
same permissions (e.g. administrators, inter-
nal users, and external users)
Actions: model mainly computer actions
(e.g. access, read, and write)
Activities: regroup actions that share the
same principles (e.g. consulting, transferring,
and paying bills)
Objects: model inactive entities (e.g. logs,
and account information.)
Views: regroup objects that possess the same
properties (e.g. Log server, Account Manage-
ment Server)
The main objective of this model is to allow organizations to deﬁne their own security policies.
OrBAC links abstract entities (e.g. roles, activities, views) and concrete entities (e.g. subjects,
actions and objects) throughout relationships (e.g. empower, consider, use). In this manner, for a
given organization, subject `s' is empowered in the role `r'; action `α' is considered in activity `a';
and object `o' is used in view `v'.
OrBAC policies can be seen as a two-level security policy: on the one hand, abstract autho-
rizations (e.g. Permission, Prohibition, Obligation) are granted to organizational entities (e.g.
Organizations, Roles, Activities, Views, Contexts), and on the other hand, concrete authorizations
(e.g. Is_permitted, Is_ prohibited, Is_Obliged) are granted to concrete entities (e.g. Subjects,
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Actions, Objects). In addition, as described by Miege [Mie05], and Cuppens et al. [CCBM04] it
is possible to consider hierarchies in organizations, roles, activities and views, which allows the
inheritance of Permissions, Prohibitions and Obligations associated with these hierarchies. These
policies are deﬁned as predicates in the OrBAC model.
Equation 6.2 gives an example of an abstract security policy, and Equation 6.3 presents an
example of a concrete security policy expressed in the OrBAC model.
Permission(org, r, a, v, c) (6.2)
Meaning that organization `org' grants role `r' the positive authorization to perform activity
`a' on view `v' in context `c'.
Is_permitted(s, α, o) (6.3)
Meaning that subject `s' is permitted to perform a concrete action `α' on object `o'.
Miege [Mie05], and Cuppens et al. [CCB07] propose the deﬁnition of dynamic policies through
OrBAC contexts, which speciﬁes conditions that must be satisﬁed in order to activate a security
policy. Each context is seen as a ternary relation between subjects, actions, and objects deﬁned
within an organization. This derives the hold predicate shown in Equation 6.4.
Hold(org, s, α, o, c) (6.4)
Meaning that in an organization org, subject `s' performs an action `α' over an object `o' within
a particular context `c'. Diﬀerent contexts have been deﬁned as: temporal (related to the time
at which a subject requests to access the system), spatial (related to the subject location), user-
declared (which depends on the subject purpose), prerequisite (which depends on the characteristics
that join a subject, an action and an object) and provisional (related to previous actions performed
by the subject on the system) to model security policies. In our approach, contexts are used to
activate countermeasures.
6.2 Coordinate System
Similar to the Cartesian Coordinate System, we propose a coordinate system composed of three
dimensions with the following characteristics:
 The system is composed of three orthogonal axes, any two of them being perpendicular,
 There exists a single unit of length for all three axes,
 There exists a single orientation for each axis.
The three axes are bounded by the size of the system. The volume encompassed by the
three axes represents the risk at which the system is exposed, and corresponds to the maximum
attack volume. Inside this volume, we ﬁnd sub-volumes that correspond to the attacks and/or
countermeasures applied on the system.
It is important to mention that we chose to model the coordinate system using 3 axes due to
the fact that we obtain from a URI the 3 main components of an information system (i.e. subject,
object, and action). However, the number of axes in our coordinate system may change. We have
a ﬂexible system that is modeled in three dimensions (i.e. user account, resource, and channel),
similar to the OrBAC model, but it can be adapted for two, four or more dimensions.
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The remaining of this section presents the volume deﬁnition, as well as the dimensions com-
posing our coordinate system, and the assigned weight to each dimension.
Figure 6.1 - Volume Graphical Representation
6.2.1 Volume Deﬁnition
A volume is the quantity of three-dimensional space enclosed by some closed boundary [Har10]. We
study 3 types of volumes: the system volume (the maximal space susceptible to be attacked), the
attack volume (part of the system volume that is compromised), and the countermeasure volume
(part of the system volume that is protected by a given countermeasure). For each element we deﬁne
the system dimensions (discussed in Section 6.2.2), and we assign a weighting factor depending on
the contribution of each axis to the calculation of the volume. This weighting factor corresponds
to the criticality of each element represented on the axis, as well as, the relative criticality of an
axis to another. Figure 6.1 depicts the graphical representation of each type of volume.
6.2.1.1 System Volume (SV):
It represents the maximal space a given system (e.g. S1) is exposed to attackers. This volume
includes tangible assets (e.g., PCs, mobile phones, network components, etc.), as well as intangible
assets (e.g., conﬁdential information, business reputation, etc) that are vulnerable to known and
unknown threats. Each of these assets are represented in the system volume as user accounts,
channels, and/or resources.
6.2.1.2 Attack Volume (AV):
Within the complete system volume exposed to attackers (including all possible vulnerable re-
sources of the given system), we concentrate on a given attack to identify the portion of the
volume being targeted based on the vulnerabilities it can exploit. These vulnerabilities are related
to all the dimensions that comprise the system volume (i.e. user accounts, channels, and resources).
Vulnerabilities are generally mistakes made by programmers when writing software (e.g. typos,
math errors, incomplete logic or incorrect use of functions or commands). These vulnerabilities
can be used directly by hackers to access protected data, which in turns allows them to modify
information, use the system to their own advantage, shut-down services, or publicly access systems
without the organization's knowledge [Mar01].
83
CHAPT 6. ATTACK VOLUME: FORMALIZATION AND MODELING
6.2.1.3 Countermeasure Volume (CV):
The countermeasure volume represents the level of action that a security solution has on a given
system. In other words, the countermeasure volume is the percentage of the system volume that
is covered and controlled by a given countermeasure. An attack is covered by a countermeasure
if their volumes overlap. The countermeasure can exceed the attack volume and cover part of the
system that is not covered by the attack. Two cases are distinguished:
 Total Coverage, where all exploitable vulnerabilities associated to a given attack A1 are
controlled by a given countermeasure (e.g. C1), in this case we have a perfect mitigation
(100% of the attack volume coverage);
 Partial Coverage, where only a portion of the exploitable vulnerabilities associated to a given
attack A1 is controlled by a given countermeasure (e.g. C1).
6.2.2 System Dimensions
In analogy with the OrBAC model, we identiﬁed 3 main dimensions that contribute directly to the
execution of a given attack: User account (subject), Resource (object), and Channel (the way to
execute actions, e.g. connect, read, write, etc). This latter is represented as the transitions between
subjects and objects. For instance, in order to access a web-server (object) of a given organization,
a user (subject) connects to the system by providing his/her login and password (action).
From the URI perspective, we consider the user information as the User account dimension, the
host and port information as the Channel dimension, and the path, query and fragment elements
as the Resource dimension. It is important to note that the URI scheme is not considered in the
deﬁnition of the attack dimensions, since it does not provide valuable information to identify an
attack. The remaining of this section details each dimension.
6.2.2.1 User Account:
A user account is a unique identiﬁer for a user in a given system that allows him/her to connect
and interact with the system's environment. A user account is generally deﬁned by a user name
or login name associated with a password. A user account is associated to a given status in the
system, from which his/her privileges and rights are derived (i.e. super administrator, system
administrator, standard user, guest, internal user, or nobody).
 Super Administrator: Also called root user, is the account with the highest level of access
within the system (i.e. permission to view and modify all ﬁelds on the system). There is
only 1 super administrator in the system.
 System Administrator: It is created by the root user and it is able to view and modify most
ﬁelds of the system. There are as many systems administrators as required.
 Standard User: It is a limited user account that is granted the right to use most software and
system settings that do not aﬀect other users. There are as many standard users as required.
 Guest: This is a user account with a temporary access to the system. Guest accounts have
the same access as standard users but it is further restricted by not being able to install
software, hardware or change settings. There are as many guests as required.
 Internal User: It is used for a person who has a member status and uses this account to access
and interact with the system. An internal user has restricted rights (e.g. it cannot access the
administrator interface, but it can perform simple edit operations on the interface). There
are as many local users as required.
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 Nobody: It is a user account that owns no ﬁles, is in no privileged groups, and has no abilities
except those which every other user has.
Table 6.2 presents the diﬀerent categories of user accounts according to their associated rights
and privileges.
Table 6.2 - User Account Categories
User Account
Rights and Privileges
Read Write Modify Admin Access
Super Admin all all all yes
System Admin all most most yes
Standard User all some some no
Guest all few few no
Internal User all few few no
Nobody all none none no
6.2.2.2 Channel:
In order to have access to a particular resource, a user must use a given channel. This section
considers the IP address and the port number to represent channels in TCP/IP connections.
However, each organization must deﬁne the way its users connect to the system and have access
to the organization's resources.
6.2.2.2.1 IP Address: The Internet Protocol (IP) address is a unique numerical label as-
signed to each device on a network (e.g. PC, printer). The IP address oﬀers two main functions:
(i) Identiﬁcation of the host or network interface, and (ii) Location addressing [oSC80]. There are
two versions of the IP addresses: IPv4, which deﬁnes an IP address as a 32-bit unit, limiting the
address space to 4,294,976,296 (232) possible unique addresses [Tou13]; and IPv6, which deﬁnes
an IP address as a 128-bit unit, limiting the space to a maximum of 3.403 × 1038 (2128) unique
addresses [DH95].
IP address can be either public, private, or reserved for special purposes [CVBH13]. Public IP
addresses are those used when communicating with or connecting to the Internet. These addresses
are designated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) [CET+11] for use in web
servers, e-mail servers, ﬁrewalls and other devices that are directly connected to the Internet.
Private IP addresses are those assigned to a device on a private TCP/IP Local Area Network
(LAN) that is accessible only within the LAN. For a resource inside the LAN to be accessible over
the Internet, a device within the LAN must be connected to the Internet with a public IP address,
and the network must be appropriately conﬁgured. Special purpose IP address are those reserved
for particular purposes e.g. tests, loopback, broadcast, or just reserved for further allocation.
Examples of public, private and reserved IP address are depicted in Table 6.3.
6.2.2.2.2 Port Number: A port is an application-speciﬁc or process-speciﬁc software con-
struct, serving as a communication end-point in a computer's host operating system.
The purpose of a port is to identify diﬀerent applications or processes running on a single
computer and thereby enable them to share a single physical connection to a packet switch network
like the Internet. Port numbers are divided into 3 ranges: The well-known ports, the registered
ports and the dynamic ports [CET+11]. Well-known ports are those from 0 through 1023 (e.g. 20:
File Transfer Protocol, 25: Simple Name System Protocol, 80: HyperText Transfer Protocol, 443:
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Table 6.3 - IP address Categories
IP Address
Types
Characteristics Examples
Public any address or number assigned to a
device accessible over the Internet
1.0.0.0/8, 9.0.0.0/8,
129.0.0.0/8
Private any address or number assigned to a
device accessible only within a LAN
10.0.0.0/8,
172.16.0.0/12,
192.168.0.0/16
Reserved/ Special
purpose
any address or number reserved for
a speciﬁc purpose e.g. loop-back,
broadcast, etc
127.0.0.0/8,
255.255.255.255/32,
240.0.0.0/4
Table 6.4 - Port Number Categories
Class Characteristics Port Numbers
1 Well-known and widely used 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 53, 80, 110, 119, 143, 161, 443
2 Well-known and not widely
used
From 0 to 1023 except ports from Class 1
3 Registered oﬃcial ports that
are used by multiple applica-
tions
1109, 1200, 1337, 1521, 1550, 1761, 2049, 2082,
2083, 2086, 2105, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2399, 2809,
4662, 5000, 5001, 5150, 5228, 5281, 6005, 6100,
6112, 6888, 6969, 7787, 7788, 7937, 8000, 8008,
8080, 8880, 8887, 8888, 9001, 9080, 9800, 9898,
15000, 20000, 26000
4 Registered oﬃcial ports and
not widely used
From 1024 to 49151 except ports from Class 3
5 Private ports From 49152 to 65535
HTTP Secure). Registered ports are those from 1024 through 49151, and dynamic or private ports
are those from 49152 through 65535. Table 6.4 presents the diﬀerent categories of port numbers
according to their use by applications [TKL+13].
6.2.2.3 Resource:
A resource is either a physical component (e.g. host, server, printer) or a logical component (e.g.
ﬁles, records, database) of limited availability within a computer system. We identify 3 elements
from the URI generic syntax (i.e. path, query, and fragment) that can be exploited to have access
to a given resource. It is important to recall that the path section of a URI contains data organized
in hierarchical form, that along with the non-hierarchical query component, serves to identify a
resource. In addition, the query and fragment sections of a given URI allow indirect identiﬁcation
of a secondary resource [BLFM05].
We deﬁned 2 levels of privileges (i.e. root, user), and 7 level of transitions (i.e. read, write,
execute, and their combinations), and we assigned numerical values to each privilege and transitions
based on their characteristics. Table 6.5 summarizes these values.
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Table 6.5 - Privilege and Access Right Values for Resources
Privilege Characteristic Value Transition Characteristic Value
Kernel It grants complete
access to all ﬁles
and commands,
including the
system's kernel.
3 R Read ﬁle names
without additional
information (e.g.
content, size, type)
9
User It allows users to
run a limited num-
ber of applications
in user mode.
1 W Modify a ﬁle or en-
tries in a directory
(e.g. create, delete,
rename)
6
X Execute ﬁles or
scripts, access
ﬁle contents and
meta-info.
6
R-W Read and write 4
R-X Read and execute 4
W-X Write and execute 4
R-W-X Read, write and ex-
ecute
3
6.2.3 Unit Volume Construction
As previously stated, a bijection between the URIs and the coordinate system is required in order
to make the appropriate transformations. A bijection is a function giving an exact pairing of the
elements of two sets [Ger07]. To have an exact pairing between X and Y (where Y needs to be
diﬀerent from X), four conditions must hold:
1. each element of X must be paired with at least one element of Y,
2. no element of X may be paired with more than one element of Y,
3. each element of Y must be paired with at least one element of X,
4. no element of Y may be paired with more than one element of X.
In formal mathematical terms, the function f: X→Y is bijective iﬀ for all y∈Y there is a unique
x∈X such that f(x)=y.
Since the three axes in our coordinate system are independent, the bijection from a URI to
the coordinate system implies three bijections (one for each axis). It is important to note that a
physical object can be accessed in many diﬀerent ways in our system, and the bijective function
must take into account all these ways. For instance, let us suppose that in a given system we have
a DMZ and a private network with a ﬁrewall in between. Depending upon the URI used to access
a machine in the system, the IP address will change. If the machine is seen behind the ﬁrewall, we
will see a private IP address, if the same machine is seen in front of the ﬁrewall, we will see a public
IP address, even though it is the same object. We will have, therefore, a bijection in the objects
but not in their IP addresses. In such a case, we can decide that the two machines correspond to
the same object with the same risk, or we can deﬁne the two machines as two separate objects,
each one with a diﬀerent risk level.
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In those cases where the information of one axis is missing, we propose the following approaches:
a.- The optimistic approach, which suggests working in a 2-dimensional system by eliminating the
axis that does not provide any information. In this case we will work with surfaces instead of
volumes but we will keep the same geometry.
b.- The pessimistic approach, which suggest using the whole axis, making the assumption that the
value of the axis is the same for all the possible cases.
Each axis contributes diﬀerently in the volume calculation. This contribution represents the
criticality of a given element in the execution of an attack. Following the CARVER methodology
(introduced in Section 6.1.2), we assign a weighting factor to each dimension (inter-dimension
normalization), as well as to each category within the dimension (intra-dimension normalization).
The remaining of the section details this methodology.
6.2.3.1 Inter-dimension Normalization:
Each attack dimension represents a portion of the total volume. Table 6.6 presents the CARVER
estimation of each dimension and its corresponding weighting factor.
Table 6.6 - Attack Dimensions Weight
Attack Dimen-
sion
C A R V E R Total % Weight Factor
User Account 8 7 9 7 8 7 46 40% 2
Channel 5 6 5 6 5 4 31 28% 1
Resource 7 6 6 5 7 5 36 32% 1.5
6.2.3.2 Intra-dimension Normalization:
Each category within the axis contributes diﬀerently to the volume calculation. The weighting
factor corresponds to the number of units that represent an instance in a given category. The
remaining of this section details the weighting factor assigned to each category of the attack
dimension.
6.2.3.2.1 User Account: We have previously deﬁned six categories of user accounts (i.e.
super administrator, system administrator, standard user, guest, internal user, and nobody). Each
user account category has an associated weighting factor that corresponds to the CARVER analysis.
Table 6.7 summarizes this information.
In an educational institution, for instance, the president, vice-president, and dean are assigned
`super administrator' accounts, which represents an access to 75-100% of the system's resources,
and a weighting factor equal to 4. Department directors, coordinators and administrative staﬀ
are assigned `system administrator' accounts, which represents an access to 50-75% of the system's
resources, and a weighting factor of 3. Professors, student assistants, PhD students, and contracted
staﬀ are assigned `standard user' accounts, which represents an access to 25-50% of the system's
resources, and a weighing factor of 2. Invited professors are assigned `guest' accounts; and registered
students are assigned `internal user' accounts, both accounts represent an access to 0-25% of the
system's resources, and a weighting factor of 1. All external users are assigned by default the
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Table 6.7 - User Account Weight
User Account Resource
Access
C A R V E R Total % Weight Factor
Super Admin 100% 10 7 8 10 9 5 49 28 4
System Admin 75% 8 7 7 9 8 5 44 25 3
Standard User 50% 5 6 6 7 7 4 35 20 2
Guest 25% 3 3 3 5 4 3 21 12 1
Internal User 25% 3 3 3 5 4 3 21 12 1
Nobody 0% 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 3 0
`nobody' user account, since they have access to none of the system's resources. The weighting
factor to the nobody account is 0.
Figure 6.2 shows the graphical representation of the weighting values for the User Account
dimension.
Figure 6.2 - User Account Weight Scale
6.2.3.2.2 Channels: We have previously deﬁned the most commonly used channels in TCP/IP
connections (i.e. IP address and port numbers). This section presents the normalization of these
channels according to their contribution in the volume measurement.
IP Address: We assigned a weighting factor that ranges from 0 to 3, to each category of IP
address. Table 6.8 summarizes this information.
Table 6.8 - IP Address Weight
IP address C A R V E R Total % Weight Factor
Public 10 9 7 9 8 7 50 60 3
Private 5 1 5 3 5 3 22 27 1
Reserved/ Special purpose 3 3 3 1 3 1 11 13 0
Figure 6.3 shows the graphical representation of the weighting values for the IP Address element.
Figure 6.3 - IP Address Weight Scale
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As depicted in Figure 6.3, public IP addresses are more likely to be used in the execution of an
attack, representing a weighting factor of 3 units. Private IP addresses represent a weighting factor
of 1 unit, and reserved/special purpose IP address are not very likely to be used in the execution
of an attack, representing a weighting factor of 0 units.
Port Number: We assigned a weighting factor that ranges from 0 to 2,5 to each of the 5
previously deﬁned categories of port numbers. Table 6.9 summarizes this information.
Table 6.9 - Port Number Weight
Port Number C A R V E R Total % Weight Factor
Class 1 10 9 8 10 7 8 52 31 3
Class 2 8 7 8 5 5 8 41 25 2
Class 3 7 8 5 9 5 7 41 25 2
Class 4 3 2 3 4 3 5 20 12 1
Class 5 2 1 3 3 1 2 12 7 0
Figure 6.4 shows the graphical representation of the weighting values for the port number
element.
Figure 6.4 - Port Number Weight Scale
As depicted in Figure 6.4, Class 1 ports are more likely to be used in the execution of an
attack, representing a weighting factor of 3 units. Class 2 and 3 ports are less likely to be used in
the execution of an attack, representing a weighting factor of 2 units. Class 4 ports represent a
weighting factor of 1 unit, and Class 5 Ports are not very likely to be used in the execution of an
attack, representing a weighting factor of 0 units.
The resulting IP-Port couple is then represented as the sequence of aﬀected IP address, followed
by the active port numbers in ascending order (e.g. IP1, IP2,..., IPn, Port1, Port2,..., Portn).
6.2.3.2.3 Resource: Resources are used to attack a given system only if the attacker has the
appropriate access rights and privileges. However, in order to acquire the required permissions,
attackers must spend some eﬀort. We assigned a weight to each resource based on the eﬀort to
obtain the access rights and privileges associated to a given resource.
The index that results from the division between the Privilege (PR) value and the Transition
(TR) value (i.e. PRTR ) represents the level of access assigned to a given resource on the system.
Table 6.10 summarizes this information and shows the weighting factor assigned to each resource
dimension type.
Figure 6.5 shows the graphical representation of the weighting values for the resource dimension.
As shown in Figure 6.5, a compromised resource with a kernel privilege and Read-Write-Execute
transition is assigned a weight of 5 units; a kernel privilege and Read-Write, Read-Execute, or
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Table 6.10 - Resource Weight
Resource Type Access C A R V E R Total % Weight
Factor
Kernel & R-W-X 100 10 10 9 9 9 8 55 23 5
Kernel & W-X/R-X/R-W 75 8 9 9 9 7 8 50 21 4
Kernel & W/X 50 6 7 7 8 7 5 40 17 3
Kernel & R / User & R-W-X 33 5 5 6 7 6 5 34 14 2
User & W-X/R-X/R-W 25 5 5 6 5 4 5 30 13 2
User & W/X 17 3 3 5 3 2 3 19 8 1
User & R 11 1 2 2 1 1 3 10 4 0
Figure 6.5 - Resource Weight Scale
Write-Execute transition is assigned a weight of 4 units; a kernel privilege with Write or Execute
transition is assigned a weight of 3 units; and a kernel privilege with a Read-only transition is
assigned a weight of 2 units. Similarly, a compromised resource with a user privilege and Read-
Write-Execute transition is assigned a weight of 2 units; a user privilege with Read-Write, Read-
Execute, or Write-Execute transition is assigned a weight of 2 units; a user privilege with Write or
Execute transition is assigned a weight of 1 unit; and a user privilege with a Read-only transition
is assigned a weight of 0 units.
6.3 Axis Contribution in the Volume Calculation
The contribution of a given axis (CoAx) in the volume calculation is determined as the union of
all its elements `E' that belongs to a given class `c' from the system `S' times its corresponding
weighting factor `WF', as proposed in Deﬁnition 1:
Deﬁnition 1: Axis contribution in the volume calculation
CoAx(S) =
∑n
i=0 Count(E ∈ c(S))×WFc
6.3.1 User Account:
The contribution of the user account dimension (CoAcc) in the calculation of the volume of system
S1 is determined as the sum of all active user accounts times their corresponding weighting factor,
as shown in Deﬁnition 1.1:
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Deﬁnition 1.1: User Account Contribution in the Volume Calculation
CoAcc(S1) = (Count(E ∈ admin*(S1)) × WF(admin*)) + (Count(E ∈ admin(S1)) ×
WF(admin)) + (Count(E ∈ std_user(S1)) × WF(std_user)) + (Count(E ∈ int_user(S1))
× WF(int_user)) + (Count(E ∈ guest (S1)) × WF(guest))
Given a system S1, all of the system's resources `r' are modiﬁed by the super administrator
`admin*', most of `r' are modiﬁed by the system administrator `admin', some of `r' are modiﬁed
by the standard user `std_user', few of `r' are modiﬁed by internal users `int_user' and/or guest
users 'guest', and none of `r' is modiﬁed by external users `nobody'; thus a compromised `admin*'
represents an access to 100% of `r', a compromised `admin' represents an access to 75% of `r', a
compromised `std_user' represents an access to 50% of `r', a compromised `int_user' or `guest'
represents an access to 25% of `r',and a compromised `nobody' represents an access to 0% of `r'.
6.3.2 Channel:
The contribution of the channel dimension (CoIp−Port) in the calculation of the volume of system
S1 is determined as the sum of the contributions of the IP address and the Port number, as shown
in Deﬁnition 1.2:
Deﬁnition 1.2: Channel contribution in the volume calculation
CoIp−Port(S1) = CoIp(S1) + CoPort(S1)
The remaining of this section deﬁnes the calculation of each channel element.
6.3.2.1 IP Address:
The contribution of the IP address (CoIp) in the calculation of the volume of system S1 is deter-
mined as the sum of all IP addresses composing system S1 times their corresponding weighting
factor, as shown in Deﬁnition 1.2.1:
Deﬁnition 1.2.1: IP contribution in the volume calculation
CoIp(S1) = Count(E ∈ Public_IP(S1)) ×WF(Public_IP) + Count(E ∈ Private_IP (S1))
×WF(Private_IP)
6.3.2.2 Port Number:
The contribution of the Port number (CoPort) in the calculation of the volume of system S1 is
determined as the sum of all open ports composing system S1 times their corresponding weighting
factor, as shown in Deﬁnition 1.2.2:
Deﬁnition 1.2.2: Port contribution in the volume calculation
CoPort(S1) = (Count(E ∈ class1(S1)) ×WF(class1)) + (Count(E ∈ class2(S1)) ×WF(class2))
+ (Count(E ∈ class3(S1)) ×WF(class3)) + (Count(E ∈ class4(S1)) ×WF(class4))
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Given a system S1, well known and widely used ports are represented by `Class 1', well-known
but not widely used ports are represented by `Class 2', registered oﬃcial ports that are used by
multiple applications are represented by `Class 3', registered oﬃcial ports and not widely used are
represented by `Class 4', and private ports are represented by `Class 5'; thus a compromised `Class
1' port results into an access of 100% of resources, a compromised `Class 2' port results into an
access of 75% of resources, a compromised `Class 3' port results into an access of 50% of resources,
a compromised `Class 4' port results into an access of 25% of resources, and a compromised `Class
5' port results into an access of 0% of `r'.
6.3.3 Resource:
The contribution of the resource dimension (CoRes) in the calculation of the volume of system S1
represents the sum of all system's resources times its corresponding weighting factor, as shown in
Deﬁnition 1.3.
Deﬁnition 1.3: Resource contribution in the volume calculation
CoRes(S1) =
∑n
i=0 Count(E ∈ Resi(S1)) ×WF (i)
It is important to note from Deﬁnition 1.3, that the contribution of the resource dimension in
the measurement of the surface volume requires the sum of all similar resources (i.e. resources with
equal privileges and transitions) in order to assign a corresponding weighting factor. This latter is
given in Table 6.10.
6.4 Volume Calculation
The projection of the three axis in our coordinate system generates a parallelepiped in three
dimensions. The volume of a parallelepiped is the product of the area of its base `A' and its height
`h'. The base is any of the six faces of the geometric ﬁgure, whereas the height is the perpendicular
distance between the base and the opposite face. In Figure 6.6, for instance, the base of the
parallelepiped is formed by the Channel (Ip-Port) and the Resource (Res) dimensions; and the
height is formed by the user account (Acc) dimension.
Figure 6.6 - Volume Representation
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An alternative method to calculate the volume of a parallelepiped is performed by the scalar
product of its vectors. For instance, having vectors a=(a1, a2, a3), b=(b1, b2, b3), and c=(c1, c2,
c3) to represent three edges that meet at one vertex, the volume then equals the absolute value of
the scalar triple product (i.e. V=|a × (b × c)| = |b × (c × a)| = |c × (a × b)|.
The remaining of this section details the calculation of the diﬀerent volumes deﬁned in Section
6.2.1.
6.4.1 System Volume (SV) Calculation:
Consider a system S1, which is a vector composed of three elements: a set of user accounts (Acc),
a set of IP address and open ports (Ip-Port), and the system's resource (Res). The volume of sys-
tem S1 is represented by the vector SV(S1)= (CoAcc(S1), CoIp−Port(S1), CoRes(S1)). The system
volume is calculated as the product of the axis contribution and its corresponding weighting factor,
as shown in Deﬁnition 2.
Deﬁnition 2: System volume calculation
SV (S1) = CoAcc(S1)× WF(Acc) ×CoIp−Port(S1)× WF(Ip-Port) × CoRes(S1)× WF(Res)
6.4.2 Attack Volume (AV) Calculation:
Consider A1 as a given attack, SVAcc(A1) as the A1'user account-based volume, SVIp−Port(A1) as
the A1'Channel-based volume, and SVRes(A1) as the A1'resource-based volume. The volume of
attack A1 is represented by the vector: AV (A1) = (CoAcc(A1), CoIp−Port(A1), CoRes(A1)). The
attack volume is calculated as the product of the axis contribution and its corresponding weighting
factor, as shown in Deﬁnition 3.
Deﬁnition 3: Attack volume calculation
AV (A1) = CoAcc(A1)× WF(Acc) × CoIp−Port(A1)× WF(Ip-Port) × CoRes(A1)× WF(Res)
The coverage (Cov) of a given attack A1 in the system S1 is computed as the ratio between the
attack volume (AV(A1)) and the the system volume (SV(S1)), as shown in Deﬁnition 3.1:
Deﬁnition 3.1: System-based attack coverage
Cov(A1/S1) =
AV (A1∩S1)
SV (S1)
× 100
6.4.3 Countermeasure Volume (CV) Calculation:
Consider a given countermeasure C1, a set of user accounts as the attack vector `Acc', a set of IP
address and ports as the attack vector `Ip-Port', and the system's resource as the attack vector
`Res'. The volume of countermeasure C1 is represented by the vector: CV (C1) = (CoAcc(C1),
CoIp−Port(C1), CoRes(C1)). The countermeasure volume is calculated as the product of the axis
contribution and its corresponding weighting factor, as shown in Deﬁnition 3.
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Deﬁnition 4: Countermeasure volume calculation
CV (C1) = CoAcc(C1)× WF(Acc) × CoIp−Port(C1)× WF(Ip-Port) × CoRes(C1)× WF(Res)
The coverage (Cov) of a given countermeasure (C1) respect to a given attack (e.g. A1) is
calculated as the ratio between the countermeasure volume overlapping with the attack volume
(CV(C1 ∩A1)) and the attack volume (AV(A1)), as shown in Deﬁnition 4.1:
Deﬁnition 4.1: Attack-based countermeasure coverage
Cov(C1/A1) =
CV (C1∩A1)
AV (A1)
× 100
From Deﬁnition 4.1, the higher the ratio, the greater the mitigation level.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced the attack volume as an improvement of the attack surface model pro-
posed by Howard et al. [How04,HW07] and Manadhata et al. [MWFM06,MKW08,Man08,MW10].
Based on the several limitations derived by the implementation of the attack surface model, we pro-
posed an approach to model the information retrieved by a URI into a three-dimensional coordinate
system (i.e. user, channel, and resource). All axes of the coordinate system are complementary,
and relate to the OrBAC model, where the user account is modeled as a subject (role), with cer-
tain privileges; the channel is modeled as an action (with the required parameters) that carries on
protocols to identify resources on the system; and the resource is modeled as an object (machine)
with a path in the URI.
We propose a weighting factor, based on the CARVER methodology, to assign a weight on each
axis according to six criteria (i.e. criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, eﬀect and
recognizability). As a result, we are able to establish a direct connection between volumes and
risks (e.g. big volume equals high risk). The ﬁgure that results from the projection of the 3 axis
represents a parallelepiped, whose volume is then compared with other volumes on the system.
Countermeasures are selected based on their coverage with respect to the attack volume.
In order to measure the volume of multiple attacks, a geometric approach is proposed in the
next chapter, where the union and intersection of multiple volumes are calculated.
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Attack Volume:
Geometric Approach
Progress lies not in enhancing what is,
but in advancing towards what will be.
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I
nnovation in Information Technology has brought numerous advancements but also some
97
CHAPT 7. ATTACK VOLUME: GEOMETRIC APPROACH
consequences. Cyber attacks have evolved along with technology, reaching a state of high
eﬃciency and performance. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), and Botnets, as well as Low
and Slow Attacks are examples of this evolution. Attackers are becoming stronger and harder to
detect, making the mitigation process a big challenge for security analysts. Part of the complexity
is due to the fact that attacks are often divided into multiple stages, possibly distributed across
multiple sources.
Most of the approaches to mitigate current attacks consider one attack at a time [Tho07,
KCBCD10] by evaluating each step of the attack and proposing security solutions to either stop
it or decrease its severity. However, very few eﬀort is dedicated to study and analyze the eﬀects
of multiple attacks over a given target. Current research focuses on approaches to detect such
attacks and demonstrate their robustness and the diﬃculty to mitigate them [AEG+10, FGV11,
VF10,Fuj10]. Most of these works propose approaches to detect multiple attacks but few of them
propose a methodology to react to these attacks.
This chapter therefore proposes an approach to react against multiple attacks based on the
notion of the attack volume (detailed in Chapter 6). The rest of the chapter is structured as
follows: Section 7.1 brieﬂy introduces the state of the art in multiple attack scenarios, Section
7.2 describes the process to calculate the union and intersection of attack volumes. Section 7.3
discusses the countermeasure volume for multiple attacks. Section 7.4 deploys a case study to
evaluate appropriate countermeasures in a scenario of multiple attacks. Finally, a discussion about
multiple attack scenarios is given in Section 7.5.
7.1 State of the Art
7.1.1 Multiple Attacks
A computer attack refers to any kind of malicious activity that attempts to collect, disrupt, deny
or destroy information system resources and/or the information itself [Kis11]. Multiple attacks
can be executed over a single or multiple targets.
Most of the attacks on the cyber space consist of opportunistic attacks rather than those
targeted to a speciﬁc entity. A single target attack originates when the attacker speciﬁcally con-
centrates his/her eﬀorts in one person or a given organization. This kind of attacks are highly
more eﬀective and dangerous than others since the actions performed by the malicious entities are
tailored, making it more diﬃcult to detect and stop [Sof09].
A multiple target attack occurs when a malicious entity attacks various parties (regardless of
who the victims are), by using one or various generic ways to attack such parties, hoping that
some of them will be vulnerable to the attack. An attacker generally ﬁnds more interesting to
deploy a multiple target attack than a single targeted one, since the former may provide a higher
probability of success (with possibly less eﬀort) in obtaining sensitive and valuable information
than a single target attack, which requires to focus on a particular subject that might be better
protected against such attacks.
7.1.2 Limitation of Current Solutions
Research in the detection and mitigation of multiple attacks is an open issue. Vetillard et al.
[VF10] present a work that combines logical (software) and physical (hardware) attacks to build
a successful attack path on a platform or application. Authors have shown and implemented an
example of a combined attack that works on a basic implementation of Java Card. The combined
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physical and logical attacks allow a wide range of diﬀerent attacks, which can be implemented on
platforms that were considered suﬃciently safe.
Amiel et al. [AV07] and Clavier et al. [CFGR10] propose a new class of attack called Passive
and Active Combined Attack (PACA) that is eﬀective on defeating symmetric cryptography and a
supposedly state of the art secure AES implementation. Results demonstrate that naively adding
countermeasures together is not suﬃcient to mitigate a combined attack and that implementing
these protections must be done carefully.
Similarly, authors in [DCMS06,MKBS07] explore Coordinated and Distributed Multiple At-
tacks (CDMA), a more damaging and highly synchronized Distributed Denial of Service Attack
(DDoS). Authors determine that CDMAs target multiple vulnerabilities using diverse selection of
protocols as well as varying the attacks over time. The resulting attack is more robust and diﬃcult
to mitigate as multiple attack vectors allow for a large target area on the victim which potentially
gives the attack a greater probability of success.
Liu et al. [LSY11] propose a defense scheme for multiple-target attacks. The solution sets
up heterogeneous thresholds for detecting suspicious items and identiﬁes target items based on
correlation analysis among suspicious items. As a result, the proposed scheme achieves interesting
results in the detection of malicious users and has less impact on normal items that are not under
attack.
To address the aforementioned limitations, we propose a geometric approach to calculate the
union and intersection of multiple attacks, using the notion of attack volume from the previous
chapter. Next section details the complete approach.
7.2 Attack Volume Union and Intersection
The calculation of the Attack Volume (AV) for multiple attacks requires the identiﬁcation of their
union and intersection. The union of two or more attack volumes is bounded and ranges from
the maximum volume of the group of attacks in its lower bound, to the sum of the individual
volumes in its upper bound. The intersection of two or more attack volumes ranges from zero in
its lower bound, to the minimum volume of the group of attacks in its upper bound, as shown in
the Deﬁnition 5.
Deﬁnition 5: Union and Intersection for multiple attacks
AV (A1 ∪ ... ∪An) ∈ [max(AV (A1), ..., AV (An))−
∑
AV (A1), ..., AV (An)]
AV (A1 ∩ ... ∩An) ∈ [0−min(AV (A1), ..., AV (An))]
Two cases can be distinguished in the calculation of the surface union and intersection: joint
and disjoint attack surfaces.
7.2.1 Disjoint Attack Volumes
The volume of one attack is disjoint from another attack volume if they have no elements in
common. Therefore, having n number of disjoint attacks (A1, ..., An), the surface volume of their
union and intersection is calculated using Equations 7.1 and 7.2 respectively.
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AV (A1 ∪ ... ∪An) =
n∑
i=1
AV (Ai) (7.1)
AV (A1 ∩ ... ∩An) = 0 (7.2)
From the previous equations, we derive the following deﬁnition:
Given two attacks (A1, A2), Attacks A1 and A2 are disjoint if their combined volume has no
element in common, therefore, the attack volume of the union is calculated as the sum of their in-
dividual surfaces, and the attack volume of the intersection is equal to 0, as shown in Deﬁnition 5.1:
Deﬁnition 5.1: Union and Intersection for disjoint attacks
iﬀ A1 ∩A2 = ∅ then, AV (A1 ∪A2) =AV (A1) +AV (A2) and AV (A1 ∩A2) =0
7.2.2 Joint Attack Volumes
The Volume of one attack is partially or totally covered by another attack if they share some or
all of their elements. For n number of partially covered attacks (e.g., A1, ..., An), the union is
calculated as the sum of the individual attack volumes minus their intersections (Equation 7.3),
and the intersection volume is calculated as the sum of the individual attack volumes minus their
union (Equation 7.4).
AV (A1 ∪ ... ∪An) =
∑n
i=1AV (Ai)−
∑n
i,j=1
(
n
2
)
AV (Ai ∩Aj)
+
∑n
i,j,k=1
(
n
3
)
AV (Ai ∩Aj ∩Ak) + ...+
(−1)n+1AV (Ai ∩ ... ∩An) (7.3)
AV (A1 ∩ ... ∩An) =
∑n
i=1AV (Ai)−
∑n
i,j=1
(
n
2
)
AV (Ai ∪Aj)
+
∑n
i,j,k=1
(
n
3
)
AV (Ai ∪Aj ∪Ak) + ...+
(−1)n+1AV (Ai ∪ ... ∪An) (7.4)
From the previous equations, we derive the following deﬁnitions:
Given two attacks (A1, A2), Attacks A1 and A2 are joint if their combined volume has at least
one element in common, therefore, the attack volume of the union is calculated as the sum of their
individual volumes minus their intersection, and the attack volume of the intersection is calculated
as the sum of their individual volumes minus their union, as shown in Deﬁnition 5.2.
Deﬁnition 5.2: Union and Intersection for joint attacks
iﬀ A1 ∩A2 6= ∅ then, AV (A1 ∪A2) = AV (A1) +AV (A2)−AV (A1 ∩A2) or
AV (A1 ∩A2) = AV (A1) +AV (A2)−AV (A1 ∪A2)
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Given two attacks (A1, A2), Attack A1 is a subset of Attack A2 if the volume of A1 is a subset
of the volume of A2 (AV(A1)⊆ AV(A2)), therefore, the attack volume of the union is equal to the
attack volume of the bigger attack, and the attack volume of the intersection is equal to the attack
volume of the smaller attack, as shown in Deﬁnition 5.3.
Deﬁnition 5.3: Union and Intersection for totally covered attacks
iﬀ A1 ⊆ A2 then, AV (A1 ∪A2) = AV (A2) and AV (A1 ∩A2) = AV (A1)
Given two attacks (A1, A2), Attacks A1 and A2 have the same volume if Attack A1 is a subset
of Attack A2 and Attack A2 is a subset of Attack A1, therefore, the attack volumes of the union
and the intersection are the same as their individual attack volume (Deﬁnition 5.4.)
Deﬁnition 5.4: Union and Intersection for equal volume attacks
iﬀ A1 ⊆ A2 ∧A2 ⊆ A1 then, AV (A1 ∪A2) = AV (A1 ∩A2) = AV (A1) = AV (A2)
Given two attack volumes as introduced in Deﬁnition 3 from Chapter 6 (e.g., AV (A1) =
〈CoAcc(A1), CoIp−Port(A1), CoRes(A1)〉; AV (A2) = 〈CoAcc(A2), CoIp−Port(A2), CoRes(A2)〉, the
attack volume intersection is calculated as the sum of all elements `E' that are included in both
set of volumes times their corresponding weighting factor, as shown in Deﬁnition 5.5.
Deﬁnition 5.5: Attack volume intersection
AV (A1 ∩A2) = CoAcc(A1 ∩A2)× 2 ×CoIp−Port(A1 ∩A2)× 1 ×CoRes(A1 ∩A2)× 1, 5.
Where:
CoAcc(A1 ∩A2) =
∑n
i=0(Ei ×WF (Ei) | Ei ∈ A1 ∧ Ei ∈ A2).
CoIp−Port(A1 ∩A2) =
∑n
i=0(Ei ×WF (Ei) | Ei ∈ A1 ∧ Ei ∈ A2).
CoRes(A1 ∩A2) =
∑n
i=0(Ei ×WF (Ei) | Ei ∈ A1 ∧ Ei ∈ A2).
From the previous equations, `E' represents the elements associated to each attack dimension
(i.e. IP address, channel, and resource) that are compromised during the execution of a given
attack, and `WF(Ei)' corresponds to the weighting factor of the element Ei as proposed in Section
6.2.3.1.
7.2.3 Dimension-based Attack Volume Calculation
The calculation of the attack volume union and intersection based on a given dimension derives
the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 6: Dimension-based union and intersection for multiple attacks
CoV ec(A1 ∪A2) = CoV ec(A1) + CoV ec(A2)− CoV ec(A1 ∩A2)
CoV ec(A1 ∩A2) =
∑
E∈V ec1∩V ec2 WF (E).
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Given two attacks (A1, A2), a set of elements V ec1={E1, E2, ...En} that are targeted by
A1 in this dimension, and a set of elements V ec2={Ea, Eb, ...Ex} that are targeted by A2, the
contribution of the union to the volume is calculated as the sum of each individual volumes minus
their intersection. The intersection of both attacks is calculated as the sum of the elements that
belong to both dimensions (V ec1, V ec2) times their corresponding weighting factor.
The remaining of this section details the methodology to calculate the attack volume union and
intersection for each attack dimension.
7.2.3.1 User Account:
Given two attacks (A1, A2), a set of user accounts UA1={Acc1, Acc2, ...Accn} that are targeted
by A1, and a set of user accounts UA2={Acca, Accb, ...Accx} that are targeted by A2, the volume
intersection of both attacks based on the user account dimension is calculated as the elements that
belong to both set of user accounts (UA1, UA2) times their corresponding weighting factor, as
shown in Deﬁnition 6.1.
Deﬁnition 6.1: User Account-based volume intersection
CoAcc(A1 ∩ A2) = Count(admin∗ ∈ UA1 ∧ UA2) ×WF (admin∗) + Count(admin ∈ UA1 ∧
UA2)×WF (admin) + Count(std_user ∈ UA1∧UA2)×WF (std_user) + Count(int_user ∈
UA1 ∧ UA2)×WF (int_user) + Count(guess ∈ UA1 ∧ UA2)×WF (guess).
Figure 7.1 - User Account-based volume union and intersection
In Figure 7.1, Attack A1 aﬀects 9 standard users (i.e. U3, U5, U7, U11, U16, U17, U19, U21,
U22) and 1 system admin account (i.e. U101), which represents a contribution on the attack
volume of CAcc (A1) = 21 units (using the weighting factor from Table 6.7). Attack A2 aﬀects
6 standard user accounts (i.e. U5, U7, U14, U16, U17, U25), which represents a contribution on
the attack volume of CoAcc (A2) = 12 units. The union of both attacks covers 11 standard user
accounts and 1 system admin; the account volume contribution based on the union of A1 and A2
is therefore calculated as CoAcc(A1 ∪ A2) = (11 × 2) + (1 × 3) = 25 units. The intersection of
attacks A1 and A2 covers 4 standard user accounts, the account volume contribution based on the
intersection of both attacks is therefore calculated as CoAcc(A1 ∩A2) = (4× 2) = 8 units.
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7.2.3.2 Channel:
As presented in Deﬁnition 1.2, the contribution of the channel dimension (CoIp−Port) in the volume
calculation is determined as the sum of the contributions of the IP address and the Port number.
The remaining of this section deﬁnes the calculation of each channel element.
7.2.3.2.1 IP Address: Given two attacks (A1, A2), a set of IP address I1={IP1, IP2, ..., IPn}
that are targeted by A1, and a set of IP address I2={IPa, IPb, ...IPx} that are targeted by A2,
the volume intersection of both attacks based on the IP address is calculated as the elements that
belong to both set of IP addresses (I1, I2) times their corresponding weighting factor. The contri-
bution (Co) of the IP address is shown in Deﬁnition 6.2.
Deﬁnition 6.2: IP address-based volume intersection
CoIp(A1∩A2) = Count(Public_IP ∈ I1∧I2)×WF(Public_IP) + Count(Private_IP ∈ I1∧I2)×
WF(Private_IP).
Figure 7.2 - IP address-based volume union and intersection
Figure 7.2 shows that having an attack `A1' that is produced in a network composed of the IP
address set [172.20.4.120 - 172.20.4.208], and an attack `A2' that is realised in a network composed
of the IP address set [172.20.4.195 - 172.20.4.240], we determine the IP address volume contribution
based on A1 as CoIP (A1) = 267 units, and the IP address volume contribution based on A2 as
CIP (A2) = 138 units (using the weighting factor from Table 6.8). The intersection between attacks
A1 and A2 results into the IP range [172.20.4.195 - 172.20.4.208], with an IP-based attack volume
contribution of CoIP (A1 ∩A2) = 42 units; and the union of attacks A1 and A2 results into the IP
range [172.20.4.120 - 172.20.4.240], with an IP-based attack volume contribution of CoIP (A1∪A2)
= 363 units.
7.2.3.2.2 Port Number: Given two attacks (A1, A2), a set of port numbers P1={Port1,
Port2, ...Portn} that are targeted by A1, and a set of IP address P2={Porta, Portb, ...Portx}
that are targeted by A2, the surface intersection of both attacks based on the port number is cal-
culated as the elements that belong to both set of port numbers (P1, P2) times their corresponding
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weighting factor, as shown in Deﬁnition 6.3.
Deﬁnition 6.3: Port-based volume intersection
CoPort(A1 ∩ A2) = Count(class1 ∈ P1 ∧ P2) × WF (class1) + Count(class2 ∈ P1 ∧ P2) ×
WF (class2) + Count(class3 ∈ P1 ∧ P2) × WF (class3) + Count(class4 ∈ P1 ∧ P2) ×
WF (class4).
Figure 7.3 - Port-based volume union and intersection
In Figure 7.3, Attack A1 aﬀects the execution of 10 ports, ﬁve of which belong to Class 1 (i.e.
20, 53, 80, 161, 443), and the rest belong to Class 2 (i.e. 57, 118, 156, 213, 220); whereas Attack
A2 has 11 target ports, 8 of which belong to Class 1 (i.e. 20, 25, 80, 110, 119, 143, 161, 443) and
the rest belong to Class 2 (i.e. 115,389, 636). The union of both attacks covers 17 ports, nine of
which belong to Class 1, and the rest belong to Class 2; the port volume contribution based on the
union of A1 and A2 is therefore calculated as CoPort(A1∪A2) = (9×3) + (8×2) = 43 units (using
the weighting factor from Table 6.9). The intersection of attacks A1 and A2 covers 4 ports, all of
them belong to Class 1, the port volume contribution based on the intersection of both attacks is
therefore calculated as CoPort(A1 ∩A2) = (4× 3) = 12 units.
Using Deﬁnition 1.2, we are able to determine the total volume for the union and intersection
of the channel dimension (IP-Port). In the previous example, the contribution Ip-Port for attack
A1 is equal to 292 units, the contribution Ip-Port for attack A2 is equal to 168 units. The channel
dimension contribution based on the union of both attacks is calculated as CoIp−Port(A1 ∪A2) =
363 + 43 = 406 units; and the channel dimension contribution based on the intersection of both
attacks is calculated as CoIp−Port(A1 ∩A2) = 42 + 12 = 54 units
7.2.3.3 Resource:
Given two attacks (A1, A2), a set of resources R1={Res1, Res2, ...Resn} that is targeted by A1,
and a set of resources R2={Resa, Resb, ...Resx} that is targeted by A2, the surface intersection of
A1 and A2 based on the resource dimension is calculated as the sum of the elements that belong to
both set of resources (R1, R2) times their corresponding weighting factor, as shown in Deﬁnition
6.4.
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Deﬁnition 6.4: Resource-based volume intersection
CoRes(A1 ∩A2) =
∑
R∈R1∩R2 WF (R)
Figure 7.4 - Resource-based volume union and intersection
In Figure 7.4, Attack A1 compromises 5 machines with user privilege, and Read-Write-Execute
(RWX) permissions (i.e. r1, r2, r3, r5, r7), and 2 machines with kernel privilege and Write/Execute
(W/X) permissions (i.e. r15, r21), which represents a volume contribution based on the resource
dimension of CoRes(A1) = (5×2)+(2×3) = 16 units (using the weighting factor from Table 6.10).
Attack A2 compromises 5 machines with user privilege, and Read-Write-Execute permissions (i.e.
r1, r3, r4, r7, r9), which represents a volume contribution based on the resource dimension of
CoRes(A2) = (5× 2) = 10 units. The union of both attacks covers 7 machines with user privilege
& RWX permissions, and 2 machines with kernel privilege & W/X permissions; the resource
volume contribution based on the union of A1 and A2 is therefore calculated as CoRes(A1 ∪A2) =
(7 × 2) + (2 × 3) = 20 units. The intersection of attacks A1 and A2 covers 3 machineswith user
privilege & RWX permissions, the resource volume contribution based on the intersection of both
attacks is therefore calculated as CoRes(A1 ∩A2) = (3× 2) = 6 units.
7.3 Countermeasure Volume for multiple attacks
Three cases are distinguished in the calculation of the countermeasure volume for a combined
attack (i.e. totally joint, totally disjoint, and partially joint volumes).
7.3.1 Totally Joint Volumes:
If the volume of attack A1 is totally covered by the volume of attack A2, countermeasures against
A2 are also used against A1 (Figure 7.5).
For instance, let us suppose that attack A1 has as target the IP address range [172.20.4.195 -
172.20.4.240], and attack A2 has as target the IP address range [172.20.0.1 - 172.20.15.254]. Attack
A2 targets a wider range of IP addresses (including the target of attack A1), therefore, only Attack
A2 is analysed and countermeasures for this latter are proposed to face both attacks. The following
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Figure 7.5 - Totally joint volumes
deﬁnition applies for totally joint surfaces:
Given two attacks (A1, A2), Attack A1 is a subset of Attack A2 iﬀ the volume of A1 is a
subset of the volume of A2, therefore, countermeasures(C) for attack A1 are also a subset of the
countermeasures for attack A2, as shown in Deﬁnition 7.
Deﬁnition 7: Countermeasures for totally joint volumes
A1 ⊆ A2, then C(A1) ⊆ C(A2)
7.3.2 Totally Disjoint Volumes:
Attacks A1 and A2 are totally disjoint, their volumes are completely diﬀerent, e.g. they have
diﬀerent targets (Figure 7.6).
Figure 7.6 - Totally disjoint volumes
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For instance, given an attack A1 that targets the IP address range [172.20.4.120 - 172.20.4.194],
and attack A2 that targets the IP address range [172.20.15.197 - 172.20.15.240], their volumes
are disjoint since they do not target the same IP addresses. Since both attacks have no target
in common, they are treated individually, assuming that countermeasures for A1 do not generate
conﬂicts with those for A2. The volume of attack A1 is therefore independent of the volume of
attack A2. The following deﬁnition applies for totally disjoint surfaces:
Given two attacks (A1, A2), Attack A1 is independent of Attack A2 iﬀ their individual volumes
do not have elements in common, therefore, countermeasures (C) for attack A1 are diﬀerent from
those of attack A2, assuming that no conﬂict originates from their implementation, as shown in
Deﬁnition 8.
Deﬁnition 8: Countermeasures for totally disjoint volumes
A1 ∩A2 = then, C(A1) 6= C(A2)
7.3.2.1 Partially Joint Volumes:
If the volume of attack A1 is partially covered by the volume of attack A2, then one countermeasure
is not suﬃcient to mitigate both attacks (Figure 7.7).
For instance, let us suppose that attack A1 has as target the IP address range [172.20.4.195 -
172.20.4.240], and attack A2 has as target the IP address range [172.20.4.120 - 172.20.4.208]. Only
the IP addresses range [172.20.4.195 - 172.20.4.208] is common for both attacks and therefore one
countermeasure will not cover the total attack surface area.
Figure 7.7 - Partially joint volumes
The following deﬁnition applies for partially joint surfaces:
Given two attacks (A1, A2), Attack A1 is partially joint with Attack A2 iﬀ (i) their combined
surface is not independent; (ii) A1's volume is not a subset of A2's volume; and (iii) A2's volume
is not a subset of A1's volume, therefore, countermeasures (C) against one attack is not a proper
subset of the countermeasures against the other attack, as shown in Deﬁnition 9.
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Deﬁnition 9: Countermeasures for partially joint volumes
iﬀ (i) A1 ∩A2 6= and (ii) A1 * A2 and (iii) A2 * A1 then,
C(A1) * C(A2) ∧ C(A2) * C(A1).
7.4 Use Case: Multiple Attacks
Telecom SudParis and Telecom Management are two French state-funded schools for engineers and
managers with more than 3000 student accounts (as of September 2013), and over 600 personnel
and administrative accounts, as shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 - Telecom SudParis User Accounts
Account Group Role Quantity Weight Factor
Administrative personnel
and technicians
Super administrator 263 4
Professors / Researchers System administrator 165 3
PhD Students Standard user 188 2
Interns Standard user 17 2
Students Internal users 3,058 1
In addition, the schools have been assigned a class B network composed of an IP address range
157.159.0.0/16, which represents a total of 65,536 public IP addresses (from which only 4,500 are
active), and use class 1 ports (a total of 12 port numbers) in their communications. The main
types of resources (i.e. machines (hosts), database servers, printers, and websites, shared by these
two institutions are shown in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 - Telecom SudParis Resources
Resource Access Privilege Quantity Weight Factor
Host* Kernel & WRX 30 5
Database Kernel & WRX 10 5
Website Kernel & WR/WX/RX 3 4
Printer Kernel & W/X 50 3
Host User & WRX, User &
WR/WX/RX, Kernel & R
900 2
The authentication service is controlled and maintained by the Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP). In a normal operation, students, and personnel access the school resources by
providing a combination of user login and password. Each element from the user accounts, channels
and resources is assigned a weighting factor, as discussed in Section 6.2.3. Table 7.3 summarizes
the weighting factor results.
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Table 7.3 - Telecom SudParis Resources
Dimension Range Description Quantity Weight Factor
User Ac-
count
U1:U263 super administrator 263 4
U264:U428 system administrator 165 3
U429:U633 standard user 205 2
U664:U3721 internal user 3058 1
Channel Ch1:Ch4500 active public IP address 4500 3
Ch4501:Ch4512Port Class 1 12 3
Resource R1:R40 kernel&WRX 40 5
R41:R43 kernel&WR/WX/RX 3 4
R44:R93 kernel&W/X 50 3
R94:R993 user&WRX, user&
WR/WX/RX, kernel&R
900 2
System Volume Calculation (SV):
1. We need to calculate the contribution (Co) of each dimension. For this, we apply Deﬁnition 1:
CoAcc(S1) = (263× 4) + (165× 3) + (205× 2) + (3, 058× 1)
CoAcc(S1) = 5, 015 units (Deﬁnition 1.1)
CoIp(S1) = (4, 500× 3) = 13, 500 units (Deﬁnition 1.2.1)
CoPort(S1) = (12× 3) = 36 units (Deﬁnition 1.2.2)
CoIp−Port(S1) = 13, 536 units (Deﬁnition 1.2)
CoRes(S1) = (40× 5) + (3× 4) + (50× 3) + (900× 2)
CoRes(S1) = 2, 212 units (Deﬁnition 1.3)
2. We need to calculate the system volume. For this, we apply Deﬁnition 2:
SV (S1) = (5, 015× 2)× (13, 536× 1)× (2, 112× 1.5)
SV (S1) = 430, 106, 901, 440 units
3
7.4.1 Attack Scenario
Telecom SudParis and Telecom Management schools have been targeted with sophisticated attacks.
The attacks originate after a group of students visited a compromised website redirected through
Facebook. The compromised website hosted exploits which then allowed malware to be installed
in the students PCs. This section describes two separated attacks that originate simultaneously in
the system, one of which is performed as a sequence of events.
7.4.1.1 Attack 1: Zeus
Zeus works in social networks, under the assumption that people will click links disguised as fan
pages, social shares, and even friend proﬁles [Hon, BS12]. Students at Telecom SudParis and
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Telecom Management are prompted to install a malware after clicking a link appearing in their
Facebook accounts. The malware sits dormant on the system until users access their bank account,
at which point it makes a copy of their user-names and passwords.
Zeus targets 38 system admin accounts (i.e. U340:U377), 21 public IP addresses (i.e. Ch100:Ch120),
and 21 hosts with user privilege (i.e. R110:R130). The geometric ﬁgure of this attack is depicted
in Figure 7.8.
Figure 7.8 - Graphical Representation of the Zeus Attack
The volume of the Zeus attack is calculated as the product of the three axes (Deﬁnition 3).
AV(A1) = [(38 × 3) × 2] × [(21 × 3) × 1] × [(21 × 2) × 1.5] = 904,932 units3
The Zeus attack contribution in the system volume is determined using Deﬁnition 3.1:
C(A1)/(S1) =
904,932
430,106,901,440 × 100 = 0.0002%
7.4.1.2 Attack 2 (Step 1): Conﬁcker
A second attack, (i.e. Conﬁcker), occurs simultaneously in the system. Conﬁcker is a computer
worm targeting the Microsoft Windows operating system, which uses ﬂaws in Windows software
and dictionary attacks on administrator passwords to propagate while forming a botnet [LW09,
Pis10].
The attack targeted 30 system admin accounts (i.e. U320:U349), 50 student accounts (i.e.
U1110:U1159), 80 public IP addresses (Ch70:Ch149), 5 hosts* with kernel privilege (i.e. R5:R9)
and 13 hosts with user privilege (i.e. R115:R127), all of them through port 80. The volume of this
attack is represented by the union of 4 parallelepipeds, as depicted in Figure 7.9.
Since the four parts of the Conﬁcker attack are disjoint, the volume of this attack is calculated
as the union of attacks A2.1, A2.2, A2.3, and A2.4 (Deﬁnition 5.1). Following Deﬁnitions 3 and 6,
we compute the attack volume of each individual portion of the attack.
AV(A2.1) = [(50 × 1)× 2]× [(80 × 3)× 1] × [(5 × 5) × 1.5] = 900,000 units3
AV(A2.2) = [(50 × 1)× 2] × [(80 × 3)× 1] × [(13 × 2)× 1.5] = 936,000 units3
AV(A2.3) = [(30 × 3)× 2] × [(80 × 3)× 1] × [(5 × 5)× 1.5] = 1,620,000 units3
AV(A2.4) = [(30 × 3)× 2] × [(80 × 3)× 1] × [(13 × 2)× 1.5] = 1,684,800 units3
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Figure 7.9 - Graphical Representation of the Conﬁcker Attack
Then, we are able to calculate the total volume of the Conﬁcker attack (Deﬁnition 5.1):
AV(A2) = (900,000 units3) + (936,000 units3) + (1,620,000 units3) + (1,684,800 units3)
AV(A2)= 5,140,800 units3
The Conﬁcker attack contribution in the system volume is determined using Deﬁnition 3.1:
C(A2)/(S1) =
5,140,800
430,106,901,440 × 100 = 0.0012%
As a result, the Conﬁcker attack represents less than 1% of the total system volume. In addition,
A2 is 5 times bigger than A1, both attacks are partially covered (Attack A1 covers a portion of
Attack A2.4), we need, therefore, to calculate the volume of the combined attack (i.e. A1 & A2).
For this, we use Deﬁnition 5.2 which allows us to calculate the union and intersection for joint
attacks.
Let us ﬁrst calculate the intersection portion of the attacks. By interposing the geometric
representation of both attacks, we identify that 10 system admin accounts (i.e. U340:U349), 21
public IP addresses (i.e. Ch100:Ch120), and 13 hosts with user privilege (R115:R127), are present
in both, Zeus and Conﬁcker attacks (Figure 7.10).
Figure 7.10 - Graphical Representation of Zeus and Conﬁcker Attacks
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The intersection of these two attacks is calculated as follows:
AV (A1 ∩A2) = [(10 × 3)× 2] × [(21 × 3)× 1] × [(13 × 2)× 1.5] = 147,420 units3
This is the priority area to mitigate. Countermeasures should be ﬁrst implemented taking into
account users, channels and resources in this region.
Using Deﬁnition 5.2, we determine the union of the joint attacks as:
AV (A1 ∪A2) = AV (A1) +AV (A2)−AV (A1 ∩A2)
AV (A1 ∪A2) = 904,932 units3 + 5,140,800 units3 - 147,420 units3 = 5,898,312 units3
7.4.1.3 Attack 2 (Step 2): Sequential Conﬁcker
After the Conﬁcker attack compromised the user accounts, channels and resources previously
described, the system detected that the compromised administrator accounts (i.e. U320:U349)
performed a brute force attack over the 10 databases of the system (i.e. R31:R40). This sequential
attack is also performed through channels Ch70:Ch149. Since the attack has changed, it is necessary
to recalculate the attack volume.
AV(A2.5) = [(50 × 1)× 2] × [(80 × 3)× 1] × [(10 × 5)× 1.5] = 1,800,000 units3
AV(A2.6) = [(30 × 3)× 2] × [(80 × 3)× 1] × [(10 × 5)× 1.5] = 3,240,000 units3
Since this portion of the attack is disjoint with the other 4 portions (i.e. A1.1, A1.2, A1.3, and
A1.4), we apply Deﬁnition 5.1 to calculate the volume of the sequential conﬁcker attack:
AV(A2) = (900,000 units3) + (936,000 units3) + (1,620,000 units3) + (1,684,800 units3) +
(1,800,000 units3) + (3,240,000 units3) = 10,180,800 units3
The union of the sequential Conﬁcker and the Zeus attacks is calculated as:
AV (A1 ∪A2) = 904,932 units3 + 10,180,800 units3 - 147,420 units3 = 10,938,312 units3
The graphical representation of the sequential Conﬁcker attack and the Zeus attack is depicted
in Figure 7.11
Figure 7.11 - Graphical Representation of Sequential Conﬁcker & Zeus Attacks
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The Zeus and the sequential Conﬁcker attack contribution in the system volume is determined
as:
C(A1 ∩A2)/(S1) = 10,938,312430,106,901,440 × 100 = 0.0025%
7.4.2 Countermeasure Analysis
Several countermeasures are proposed to react over the Zeus and the Conﬁcker attacks [Kri09,Gud].
However, due to space constraint, we evaluate the three most common solutions for these attack.
The most common countermeasures used to mitigate the Zeus attack are described as follows:
C1.1 Use behavioral detection techniques (e.g. buﬀer overﬂow protection in Host IPS)
C1.2 Download and install antivirus/antimalware on all the machines of the network
C1.3 Make all shares read-only, the trojan easily spreads via shares
The most common countermeasures used to mitigate the Conﬁcker attack are described as
follows:
C2.1 Download and install patches for windows (e.g. KB958644, KB957097, KB958687) on all the
machines of the network and install antivirus/antimalware (e.g. McAfee VirusScan, ToPS
for endpoints), or tools for identiﬁcation of local infections and for vaccination (e.g. Netﬂow)
C2.2 Block access to a list of domains by using a proxy server (e.g. Squid)
C2.3 Create signatures for matching against the shellcode pattern and use them with IDS/IPS
(e.g. Snort)
Table 7.4 summarizes the total coverage and eﬀectiveness information of each countermeasure.
Table 7.4 - Countermeasure Information
Countermeasure User Account Channel Resource Eﬀectiveness
C1.1 U300:U349 Ch1:Ch149 R121:R123 60%
C1.2 U301:U433 Ch100:Ch179 R94:R193 70%
C1.3 U330:U360 Ch1:Ch110 R1:R119 50%
C2.1 U229:U550 Ch51:Ch110 R94:R130 70%
C2.2 U270:U449 Ch70:Ch149 R1:R30 80%
C2.3 U1030:U1160 Ch40:Ch90 R1:R123 75%
7.4.2.1 Countermeasure Volume
Following Deﬁnition 4, we compute the volume of each individual countermeasure.
CV(C1.1) = [(50 × 3)× 2] × [(149 × 3)× 1] × [(3 × 2)× 1.5] = 1,206,900 units3
CV(C1.2) = [(133 × 3)× 2] × [(80 × 3)× 1] × [(100 × 2)× 1.5] = 57,456,000 units3
CV(C1.3) = [(31 × 3)× 2] × [(110 × 3)× 1] × [((40 × 5)+ (3 × 4)+ (50 × 3)+ (26 × 2))× 1.5]
= 25,411,320 units3
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CV(C2.1) = [((35×4)+ (165×3)+ (122×2))×2] × [(60×3)×1] × [(37×2)×1.5] = 35,124,840 units3
CV(C2.2) = [((159 × 3)+ (21 × 2))× 2] × [(80 × 3)× 1] × [(30 × 5) × 1.5] = 56,052,000 units3
CV(C2.3) = [(131 × 1)× 2] × [(51 × 3)× 1] × [((40 × 5)+ (3 × 4)+ (50 × 3)+ (30 × 2))× 1.5]
= 14,551,218 units3
Table 7.5 summarizes the results of the volume calculation for system S1, attacks A1, A2, and
each countermeasure.
Table 7.5 - Resulting Volumes
Element User Account Channel Resource Volume (units3)
S1 U1:U3691 Ch1:Ch4512 R1:R993 430,106,901,440
A1 U320:U349&
U1110:U1159
Ch70:Ch149 R5:R9& R31:R40&
R115:R127
8,380,800
A2 U340:U377 Ch100:Ch120 R110:R130 904,932
C1.1 U300:U349 Ch1:Ch149 R121:R123 1,206,900
C1.2 U301:U433 Ch100:Ch179 R94:R193 57,456,000
C1.3 U330:U360 Ch1:Ch110 R1:R119 25,411,320
C2.1 U229:U550 Ch51:Ch110 R94:R130 35,124,840
C2.2 U270:U449 Ch70:Ch149 R1:R30 56,052,000
C2.3 U1030:U1160 Ch40:Ch90 R1:R123 14,551,218
The graphical representation of the attack scenario with the countermeasure candidates is de-
picted in Figure 7.12.
Figure 7.12 - Graphical Representation of attacks and countermeasures
In Figure 7.12 the red and yellow ﬁgures represent the countermeasure candidates, the blue
parallelepipeds represent the ﬁve parts of the conﬁcker attack, and the green parallelepiped rep-
resents the zeus attack. All countermeasure volumes are higher than the attack volumes, except
for C1.1, whose volume is smaller than the conﬁcker attack, but higher than the zeus attack. The
implementation of such countermeasures may result in collateral damages (when the countermea-
sure volume is higher than the attack volume) and/or residual risk, otherwise. For instance, let us
suppose that candidate C2.1 is selected as the optimal countermeasure. Its implementation will
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cover a volume of 35,124,840 units3, which is higher than the combined attack (whose volume is
equivalent to 5,898,312 units3). If the countermeasure covers the total attack volume, there will
be around 30,000,000 units3 that will cover other user accounts, channels, and resources. This
latter can be considered as a collateral damage, if its implementation aﬀects negatively such users,
channels, and resources.
7.4.2.2 Countermeasure Coverage
Each countermeasure is represented as a parallelepiped that covers a set of user accounts, channels
and resources from System S1. Such coverage represents only a portion of the combined attack
(i.e. Conﬁcker + Zeus). The calculation of the coverage of each countermeasure is performed
using Deﬁnition 4.1. For this, we need to identify the elements (i.e. user accounts, channels, and
resources) that belong to both, the selected countermeasure and the attack. In this case we want
to determine the coverage of each countermeasure over the combined attack. Table 7.6 summarizes
this information.
Table 7.6 - Countermeasure coverage elements
Counter- User Channel Resource Coverage
measure Account Volume
(units3)
C1.1 U320:U349 Ch70:Ch149 R121:R123 388,800
C1.2 U320:U377 Ch100:Ch149 R110:R130 3,288,600
C1.3 U330:U360 Ch70:Ch110 R5:R9&
R31:R40&
R110:R119
3,260,115
C2.1 U320:U377 Ch70:Ch110 R110:R130 2,696,652
C2.2 U320:U377 Ch70:Ch149 R5:R9 3,132,000
C2.3 U1110:U1130 Ch70:Ch90 R5:R9&
R31:R40 &
R110:R123
408,807
Results from Table 7.6 show the elements (i.e. user account, channel, resource) from a given
attack, that are controlled by a given countermeasure. For instance, we determine that none of
the countermeasures covers 100% of the combined attack volume (i.e. AV (A1 ∪A2) = 10,938,312
units3). Their individual implementation only covers a portion of both attack volumes. This
coverage is calculated using Deﬁnition 4.1, as follows:
Cov(C1.1/A1 ∪A2) = 388,80010,938,312 × 100 = 3.55%
Cov(C1.2/A1 ∪A2) = 3,288,60010,938,312 × 100 = 30.06%
Cov(C1.3/A1 ∪A2) = 3,260,11510,938,312 × 100 = 29.80%
Cov(C2.1/A1 ∪A2) = 2,696,65210,938,312 × 100 = 24.65%
Cov(C2.2/A1 ∪A2) = 3,132,00010,938,312 × 100 = 28.63%
Cov(C2.3/A1 ∪A2) = 408,80710,938,312 × 100 = 3.74%
As a result, the individual application of any of the countermeasures represents a partial mitiga-
tion of the combined attack, that in the best of the cases reaches 30.06% of the total risk, meaning
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that part of the attack is not treated at all. The residual risk is, therefore, calculated as the
diﬀerence between the attack volume and the countermeasure coverage volume. In our example,
the residual risk ranges from 60% to 95% as shown in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7 - Residual risk and collateral damage
Counter-
measure
Coverage
(%)
Residual
Risk
(units3)
Residual
Risk (%)
Collateral
Damage
(units3)
Collateral
Damage
(%)
C1.1 3.55% 10,549,512 96.45% 818,100 67.79%
C1.2 30.06% 7,649,712 69.94% 54,167,400 94.28%
C1.3 29.80% 7,678,197 70.20% 22,151,205 87.17%
C2.1 24.65% 8,241,660 75.35% 32,428,188 92.32%
C2.2 28.63% 7,806,312 71.37% 52,920,000 94.41%
C2.3 3.74% 10,529,505 96.26% 14,142,411 97.19%
In addition, since only one part of the countermeasure volume is useful to mitigate the attack,
the remaining countermeasure volume is considered as a collateral damage, meaning that the
application of any of the countermeasures implies that the treatment is going to be performed in
all associated user accounts, channels, and resources associated to the given countermeasure, even
for those elements that are not covered by any of the attack volumes. The collateral damage is,
therefore, calculated as the diﬀerence between the total countermeasure volume and the attack-
based countermeasure coverage. For instance, the total volume of C2.1 is determined as 35,124,840
units3 and the volume coverage of C2.1 is 2,696,652 units3, the collateral damage for C2.1 is
therefore 32,428,188 units3, which represents 92.32% of the total countermeasure volume.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced a geometric approach to calculate the volume of the union and
intersection of multiple attacks. The approach considers joint and/or disjoint attacks, and proposes
equations for their corresponding evaluation. The contribution of each attack vector (i.e. user
account, channel, resource) is analysed in order to model the required operations to calculate their
union and intersection. Examples on the calculation of the attack volume based on each attack
vector are provided accordingly.
The proposed approach provides a clear representation of attacks and countermeasures in a
given system, and the possibility to identify priority areas (i.e. those with the highest attack
volume, or where multiple attacks intersect). Consequently, it is possible to detect the users,
channels, and resources that are the most vulnerable in the system, in order to deﬁne the reaction
strategies to apply.
Another important aspect to discuss is the fact that our approach proposes an accurate and
quantitative methodology to evaluate countermeasures for multiple attack scenarios. Three cases
are considered in the countermeasure evaluation: totally joint attacks, totally disjoint attacks, and
partially joint attacks. As a result, countermeasure volumes are analysed and compared, making
it possible to determine the coverage of each countermeasure in each of the studied attacks.
The case study discussed at the end of this chapter considers speciﬁc information regarding
user accounts, channels, and resources provided by an educational institution in France. We did
not reuse one of the scenarios discussed in Part I of the dissertation, since they do not provide
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enough information to deploy our model. As a consequence, we can observe that applying only
one countermeasure is not enough to mitigate the combined attack (Conﬁcker & Zeus). None of
the countermeasures implemented individually protect 100% of the users, channels, and resources
aﬀected by both attacks. It is, therefore, necessary to implement multiple countermeasures as
described in Deﬁnition 8. However, it is worth noting that in this example, even the implementation
of all countermeasures does not provide a mitigation of 100% of the combined attacks.
As a result, mitigation strategies should be considered according to the objectives and goals of
each organization. For instance, some organizations could be very concerned about residual risks.
Strategies should consider the implementation of countermeasures that mitigate the maximum
volume of attacks, regardless of the collateral damage they may cause. On the contrary, for
those organizations that care about collateral damage, the mitigation strategy should consider the
implementation of the least number of countermeasures, as well as the implementation of very
punctual countermeasures.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
The open mind never acts: when we have
done our utmost to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion, we still - must close our minds
for the moment with a snap, and act
dogmatically on our conclusions.
George Bernard Shaw - 1856-1950
Throughout this thesis we proposed a quantitative approach to select optimal security coun-
termeasures based on the Return On Response Investment (RORI) index. The proposed solution
is twofold. In the ﬁrst part of the dissertation, we explored individual attack scenarios to evaluate
the expected losses that result from a particular attack versus the beneﬁts that can be obtained
if a countermeasure is implemented. Countermeasures are evaluated individually and then a com-
bination is performed among all candidates in order to select the countermeasure or group of
countermeasures that provides the highest beneﬁt to the organization. In the second part of the
dissertation, we studied the notion of attack surface in order to propose an approach that calcu-
lates the volume of each attack, and through geometrical operations, we determined the union and
intersection of multiple attacks occurring simultaneously in a given system. As a result, optimal
countermeasures are selected for concurrent or multi-step attack scenarios, based on the the volume
they cover on the system.
8.1 Contributions
In response to Objective 1.1, we proposed the Return On Response Investment (RORI) model
for evaluating and ranking individual countermeasures in a single attack scenario. The model
evaluates not only the cost and beneﬁt of a given security solution, but also the impact of the
attack over a given system, and the organization infrastructure value. As a result, our model
selects countermeasures from a pool of candidates, and ranks them based on a trade-oﬀ between
their eﬃciency in stopping the attack observed by the SIEM, and their ability to preserve, at
the same time, the best service to normal users. In response to Objective 1.2, we proposed a
combination approach to evaluate and select combined countermeasures to mitigate the eﬀects of
individual attacks. The approach is divided into two phases: the evaluation of the parameters
associated to the intrusion or attack (e.g., ALE and AIV); and the evaluation of the parameters
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associated to the combined solutions (e.g., ARC and RM). As a result, the system is able to rank
and select the countermeasure and/or combined solution that provides the highest cost-eﬀectiveness
ratio, thus the highest beneﬁt to the organization.
In order to fulﬁl Objective 1.3, we proposed in the ﬁrst part of the dissertation, a complete
methodology to estimate each parameter of the RORI model and select the countermeasure(s)
that provides the highest RORI index, thus the highest beneﬁt to the organization. In the second
part of the dissertation, we proposed a notion of attack volume, extending the notion of attack
surface, to evaluate multiple attacks and multiple countermeasures. The approach models the
volume of each attack based on a three-dimensional coordinate system (i.e. user, channel, and
resource). Each axis from the coordinate system is weighted using the CARVER methodology. As
a result, we are able to connect volumes with risks (e.g. big volume equals high risk, small volume
equals low risk).
In response to Objective 1.4, we provided in the ﬁrst part of the dissertation, a deployment
of the RORI index and the operations required to evaluate and select optimal countermeasures
over two real case scenarios: the ﬁrst one, a Mobile Money Transfer Service (provided by a large
telecommunication company based in France), and the second one, a Critical Infrastructure Control
Process (Dam) (provided by a medium-sized telecommunication company based in Italy). Both
use case deployments show the applicability of the RORI model and demonstrates that in most
cases, combined countermeasures provide a higher RORI index and thus a higher beneﬁt to the
organization. In the second part of the dissertation, we proposed a methodology to evaluate mul-
tiple attacks occurring simultaneously on the system. The methodology considers the volume each
attack covers on a given system and provides a geometric approach to calculate the countermeasure
coverage based on the union and intersection of the individual volumes. A case study with two
simultaneous attacks is deployed in order to show the applicability of our proposed model. As a
result, countermeasures are proposed for complex and/or combined attacks.
In response to Objective 1.5, an implementation of the RORI model using the OrBAC formalism
is provided over the Mobile Money Transfer use case. The implementation models the transactions
performed by mobile users (e.g. connect, authenticate, receive and emit money) in two contexts:
default context (when no attack is detected), and attack context (when the system detects a given
attack). As a result, security policies are activated/deactivated according to the deﬁned context.
In order to solve conﬂicts, we assign a priority to each security policy, based on the RORI index.
Thus, the higher the RORI index, the higher the priority assigned.
8.2 Perspectives
Perspectives for future work concentrate in two main aspects: extension of the RORI model, and
improvement of the attack volume formalism.
8.2.1 RORI Model Extensions
The RORI model should consider other parameters such as reaction time, recovery time, vulnera-
bility, and eﬀort, in order to perform a dynamic and automated response to intrusions and attacks.
The use of the OrBAC model could allow the deﬁnition of such parameters in temporal, spacial
and user deﬁned contexts. For instance, the evaluation of the RORI model should consider the
time at which a given user is connected into the system (e.g. operational hours, weekends, night
time) as well as his/her geographical location (remote access, in-site, etc), making the reaction
process an active and dynamic task.
In addition, the RORI model could be greatly improved by considering service dependencies
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in the selection of countermeasures. In this sense, the work of Kheir et al. [KCBCD10, Khe10]
has demonstrated that the use of service dependencies for assessment of intrusion and response
impacts provides enough evidence to compare response alternatives and to select optimal intrusion
responses. Merging the notion of service dependencies with the proposed RORI model could be
an interesting subject of further research.
One research that could be fully integrated with our model is the work performed by Ben
Mustapha et al. [MBD13]. The approach considers the Responsibility Domain of a Policy Enforce-
ment Point (RD(PEP)), that is, the capability and ability for a PEP to enforce security policies.
The main objective is to build a consistent view of the deployed policy enforcement capabilities
(through approximations) that may contribute in deﬁning the appropriate response strategy. As a
result, alerts are managed and correlated according to the PEP capabilities, and countermeasures
could be easily evaluated in each responsibility domain.
Another aspect that should be considered for future work is to improve detection in order to
enhance the reaction process. A ﬁrst approach has been done within the MAnagement of Security
information and events in Service Infrastructures (MASSIF) Project1. The work of Coppolino
et al. [CDER09] and Romano et al. [RDFC] demonstrate that processing events at the edge of
the platform signiﬁcantly reduces event volume for scalability and allows to bound the analysis
of sensitive data at the edge of the SIEM architecture. As a result, diﬀerent levels of mitigation
for the detected attack (e.g., simple, strong, enhanced, etc) could be implemented, which in turn
translates into diﬀerent levels of countermeasures.
8.2.2 Attack Volume Improvements
A validation and implementation of the attack volume formalism into a real case study should
be important for its continuity and improvement. One validation approach could be the use of
expert user survey proposed by Manadhata [Man08], where data is collected and analysed based
on a survey questionnaire that measures the level of agreement or disagreement that selected
subjects have with the measurement method. Another validation approach would be to implement
the method in controlled environments that can provide real data regarding losses, attack, and
countermeasures. Comparing the results obtained by applying our proposed model with the ones
obtained in controlled scenarios could indicate how close or far our model is from reality.
Another aspect that should be considered in the attack volume model is the integration of
other axes (e.g. time, contexts, etc) into the coordinate system. We have proposed in Chapter 6
to evaluate the attack volume using three axes (i.e. user account, channel, resource). However,
the number of axes in our coordinate system may change. The proposed system is ﬂexible enough
to model the information retrieved by a URI into two or more dimensions, resulting in a variety
of geometrical ﬁgures (e.g. squares, cube, hypercube) that are not initially considered in the
calculation of the attack volume.
In Part II of this dissertation we proposed a method to relate volume and risk. However, we
have not provided a methodology to relate volume with monetary cost, which in the end, provide
the rules that security organizations could use to charge their clients according to the desired risk
level. For instance, if a given organization requires a basic level of security (only a minimum
protection), the contracted service should represent a lesser cost than the one provided to other
organizations that require a higher level of security.
1http://www.massif-project.eu/
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CHAPT 8. CONCLUSION
8.3 Final Word
To conclude, this research has been an opportunity to investigate a wide variety of concepts, models
and technologies in the information and network security ﬁelds. Our objective was to analyse an
issue that has not been addressed before: the selection of optimal countermeasures for multiple
and complex attack scenarios. We provide a novel and systematic approach in response to the
aforementioned issue, and we propose new ideas for further research.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Glossary of Terms
Account Takeover A password-based attack that exploits vulnerabilities on the user's
side (e.g., social engineering, key-loggers, etc.) and steals the mobile
user account to perform transactions in favour of the attacker.
Administration
Password Theft
An unfaithful employee of the dam, with a non administrator role
but that is enabled to access to the control station uses stolen ad-
ministrator credentials to open the dam's gates.
Attack An attempt to gain unauthorized access to system services, resources,
or information, or an attempt to compromise system integrity.
Attack Surface Refers to the subset of resources used to attack a system. An at-
tacker may use the system's entry and exit points (methods e.g., get,
read, write, print,... that receive/send data items directly from/to
the system's environment), channels (e.g., TCP, SSL, Unix socket,...
used to connect to the system and invoke a method), and untrusted
data items (e.g., ﬁles, cookies, database records, registry entries,...
used by the system'users to send/receive data indirectly into/from
the system) to attack the system.
Attack Surface Ac-
tion
Refers to the system's total area exposed to a given attack. This
surface includes tangible assets (e.g., PCs, mobile phones, network
components, etc.), as well as intangible assets (e.g., conﬁdential in-
formation, business reputation, etc).
Botnet A number of Internet computers that, although their owners are most
time unaware of it, have been set up to forward transmissions (in-
cluding spam or viruses) to other computers on the Internet.
Collateral Damage Costs that are added by a new response, and which are not related
to intrusion costs. For instance, by modifying a conﬁguration, the
response aﬀects users of the target system, and thus resulting in col-
lateral and yet, unavoidable damages.
Combined Counter-
measure
A combined countermeasure results from the simultaneous implemen-
tation of two or more countermeasures to mitigate a given attack. A
combined solution is therefore analysed as a single countermeasure
with a combined cost and a combined eﬀectiveness.
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Control Station
Hacking
A malicious user takes the control of some machines in the control
station from the visualization station, making it possible to modify
sensor settings and commands to the actuators.
Controlled Faux
Accounts
Accounts designed to lead intruders to believe that they are exe-
cuting within a compromised standard account, when instead they
are locked into a special limited access account. This technique
eliminates the need for the separate hardware resources required
by a faux system, but must rely on the target operating system
security to ensure isolation from protected system resources.
Countermeasure Actions, devices, procedures, or techniques that meet or oppose
(i.e., counters) a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminat-
ing or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by
discovering and reporting it so that corrective action can be taken.
Dam It is an infrastructure used for water supplying, hydroelectric
power generation, irrigation, water activities and wildlife habitat
granting.
Denial of Service An attempt against the availability of a particular system. The
main objective is to disrupt service and network availability by
attempting to reduce a legitimate user's bandwidth, or preventing
access to service or system.
Discount Rate The rate used to calculate the present value of future cash ﬂows.
Discounted Cash
Flow
Equal to future cash ﬂows divided by discount rate factors to
obtain present value.
Employee Complic-
ity
An employee or a retailer is complicit with Money-Laundering ac-
tivities and facilitates opening of account despite knowing that the
account will be loaded with funds coming from criminal activities.
Financial State-
ment
Enterprise balance sheet, income statement, cash-ﬂow statement,
and/or statements of changes in owner's equity.
Hazardous Water
Release
An entity commands water releasing operations on the dam. The
discharging operation causes water movements that are hazardous
for water recreational activities held on the reservoir.
Hiding User Iden-
tity
An account in the Mobile Monet Transfer Service system that only
executes remote transactions.
Honey-pot Systems or accounts used to lure the intruder into pursuing a
decoy controlled environment directly of his own volition. Honey-
pots are placed near assets requiring protection, are made attrac-
tive, and are fully instrumented for intrusion detection and back
tracking.
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Host-based in-
trusion detection
system (HIDS)
IDSs which operate on information collected from within an in-
dividual computer system. This vantage point allows host-based
IDSs to determine exactly which processes and user accounts are
involved in a particular attack on the Operating System.
Hydroelectric
Power Plant Anti-
Islanding Hacking
The hydroelectric power plant requests for anti-islanding support
to the dam, in that the dam has to stop the water feeding the
hydraulic turbines. An attacker intercepts the requests to the
dam control station and hides the requests. The dam continues
in feeding the turbine with water, causing their failure.
Infectious threats It corresponds to viruses, worms, trojan horses and other similar
threats.
Intrusion detection
system (IDS)
Hardware or software product that gathers and analyzes informa-
tion from various areas within a computer or a network to identify
possible security breaches, which include both intrusions (attacks
from outside the organizations) and misuse (attacks from within
the organizations.)
Intrusion preven-
tion systemv(IPS)
Systems which can detect an intrusive activity and can also at-
tempt to stop the activity, ideally before it reaches its targets.
Mobile money
(mMoney)
An electronic unit of monetary denominated in local currency and
issued by the Bank.
Money Creation/
Destruction
Within the Mobile Money Transfer System, a certain amount of
virtual money is authorized to circulate. This amount is strictly
controlled to avoid any money creation and/or destruction. The
amount should remain constant at all time and any change is
considered as a fraud.
mWallet Account hosted in the Mobile Money Transfer system, allowing
the mWallet holder to carry out various actions with mMoney.
An mWallet can also be referred to as an account.
Net Cash Flow Projected revenues and cost savings less costs during a given pe-
riod of time of a project.
Network-based in-
trusion detection
systems (NIDS)
IDSs which detect attacks by capturing and analyzing network
packets.
NOOP No Operational action executed to mitigate a given attack.
Payback period Time taken to recoup the original investment with the new revenue
and/or cost savings from the project.
Policy Enforcement
Point
Logical entity or place on a server that enforces policies for ad-
mission control and decisions in response to a request from a user
wanting to access a resource on a computer or network server.
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Polymorphic Virus A virus that includes a scrambled body and decryption routine
that ﬁrst gain control of the computer, then decrypts the virus
body, and ﬁnally adds a mutation engine that generates randomize
decryption routines that change each time a virus infect a new
program.
Quarantined Faux
Systems
A system designed to lead intruders (primarily the unfamiliar out-
sider) to believe that they are logged into the target system, when
they are actually locked into a separate controlled system. An ef-
fective quarantined faux system encourages an intruder to remain
long enough for a response team to determine the intruder's iden-
tity and motive.
Risk The level of impact on organizational operations (e.g., functions,
image, or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals result-
ing from the operation of an information system given the poten-
tial impact of a threat and the likelihood of such threat occurring.
Security Policy A set of criteria for the provision of security services. It deﬁnes
and constrains the activities of a data processing facility in order
to maintain a condition of security for systems and data.
Security Informa-
tion and Event
Management
(SIEM)
Integrated information security oriented platform that oﬀer the
following services: Log management (log collection, storage, orga-
nization and retrieval); IT regulatory compliance (audit, valida-
tion or violation identiﬁcation); Event correlation (normalization,
fusion, veriﬁcation, analysis); Active response (decision analysis,
counter-measure response, prioritization); and Endpoint security
(monitoring, updating, conﬁguration).
Supervisory Con-
trol And Data Ac-
quisition SCADA
Industrial control systems targeted to monitor and control infras-
tructure, industrial, and facility based processes, with the objec-
tive of supporting critical infrastructure protection processes.
Threat A circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact
organizational operations (e.g., mission, functions, reputation), as
well as organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or
even the Nation through unauthorized access, destruction, disclo-
sure, modiﬁcation of information, and/or denial of service.
Tiltmeter Compro-
mise
The attacker takes control of the tiltmeter sensors and uses them
to send false measurements to the monitoring station. In addi-
tion, the real status of the tilt of the dam's walls is hidden to
the dam administrator. As a result, the dam's displacements and
tilt trends are indeﬁnitely hidden covering anomalous behaviours,
preventing the monitoring system from raising alarms.
Time Value of
Money
The idea that cost savings or revenue received today is more valu-
able than the same cost savings or revenue received some time in
the future.
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Traﬃcking Collec-
tion
An mWallet that is credited by many diﬀerent entities with several
loading means (e.g., credit card, bank transfer, mWallet transfer,
payment intermediary, etc.) which is used by a fraudster to collect
payments related to his/her traﬃcking.
Visualization Sta-
tion Misuse
A station that is used to monitor the behavior of the system is
able to send fake commands to the dam actuators or sensors.
Water Level Sensor
Compromise
The attacker takes control of the water level sensors and uses
them to send spoofed measurements to the monitoring station.
The real status of the reservoir is hiden to the dam administrator,
therefore, the dam can be overﬂown without alarms being raised
by the monitoring system.
Zombies A compromised computer connected to the Internet that is used
to perform malicious tasks under remote control.
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Appendix A
French Summary
Optimisation de la Réponse aux menaces basée sur les coûts dans des systèmes pour
la Sécurité de l'Information et la Gestion des Evénements (SIEMs)
L
es SIEMs (systèmes pour la Sécurité de l'Information et la Gestion des Evénements) sont le
coeur des centres opérationnels de sécurité actuels. Les SIEMs corrèlent les événements en
provenance de diﬀérents capteurs (anti-virus, pare-feux, systèmes de détection d'intrusion, etc), et
oﬀrent des vues synthétiques pour la gestion des menaces ainsi que des rapports de sécurité.
La recherche dans les technologies SIEM a toujours mis l'accent sur la fourniture d'une in-
terprétation complète des menaces, en particulier pour évaluer leur importance et hiérarchiser les
réponses. Toutefois, dans de nombreux cas, la réponse des menaces a encore besoin de l'homme
pour mener l'analyse et aboutir à la prise de décisions, p.ex. compréhension des menaces, déﬁnition
des contremesures appropriées ainsi que leur déploiement. Il s'agit d'un processus lent et coûteux,
nécessitant un haut niveau d'expertise, qui reste néanmoins sujet à erreurs. Ainsi, des recherches
récentes sur les SIEMs ont mis l'accent sur l'importance et la capacité d'automatiser le processus
de sélection et le déploiement des contremesures.
Certains auteurs [DTCCB07,RGF+10] ont proposé des mécanismes automatiques de réponse,
comme l'adaptation des politiques de sécurité pour dépasser les limites de réponses statiques ou
manuelles. Bien que ces approches améliorent le processus de réaction (en le rendant plus rapide
et/ou plus eﬃcace), ils restent limités car ces solutions n'analysent pas l'impact des contremesures
choisies pour atténuer les attaques.
Dans cette thèse, nous proposons une nouvelle approche systématique qui sélectionne la con-
tremesure optimale au travers d'un ensemble de candidats, classés sur la base d'une comparaison
entre leur eﬃcacité à arrêter l'attaque et leur capacité à préserver, simultanément, le meilleur
service aux utilisateurs légitimes.
Aﬁn d'analyser quantitativement l'impact de l'attaque, notre modèle prend en compte deux
aspects de la politique de sécurité liées aux réponses des menaces: premièrement, le changement
cumulé à long terme des politiques de sécurité suite à des attaques antérieures et, deuxièmement, le
fait que les politiques de sécurité peuvent nécessiter d' être automatiquement adaptées au contexte
actuel.
Prenant en compte les précédents modèles quantitatifs [Jef04, Sch11, CM05, BSB07, SAS06,
SBW07a, KLI08, KCBCD10, Khe10], cette thèse propose un modèle pour sélectionner la con-
tremesure qui oﬀre le plus haut niveau de bénéﬁce à l'organisation. Nous adaptons la proposition
faite dans [KCBCD10,Khe10] pour l'utilisation des métriques de coûts visant à évaluer l'impact
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de chaque contremesure, ce qui permet au système de sélectionner celle qui fournit l'indice RORI
maximal.
A.1 État de l'art
Plusieurs auteurs ont proposé des métriques de coûts pour équilibrer dommages d'intrusion et
coûts d'intervention tout en garantissant le choix de la réponse la plus appropriée sans sacriﬁer les
fonctionnalités du système. Un résumé de ces modèles est présenté dans le Tableau A.1.
L'approche la plus simple et la plus utilisée pour évaluer les conséquences ﬁnancières des in-
vestissements dans les entreprises est le retour sur investissement (ROI). Le ROI compare le bénéﬁce
par rapport aux coûts obtenus d'investissement donnés [Jef04,Sch11].
Le retour sur l'attaque (ROA) a été déﬁni comme le gain espéré par l'attaquant pour une attaque
réussie face aux pertes qu'il subit suite à l'adoption de mesures de sécurité par sa cible [CM05]. Les
auteurs aﬃrment par ailleurs que l'eﬃcacité des investissements dans les technologies de sécurité
pourrait se dégrader en raison de changements de contexte, sans impact sur l'indice ROI. En outre,
le retour sur investissement seul ne peut pas prévoir les diﬀérents impacts que les solutions ont sur
les comportements de l'attaquant.
Le retour sur investissement de la sécurité (ROSI) [BSB07,SAS06], a été proposée comme une
métrique qui compare les diﬀérences entre dommages causés par les incidents de sécurité (avec
ou sans contremesures) et coût de la solution. Les auteurs conviennent que même en ayant des
résultats inexacts, si la méthode produit des résultats cohérents et répétitifs, le modèle peut être
utile pour comparer les solutions de sécurité sur la base de valeurs relatives.
Plus récemment, le retour sur Investissement de la Réponse (RORI) [KCBCD10, Khe10] a
été introduit comme un modèle de dépendance de service pour la réponse des coûts sensibles,
en fonction d'une comparaison ﬁnancière des options de réponse. L'indice RORI considère non
seulement les dommages collatéraux de réponse, mais aussi les eﬀets sur la réponse des intrusions.
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APP A. FRENCH SUMMARY
A.2 Modèle de Sélection de Contremesures
Notre solution considère l'approche proposée par Kheir et al. [KCBCD10,Khe10], où les auteurs
déﬁnissent le Retour Sur l'Investissement de Réponse (RORI) par la formule représentée dans
l'Équation A.1.
RORI =
[ICb−RC]−OC
CD +OC
(A.1)
où,
 ICb est l'impact d'intrusion attendu en l'absence des mesures de sécurité. Il mesure le coût
des dommages du aux intrusions ou attaques.
 RC est l'impact combiné tant pour l'intrusion que pour la réponse. RC représente la somme
des impacts d'intrusion attendus après mise en place d'une réponse et coût engendré par
cette réponse.
 OC est le coût opérationnel qui inclut les coûts de déploiement et de mise en place de réponses,
tel que la main d'oeuvre et le sur-provisionnement.
 Le CD est le dommage de réponse collatérale qui représente le coût engendré par la mesure
de sécurité.
Le déploiement de l'indice du Retour sur l'investissement de réponse (RORI) dans des scénarios
réels a mis en évidence les limitations suivantes :
 La valeur absolue de paramètres comme l'ICb et le RC est diﬃcile à estimer. Néanmoins, un
indice de ces paramètres est plus facile à déterminer, ce qui réduit à son tour des erreurs de
magnitude.
 L'indice RORI n'est pas déﬁni lorsqu'aucune contremesure n'est choisie. Comme le coût
opérationnel (OC) est associé à la mesure de sécurité, l'indice RORI donnera lieu à une
indétermination lorsqu'aucune solution n'est choisie.
 L'indice RORI n'est pas normalisé par rapport à la largeur et la complexité de l'infrastructure
d'une organisation.
A.2.1 RORI Amélioré
Nous proposons une amélioration de l'indice RORI en tenant compte le coût de la contremesure et
son niveau de mitigation associée ainsi que la valeur de l'infrastructure et les pertes qui peuvent se
produire comme conséquence d'une intrusion ou d'une attaque. L'indice RORI amélioré considère
le choix de n'est pas mettre en place de contremesure, et le compare avec les résultats obtenus
par la mise en oeuvre de solutions de sécurité (individuelles ou combinées). L'indice amélioré du
retour sur l'investissement de réponse (RORI) fournit également une réponse relative à la taille de
l'infrastructure. Son calcul utilise les paramètres représentés dans l'Equation A.2.
RORI =
(ALE ×RM)−ARC
ARC +AIV
× 100 (A.2)
où,
 ALE (Perte annuelle attendue) est le coût de l'impact obtenu en l'absence de mesures de
sécurité. ALE est exprimée en devises par an (p.ex. $/an) et dépendra directement de la
sévérité de l'attaque et de sa probabilité d'occurrence.
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 RM désigne le niveau d'atténuation du risque associé à une solution particulière. Il prend
une valeur comprise entre 0 et 100. En l'absence de contremesures, RM est égal à 0%.
 ARC est le coût annuel de réponse qui est engagé par la mise en oeuvre d'une nouvelle
politique de sécurité. De l'équation A.1, ARC = OC + CD. ARC est toujours supérieur ou
égal à 0, et il est exprimé en devise par an (p.ex. $/an)
 AIV est la valeur annuelle de l'infrastructure (p.ex. le coût du matériel, des services pour les
opérations régulières, etc) que l'on attend du système, quelles que soient les contremesures
mises en oeuvre. ARC est supérieur à zéro (AIV > 0 ), et il est exprimé en devise par an
(p.ex. $/an).
A.2.2 Améliorations
 Les paramètres `ICB − RC' sont substitués par `ALE × RM ' aﬁn dévaluer plus facilement
la réponse de solutions individuelles et combinées, tout en réduisant l'ampleur d'erreur.
 Le paramètre AIV fournit une réponse par rapport à la taille de l'infrastructure. AIV est
corrélé à la perte annuelle attendue (ALE) du système, et permet de comparer les résultats
RORI des diﬀérents systèmes quelles que soient leurs tailles.
 L'introduction du paramètre de valeur annuelle de l'infrastructure (AIV) permet de gérer le
cas où aucune contremesure n'est sélectionnée, ce qui se traduit par la valeur 0, et signiﬁe
qu'aucun gain n'est prévu si aucune solution n'est mise en oeuvre.
A.2.3 Analyse de Sensibilité
RORI est un indice relatif indiquant le pourcentage de bénéﬁce perçus si une contremesure est mise
en oeuvre. Lors de l'analyse de l'investissement dans la sécurité de l'information, il ne faut pas
s'attendre à une augmentation des proﬁts, mais plutôt au contraire, à une atténuation des risques
auxquels l'organisation est exposée.
L'indice RORI varie de −ARCARC+AIV (dans sa limite inférieure) jusqu'à
ALE
AIV (dans sa limite
supérieure). Un RORI positif signiﬁe que nous nous attendons à diminuer le risque jusqu'à un
certain niveau et qu'il est donc approprié d'appliquer la solution de sécurité. p.ex. un RORI
de 50% signiﬁe que nous nous attendons à atténuer la moitié du risque auquel l'organisation est
exposée. Toutefois, lors de l'évaluation de l'option de ne rien faire (pas de contremesure évaluée),
il faut s'attendre à 0% de mitigation du risque.
Le pire scénario (le coût de la contremesure est supérieur aux avantages qu'elle procure) aura
ALE × RM << ARC, donc RORI → −ARCARC+AIV . Le meilleur scénario (mitigation parfaite) aura
RM = 1, ARC = 0, donc RORI = ALEAIV . Si le bénéﬁce attendu est égal au coût de la contremesure,
RORI s'approchera à zéro. Toutefois, si le bénéﬁce attendu est inférieur au coût de la contremesure,
RORI atteindra une valeur négative. Ce n'est que dans les cas où le bénéﬁce est supérieur au coût
de la mise en oeuvre d'une mesure de sécurité que RORI atteindra une valeur positive.
Aﬁn d'évaluer les eﬀets sur les résultats RORI, nous avons eﬀectué une série d'analyses de
sensibilité où deux variables ont été modiﬁées, tandis que les autres ont gardé leurs valeurs du
scénario de référence. Les résultats obtenus sont décrits comme suit:
 Si l'ARC est des ordres de magnitude en dessous de l'AIV (ARC  AIV ), l'impact de l'ARC
sur RORI est très faible. Dans ce cas, ARC + AIV ∼= AIV , donc RORI ∼= (ALE×RMAIV ).
Toutefois, si l'ARC est des ordres de magnitude au-dessus de l'AIV (ARC  AIV ), l'impact
de l'ARC sur l'indice RORI est très forte. Dans ce cas, ARC +AIV ∼= ARC, donc RORI ∼=
(ALE×RM)−ARC
ARC .
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 Si l'ALE est des ordres de magnitude en dessous de l'AIV (ALE  AIV ), l'ALE impact
négativement l'indice RORI, car ALE × RM ∼= 0, donc RORI ∼= −ARCARC+AIV . Toutefois, si
l'ALE est des ordres de magnitude au-dessus de l'AIV (ALE  AIV ), l'indice RORI est
positivement impacté. Dans ce cas, AIV ∼= 0, donc RORI ∼= (ALE×RM)−ARCARC .
 Si l'ALE est des ordres de magnitude en dessous de l'ARC (ALE  ARC), l'ALE impact
négativement l'indice RORI, car ALE ∼= 0, donc RORI ∼= −ARCARC+AIV . Toutefois, si l'ALE est
des ordres de magnitude au-dessus de l'ARC (ALE  ARC), l'indice RORI est positivement
impacté. Dans ce cas, l'ARC ∼= 0, donc RORI ∼= ALE×RMAIV .
 Si RM augmente par rapport à l'AIV, l'ALE et l'ARC, l'indice RORI dépendra de la valeur
de l'ALE. Dans ce cas, ALE×RM ∼= ALE, donc RORI ∼= ALE−ARCARC+AIV , ce qui rend la solution
plus attractive au mesure que l'ALE augmente.
A.2.4 Limitations restantes
L'évaluation et la sélection des contremesures dépendent de l'estimation appropriée de la valeur de
l'infrastructure, de l'impact des attaques et de la déﬁnition des politiques de sécurité nécessaires
pour atténuer l'attaque. Une telle déﬁnition devrait inclure les coûts et les bénéﬁces associés à une
contremesure particulière dans un scénario d'attaque donnée.
La principale limitation du mod`ele RORI est la précision dans l'estimation des diﬀérents
paramètres qui composent la formule. L'estimation de la perte annuelle attendue (ALE) d'une
attaque qui se produirait sur un système donné, et le niveau d'atténuation des risques (RM) d'une
contremesure particulière est diﬃcile à déduire et nécessite un eﬀort important. Une mesure précise
de ces deux paramètres est quasi-impossible car elle nécessite des prédictions d'un événement qui
n'a pas encore eu lieu. Cependant, une estimation qualitative de la RM et ALE reste possible, ce
qui fait de l'évaluation RORI un outil intéressant dans l'aide à la décision pour les analystes de
sécurité.
Le modèle RORI présenté dans ce document ne considère pas l'interdépendance entre con-
tremesures (c.-à-d. comment l'application d'une contremesure peut aﬀecter l'eﬃcacité des autres),
mais il décrit les restrictions et/ou les conﬁts qui peuvent se produire lors de la mise en oeuvre de
la contremesure choisie (p.ex. contremesures partiellement ou totalement restrictives).
Finalement, le modèle évalue les contremesures individuelles et combinées pour attenuer les
eﬀets d'une attaque donnée, mais il ne tient pas compte de l'évaluation et de la sélection des
contremesures dans un scénario d'attaques multiples.
A.3 Processus de Sélection de Contremesures Individuelles
Le processus de sélection des contremesures optimales est eﬀectuée en deux étapes: le calcul RORI
et l'évaluation de contremesures. Cette section détaille chaque partie du modèle.
A.3.1 Calcul du RORI
Le retour sur l'investissement de Réponse proposé dans la section A.2.1 est utilisé comme une
approche quantitative pour évaluer et classer un ensemble de contremesures, ce qui permet de
choisir celle qui convient le mieux pour atténuer les eﬀets d'une attaque donnée. Les paramètres
d'entrée pour le calcul RORI sont de deux types: des paramètres invariables (p.ex. ALE, AIV),
qui dépendent de l'intrusion ou de l'attaque, et des paramètres variables (p.ex. RM, ARC), qui
dépendent de la contremesure.
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A.3.1.1 Paramètres Invariables
A.3.1.1.1 La Perte Annuelle Estimée (ALE): désigne le coût d'impact obtenue en l'absence
des mesures de sécurité. Il inclut la perte de biens (La), la perte de données (Ld), la perte de la
réputation (Lr), les procédures juridiques (Lp), la perte de chiﬀre d'aﬀaires avec des clients exis-
tants (LREC), la perte de revenus provenant des clients potentiels (LRPC), d'autres pertes (Ol),
le contrat d'assurance (Ci), et le taux annuel d'occurrence (ARO), comme le montre l'Équation
A.3.
ALE = (La+ Ld+ Lr + Lp+ Lrc+Ol − Ci)×ARO (A.3)
où,
 La Perte de biens (La), se réfère à la valeur des actifs physiques qui seraient aﬀecté par une
intrusion ou attaque (p.ex. le matériel, le mobilier, les infrastructures physiques, etc).
 La Perte de données (Ld), se réfère à la valeur des actifs non-physiques qui souﬀrent de
dommages ou modiﬁcations à la suite d'une intrusion ou attaque (p.ex. logiciels, bases de
données, documents électroniques, etc).
 La Perte de réputation (Lr), se réfère à la perte d'image ou crédibilité dès lors qu'il est
impossible de fournir les produits ou services aux niveaux attendus.
 Les Procédures judiciaires (Lp), se réfère à des sanctions pénales qui peuvent survenir dès
lors que les obligations contractuelles avec les clients ne peuvent être remplies.
 La perte de chiﬀre d'aﬀaires avec des clients existants (LREC), représente les pertes qui se
sont produites lors de l'incident empêchant la fourniture des produits ou services aux niveaux
attendus par les clients existants.
 La Perte de revenus des clients potentiels (LRPC), se réfère aux pertes engendrées par
l'impossibilité d'acquérir de nouveaux clients suite à l'incident.
 Les autres pertes (Ol), prennent en compte toutes les autres pertes qui peuvent survenir lors
de l'incident (p.ex. la récupération du temps, les services externes, etc).
 L'Assurance contractée (Ci), cette valeur peut être soustraite de la quantité totale des pertes
si l'organisation dispose d'une assurance qui couvre une partie des pertes.
 Le Taux annuel d'occurrence (ARO) se réfère à la fréquence estimée de l'attaque (p.ex. une
fois par jour, une fois par an, etc).
A.3.1.1.2 La Valeur Annuel de l'Infrastructure (AIV): correspond aux coûts que le
système est susceptible d'avoir en une année, quelle que soit la mise en oeuvre de contremesures,
p.ex. les coûts d'équipement (Ec), les frais du personnel (Pc), les frais de service (SC), d'autres
frais (Oc), et la valeur de revente (Rv), comme l'indique l'Équation A.4.
AIV = Ec+ Pc+ Sc+Oc−Rv (A.4)
où,
 Le Coût d'Équipement (Ec), correspond au coût annuel des équipements de sécurité, des
produits ou des matériaux (p.ex. l'achat, la location, le crédit-bail, les licences, etc) requises
pour les opérations régulières de l'infrastructure.
 Le Frais du personnel (Pc), correspondent aux coûts des employés qui eﬀectuent les opéra-
tions régulières de l'infrastructure (p.ex. les salaires, les primes, le paiement des heures
supplémentaires, etc.)
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 Le Coût des services rendus (Sc), correspondent aux coûts des services réguliers (p.ex. les
frais d'électricité, d'infrastructures, de l'assurance contractée, etc), liés à l'organisation pour
ses activités régulières.
 D'autres coûts (Oc), se réfèrent à tous les autres frais nécessaires au fonctionnement régulier
de l'infrastructure du système.
 Les coûts de revente (Rv), se réfèrent à la valeur des équipements de sécurité après leur
utilisation.
A.3.1.2 Paramètres Variables
A.3.1.2.1 La Mitigation du Risque (RM): considère le pourcentage de réduction du coût
total de l'incident qui est donné à partir de la mise en oeuvre d'une contremesure. RM est cal-
culée comme étant le produit entre la surface de couverture des contremesures (SC) et son Factor
d'Eﬃcacité (EF), tel qu'illustré dans l'Équation A.5.
RM = SC × EF (A.5)
où,
 La Surface de Couverture (SC) est le pourcentage de la surface d'attaque qui est couvert
et contrôlé par une contremesure donnée. Par exemple, le blocage d'un utilisateur pour-
rait couvrir 85% de la surface d'attaque, et l'augmentation de la surveillance pour bloquer
ponctuellement des opérations ne couvre que 60% de la surface d'attaque. Ces valeurs sont
inhérentes à la nature de l'attaque et le système auquel il est aﬀecté, ce qui permet d'obtenir
des valeurs diﬀérentes de couverture de surface pour la même contremesure appliquée dans
diﬀérents scénarios d'attaque.
 Le Facteur d'Eﬃcacité (FE) considère le pourcentage de réduction du coût total de l'incident
qui est donné à partir de l'application d'une mesure de sécurité. Selon la méthode de Norman
[Nor10], le risque d'une attaque (R) est déterminé comme étant le produit de la vulnérabilité
(V), la probabilité d'occurrence (P), et la conséquence (C), (c.-à-d., R = V ×P×C). Un risque
peut être atténué par la diminution de la vulnérabilité, la probabilité et / ou la conséquence.
Par conséquent, le Factor d'Eﬃcacité (EF) est calculé comme le pourcentage de réduction
des risques qui résulte de l'application d'une contremesure donnée. p.ex. si le risque d'une
attaque donnée avant contremesure est R1 = 10 × 7 × 7 = 490 et le risque résultant après
l'application d'une contremesure est R2 = 7× 6× 6 = 252, EF = 100− (R2×100R1 ) = 51, 43%
A.3.1.2.2 Le Coût Annuel de Réponse (ARC): se réfère au coût de la réponse associé
à une contremesure donnée. Il inclut les coûts directs: p.ex. les coûts de mise en oeuvre (CoI),
les coûts de maintenance (CoM), d'autres coûts directs (ODC) et les coûts indirects (Ic), comme
indiqué dans l'Équation A.6.
ARC = CoI + CoM +Odc+ Ic (A.6)
où,
 Le Coût de mise en oeuvre (CoI), se réfère au coût du déploiement, d'installation et /ou de
mise en oeuvre des mesures de sécurité aﬁn d'atténuer une attaque donnée.
 Le Coût de maintenance (CoM), comprend le coût des services réguliers (p.ex. électricité,
conseil, analyse, tests, etc) qui sont nécessaires pour l'implémentation des contremesures.
 Les autres coûts directs (Odc), se réfèrent à tous les autres coûts directs (p.ex. fournisseurs
et partenaires) qui sont nécessaires pour mettre en place des contremesures.
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 Les coûts indirects (Ic), se réfèrent aux conséquences qui peuvent parvenir lors de l'adoption
d'une contremesure particulière aux utilisateurs légitimes.
Les paramètres ALE et AIV sont déﬁnis statiquement et dépendent de l'attaque détectée. Les
paramètres RM et ARC dépendent des contremesures proposées. Leur calcul nécessite que le
système détermine la couverture de surface discutée dans la section A.4.2.
A.3.2 Évaluation de Contremesures Individuelles
Le processus d'évaluation de contremesures commence en sélectionnant la première contremesure
de la liste et en calculant son indice RORI. Le RORI obtenu est comparé contre celui par défaut,
tel qu'illustré dans la Figure A.1.
Avant d'évaluer la première contremesure nous avons établie une valeur RORI par défaut égale
à zéro (paramètres RM et ARC positionnés à 0, car aucune contremesure n'est mise en oeuvre). Si
le RORI résultant est diﬀérent de celui par défaut, le système vériﬁe si le RORI évalué est supérieur
à la valeur par défaut, dans ce cas-là, la contremesure évaluée est sélectionnée, et elle remplace la
valeur du RORI par défaut. A contrario, si le RORI résultant est inférieur à celui par défaut, le
système évalue une autre contremesure et le RORI par défaut reste inchangé.
Enﬁn, si le RORI résultant est égal à la valeur par défaut, le système vériﬁe le coût annuel de
réponse (ARC) et sélectionne celui avec la valeur de coût la plus faible (il est toujours préférable
de mettre en oeuvre une contremesure qui coûte le moins cher et fournit le plus grand bénéﬁce).
Il peut arriver que, lorsque l'on compare les coûts de deux contremesures, ils sont exactement
identiques. Dans ce cas-là, le système maintient la valeur du RORI par défaut et cherche une autre
solution à évaluer.
Le processus est répété pour évaluer la deuxième contremesure sur la liste, puis le troisième, et
ainsi de suite, jusqu'à ce qu'il ne reste plus de contremesures à évaluer. Le système sélectionne la
dernière contremesure prise par défaut, car elle fournit l'indice RORI le plus élevé.
A.4 Processus de Sélection de Contremesures Combinées
Le processus de sélection des contremesures combinées prend compte des axiomes et approches
combinatoires, pour estimer les paramètres liés aux contremesures p.ex. La Mitigation du Risque
(RM) et Le Coût Annuel de Réponse (ARC). Cette section détaille chaque partie du modèle.
A.4.1 Axiomes Combinatoires
Les axiomes suivants ont été déﬁnis aﬁn de calculer le coût et le niveau d'atténuation des risques
qui résulte de la combinaison de deux ou plusieurs contremesures:
Axiome 1 : Le coût d'une contremesure combinée est égal à la somme de tous les coûts indi-
viduels des contremesures, p.ex. ARC(C1 ∪C2) = ARC(C1) +ARC(C2), où l'ARC est le coût de
la contremesure, et C1, C2 sont les contremesures individuelles. L'Équation A.7 illustre le cas le
plus général.
ARC(C1 ∪ ... ∪ Cn) = ARC(C1) + ...+ARC(Cn) (A.7)
157
APP A. FRENCH SUMMARY
Figure A.1 - Processus d'Évaluation de Contremesures Individuelles
Cet axiome est utilisé pour des contremesures conjointes et disjointes, car l'application des
multiples contremesures implique généralement des coûts plus élevés de mise en oeuvre, de con-
sultation, de maintien, etc, par rapport aux coûts engagés par l'application d'une contremesure
individuelle. De plus, dans une approche pessimiste qui consisterait à considérer le pire des cas,
nous sommes en mesure d'estimer le retour sur investissement de la réponse pour une solution
158
A.4. Processus de Sélection de Contremesures Combinées
combinée, ce qui signiﬁe que si la solution est eﬃcace pour un coût plus élevé, elle sera toujours
eﬃcace si le coût est inférieur à celui estimé.
Axiome 2 : L'Atténuation des risques (RM) pour une solution combinée est calculé comme
la probabilité de leur recouvrement de la surface combinée SC(C1 ∪C2 ∪ ... ∪Cn) multiplié par le
facteur d'eﬃcacité (EF). Pour deux contremesures mutuellement exclusives (C1, C2), l'atténuation
du risque est calculé comme RM(C1 ∪ C2) = SC(C1)× EF1+ SC(C2)× EF2. Cependant, pour
deux contremesures non mutuellement exclusives, l'atténuation du risque peut être calculée de
deux façons :
1. Soit comme la somme de leurs surface de couverture individuelles multiplié par leurs facteurs
d'eﬃcacité respectifs, ensuite é de la surface de couverture de leur intersection multiplié par
le facteur d'eﬃcacité le plus faible, c.-à-d. RM(C1∪C2) = SC(C1)× EF1+ SC(C2)× EF2−
SC(C1 ∩ C2)× min(EF1, EF2). L'Équation A.8 illustre le cas le plus général.
RM(C1 ∪ ... ∪ Cn) = SC(C1)× EF1 + ...+ SC(Cn)×
EFn −
∑
SC(∩twoevents)×min(EF1, ..., EFn)
+
∑
SC(∩threeevents)×min(EF1, ..., EFn)...
+(−1)n+1SC(C1...Cn)×min(EF1, ..., EFn) (A.8)
2. Soit comme la diﬀérence entre les deux surfaces de contremesures partiellement couvertes
multiplié par leurs facteurs d'eﬃcacité respectifs, ajouté de la surface de couverture de leur in-
tersection multiplié par le facteur d'eﬃcacité le plus élevé, c.-à-d. RM(C1∪C2) = [SC(C1)−
(SC(C1) × SC(C2))]× EF1 + [SC(C2)− (SC(C1) × SC(C2))]× EF2 + SC(C1 ∩ C2)×
max(EF1, EF2).
A.4.2 Surface de Couverture de Contremesures
La surface de couverture est un travail en développement dans de nombreux domaines de recherche
(p.ex. les réseaux de capteurs sans ﬁl, les systèmes chimiques, le calcul de propriétés physiques,
biologiques, etc.). En sécurité de l'information, la notion de recouvrement de la surface est liée à
la surface de l'attaque, déﬁnie par Manadhata [MW10] comme le sous-ensemble des ressources du
système qu'une entité malveillante peut utiliser pour envoyer/recevoir des données vers/à partir
du système pour attaquer le système. Ainsi, plus la surface du système est grande, plus il y a
d'opportunités d'attaque [HW07].
Intuitivement, la surface de couverture de contremesures représente le niveau d'actions que la
solution de sécurité peut avoir sur une surface d'attaque d'un système. Plus clairement, la surface
de couverture est le pourcentage de la surface d'attaque qui est couverte et contrôlée par une
contremesure donnée. La surface de couverture est nécessaire pour calculer le niveau d'atténuation
du risque (RM) pour une contremesure individuelle et combinée.
L'union de deux ou plusieurs surfaces est un indice qui varie entre la surface de couverture
maximale de l'ensemble de contremesures (c.-à-d. max SC(C1, ..., Cn)) dans sa limite inférieure,
et la somme des surfaces individuelles (c.-à-d.
∑
SC(C1), ..., SC(Cn)) dans sa limite supérieure.
L'intersection de deux ou plusieurs surfaces est un indice qui varie de zéro dans sa limite inférieure,
à la surface de couverture minimal du groupe de contremesures dans sa limite supérieure (c.-à-d.
min SC(C1, ..., Cn)). Deux cas peuvent se distinguer dans le calcul de la surface de couverture
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pour une contremesure combinée (c.-à-d. les surfaces jointes et disjointes). La Figure A.2 illustre
ces cas.
Figure A.2 - Surface de Couverture de Contremesures
 Surfaces disjointes: La surface de couverture d'une contremesure est disjointe de la sur-
face de couverture d'une autre contremesure si elles n'ont pas d'éléments en commun. Par
conséquent, avec deux contremesures disjointes (p.ex. C1, C4), la surface de couverture de
l'union est calculé telle que SC(C1 ∪C4) = SC(C1) +SC(C4), et la surface de couverture de
l'intersection est égale à zéro.
 Surfaces Jointes: La surface d'une contremesure est jointe si elle est partiellement ou totale-
ment recouverte par celle d'une autre contremesure. Pour des contremesures partiellement
jointes (p.ex. C1, C2), l'union de la solution combinée est calculée telle que la somme des
surfaces individuelles moins leur intersection (Équation A.9), et la surface de couverture de la
l'intersection est calculée comme la moyenne des limites inférieures et supérieures (Équation
A.10).
SC(C1 ∪ C2) = SC(C1) + SC(C2)− SC(C1 ∩ C2) (A.9)
SC(C1 ∩ C2) = SC(C1 ∩ C2)LOW + SC(C1 ∩ C2)UP
2
(A.10)
La limite inférieure de l'intersection entre deux contremesures SC(C1 ∩ C2)LOW est égale
à 0 si la somme de leurs surfaces est inférieure ou égale à 1, sinon, elle reçoit la valeur
(SC(C1) + SC(C2)− 1). La limite supérieure de l'intersection entre deux contremesures est
égale à la couverture totale de la surface la plus petite.
Un cas plus général pour le calcul de l'union et l'intersection des contremesures combinées
est présenté dans l'Équation A.11, où x = SC(C1) + ... + SC(Cn) − (n − 1), et n= nombre
maximal des contremesures à combiner.
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SC(C1 ∪ ... ∪ Cn) = SC(C1) + ...+ SC(Cn)− SC(C1 ∩ ... ∩ Cn)
SC(C1 ∩ ... ∩ Cn) = SC(C1∩...∩Cn)LOW+SC(C1∩...∩Cn)UP2
SC(C1 ∩ Cn)LOW =
{
0 if SC(C1) + ...+ SC(Cn) ≤ n− 1
x if SC(C1) + ...+ SC(Cn) > n− 1
SC(C1 ∩ ... ∩ Cn)UP = min {SC(C1), ..., SC(Cn)} (A.11)
Pour les surfaces jointes en totalité (p.ex. C1, C3), l'union de la surface de couverture com-
binée est calculée telle que SC(C1 ∪C3) = SC(C1), et la surface couverture de l'intersection
est calculée telle que SC(C1 ∩ C3) = SC(C3). Une variante de ce cas se produit lorsque les
deux contremesures ont la même valeur de surface, les surfaces de couverture de l'union et
l'intersection sont alors calculées telles SC(C4 ∪ C5) = SC(C4 ∩ C5) = SC(C4) = SC(C5).
A.4.3 Approches Combinatoires
Pour déterminer le nombre maximal de solutions combinées qui peuvent résulter d'un ensemble de
contremesures individuelles, nous déﬁnissons un ensemble d'éléments où l'ordre n'est pas important
et les répétitions ne sont pas autorisées. Cette section décrit les deux approches (c.-à-d. restrictive
et non-restrictive) qui sont considérées dans la combinaison de contremesures de sécurité.
A.4.3.1 Approche non-restrictive
Des contremesures non restrictives sont celles qui peuvent être parfaitement combinées (c.-à-d.
il n'existe aucune restriction dans leur combinaison). Le nombre maximal des contremesures est
calculé comme la somme de la n-nième ligne (en partant de zéro) des coeﬃcients binomiaux [Gri85],
[Ros94], tel qu'exprimé dans l'Équation A.12, où n est le nombre total d'éléments à combiner et
k est l'ensemble des éléments combinés (de zéro à n).
∑
0≤k≤n
(
n
k
)
= 2n − 1− n (A.12)
p.ex. pour un groupe de 4 contremesures, le nombre maximal de solutions combinées est(
4
k
)
= 24 − 1− 4 = 11. Le Tableau A.2 résume ces résultats.
A.4.3.2 Approche Restrictive
Trois cas peuvent apparaître lorsqu'une ou plusieurs contremesures sont restrictives et ne peuvent
pas être combinées avec d'autres contremesures.
A.4.3.2.1 Contremesures Mutuellement Exclusives : En probabilité, deux événements
sont mutuellement exclusifs s'ils ne peuvent pas se produire simultanément (c.-à-d. qu'ils n'ont
pas de résultats en commun) [RH98], [Olo05]. Considérant le cas d'avoir quatre contremesures
(C1, C2, C3, C4), et sachant que C1 et C3 sont mutuellement exclusives (elles ne peuvent pas être
combinées), le nombre total de combinaisons possibles est donnée par l'Équation A.13 [And], [ML].
∑
0≤k≤n
(
n
k
)
=
[
(k + 1)(2n−k)
]− 1− n for k ≥ 2 (A.13)
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où n est le nombre total d'éléments à combiner et k le nombre de contremesures qui s'excluent
mutuellement. Dans ce cas, nous avons n = 4 et k = 2, ce qui donne
(
4
2
)
=
[
(2 + 1)(24−2)
]−1−4 = 7
combinaisons possibles. Le Tableau A.2 résume ces résultats.
A.4.3.2.2 Contremesures Partiellement Restrictives : Une contremesure peut être mise
en oeuvre avec quelques autres contremesures mais pas avec leur totalité. Par exemple, supposons
que de l'ensemble de 4 contremesures (C1, C2, C3, C4), C1 ne peut être combinée qu'avec C4 (les
combinaisons de C1 avec C2 et C1 à C3 créent un conﬂit dans le système). Le nombre total de
combinaisons possibles est alors donné par lÉquation A.14 [FS09b].
∑
0≤k≤n
(
n
k
)
=
[
(2k−1 + 1)(2n−k)
]− 1− n for k ≥ 2 (A.14)
où n est le nombre total d'éléments à combiner et k le nombre de contremesures partiellement
restrictives. Dans ce cas, nous avons n=4 et k=3, ce qui donne
(
4
3
)
=
[
(23−1 + 1)(24−3)
]−1−4 = 5
combinaisons possibles. Le Tableau A.2 résume ces résultats.
A.4.3.2.3 Contremesures Totalement Restrictives : Parmi le groupe de contremesures
sélectionnées, une ou plusieurs ne peuvent pas être combinées avec le reste des contremesures.
Pour connaître le nombre exact de combinaisons possibles, on utilise alors l'Équation A.15 [Ros94],
[War07].
∑
0≤k≤n
(
n
k
)
= 2n−k + (k − 1)− n for k ≥ 1 (A.15)
où n est le nombre total d'éléments à combiner et k le nombre de contremesures totallement
restrictives. Par exemple, en ayant 4 contremesures (C1, C2, C3, C4) et en sachant que C1 est
totallement restrictive, nous aurons
(
4
1
)
= 24−1 + (1− 1) − 4 = 4 combinaisons possibles. Le
Tableau A.2 résume ces résultats.
Table A.2 - Combinaissons générées d'un groupe de 4 contremesures
Type Non- Mutuellement Partiellement Totalement
Restrictive Exclusive Restrictive Restrictive
Double C1+C2, C1+C3,
C1+C4, C2+C3,
C2+C4, C3+C4,
C1+C2, C1+C4,
C2+C3, C2+C4,
C3+C4,
C1+C4, C2+C3,
C2+C4, C3+C4,
C2+C3, C2+C4,
C3+C4,
Triple C1+C2+C3,
C1+C2+C4,
C1+C3+C4,
C2+C3+C4,
C1+C2+C4,
C2+C3+C4
C2+C3+C4 C2+C3+C4
Quadruple C1+C2+C3+C4
Total 11 7 5 4
A.4.4 Évaluation des Contremesures Combinées
Une contremesure combinée résulte de la mise en oeuvre simultanée de deux ou plusieurs con-
tremesures pour atténuer une attaque donnée. Une solution combinée est donc analysée comme
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une contremesure individuelle, avec un coût combiné et une eﬃcacité combinée. La combinaison
des solutions de sécurité est possible seulement si les conditions suivantes sont remplies:
1. Les contremesures ne sont pas mutuellement exclusives,
2. La surface totale de couverture d'une contremesure n'est pas totalement recouverte par une
autre contremesure avec une surface de couverture identique.
Le processus de sélection et de classement des contremesures combinées est représenté dans la
Figure A.3. Le processus prend comme entrée les résultats obtenus à partir de l'évaluation des
contremesures individuelles, tel que décrit dans la Section A.3.2 (étape 1). Le système élimine
ensuite les contremesures pour lesquelles l'indice RORI est inférieur à la moyenne ou au-dessous
d'un seuil prédéﬁni (étape 2). Cette action permet au système d'optimiser le processus d'évaluation.
Une fois que nous avions la liste des contremesures combinables (étape 3), on calcule le nombre
total de combinaisons possibles. Ensuite, il est possible de générer des groupes de 2, 3, ..., n
contremesures, où n est le nombre total d'éléments à combiner (étape 4).
La métrique RORI est ensuite calculée pour chaque groupe de combinaisons (étape 5), en tenant
compte du fait que pour une solution combinée, le coût est calculé comme la somme de tous les coûts
individuels des contremesures (Axiome 1) et l'atténuation du risque d'une solution combinée est
calculée comme étant la probabilité de l'union des événements (Axiome 2). La valeur annuelle des
infrastructures et la perte annuelle estimée demeure invariable pour toutes les solutions combinées.
Aﬁn d'évaluer toutes les contremesures combinées, il est nécessaire d'utiliser les axiomes 1 et
2 décrites en Section A.4.1. Dans l'étape 6, la valeur RORI obtenue est comparée à la valeur par
défaut (la valeur RORI la plus élevée obtenue dans l'évaluation individuelle des contremesures).
Si le RORI résultant est égal à la valeur par défaut, le système vériﬁe le coût de la contremesure
(ARC) et sélectionne celle qui a la valeur la plus basse (étape 6a). Dans le cas contraire, le système
compare si le RORI actuel est supérieur à la valeur par défaut (étape 6b), la contremesure est alors
sélectionnée, et elle remplace la valeur par défaut (étape 7a).
Toutefois, si le RORI résultant est inférieure à la valeur par défaut (étape 7b), le système
cherche une autre combinaison à évaluer (étape 8a).
Lorsqu'aucune autre combinaison est possible (étape 8b), le système conserve la contremesure
par défaut, car c'est elle qui oﬀre le plus haut indice RORI.
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Figure A.3 - Processus d'Évaluation de Contremesures Combinées
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A.5 Travaux Liés
La plupart des travaux existants concernant la sélection des contremesures se concentre uniquement
sur les modèles qui utilisent l'analyse qualitative ou sur l'évaluation d'une solution individuelle pour
une seule attaque. Par exemple, Cavusoglu et al. [CMR04] proposent un modèle pour évaluer des
options d'investissement de sécurité qui utilise une approche de l'arbre d'attaque basée sur la
théorie des jeux. A noter que leur modèle ne considère la mise en oeuvre de contremesures en
cas d'une attaque individuelle exclusivement. Notre solution quand à elle peut être adaptée à des
scénarios d'attaques multiples.
Duan et Cleand-Huang [DCH06] considèrent des méthodes heuristiques ainsi qu'une approche
d'algorithmes génétiques pour le processus de sélection d'un ensemble de contremesures. Toutefois,
en raison de la complexité de l'espace de recherche, l'approche heuristique n'est ni optimale, ni
complète. Les principaux inconvénients de l'approche de l'algorithme génétique est la diﬃculté de
mesurer avec précision la meilleure partie de chaque contremesure à combiner. En plus, l'utilisation
de la valeur actualisée nette (VAN) comme mesure de comparaison n'est pas suﬃsante pour décider
entre plusieurs contremesures. Notre solution utilise l'ALE au lieu de la VAN, puisque ce dernier
n'est utile qu'avec des investissements de longs périodes. Les contremesures dans notre modèle
sont proposées pour être mises en oeuvre pour une courte période de temps (à partir du moment
où une intrusion est détectée jusqu'à ce que le système reviennet à son fonctionnement normal).
Par ailleurs, Neubauer et al. [NSW06] proposent l'utilisation de portefeuilles de sauvegarde
eﬃcaces qui sont évalués en fonction de plusieurs objectifs (p.ex. la valeur de l'image, la valeur
monétaire, le coût accepté, le temps de conﬁguration, etc.) Cependant, un modérateur est néces-
saire pour des conseils pendant le processus, les calculs se fondent principalement sur la métrique
de perte annuelle attendue, et des résultats incertains de milieux complexes ne sont pas considérés
par l'outil. Notre modèle ne nécessite pas de modérateur au cours du processus d'évaluation et
utilise non seulement la perte annuelle attendue, mais aussi le coût de fonctionnement, le coût de
contremesures et le niveau d'atténuation des risques aﬁn d'évaluer les dommages collatéraux de
réponses et les eﬀets d'intervention sur les attaques.
Bisterilli et al. [BFP07] présentent une approche qualitative pour la sélection des contremesures
de sécurité en utilisant des arbres de défense (une extension des arbres d'attaque) et les préférences
sur les contremesures en utilisant les réseaux de préférences conditionnelles (CP-net). Cependant,
les conditions de sélection de contremesures sont fondées sur la connaissance d'experts, l'approche
est statique et qualitative (pas de méthode mathématique pour évaluer et sélectionner des con-
tremesures), et elle ne tient pas compte des attaques comme des variables aléatoires. Notre solution
propose un modèle quantitatif (basé sur l'indice RORI) qui ne repose pas sur des connaissances
expertes pour la sélection des contremesures appropriées.
Zonouz et al. [ZKSY09] proposent un moteur de réponse et récupération (RRE) qui utilise une
approche graphique d'arbre pour analyser les événements et les contremesures sélectionnées sur la
base de la logique booléenne. RRE modèle un scénario de jeu à deux joueurs (l'oﬀensive et la défen-
sive), et choisit les mesures d'intervention en résolvant des processus des décisions concurrentielles
de Markov partiellement observables, qui proviennent des arbres de réponse d'attaque. Cependant,
cette approche ne tient pas compte des avantages et des coûts associés à une action de réponse
donnée. Et elle n'évalue pas quantitativement les diﬀérentes contremesures pour sélectionner celle
qui oﬀre le plus grand bénéﬁce à l'organisation.
Plus récemment, Bedi et al. [BGS+11] décrivent une approche qui utilise un algorithme pour
générer des ensembles optimaux de contremesures. Cependant, cette approche est proposée pour
être mise en oeuvre durant la phase de conception du logiciel uniquement, et elle ne tient pas
compte des menaces non identiﬁées, ni de l'impact des contremesures dans le processus d'analyse
et de sélection. A contrario, notre solution peut être mise en oeuvre dans le déploiement en temps
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réel, et elle examine l'impact des contremesures (le coût, le niveau d'atténuation des risques), aussi
bien durant la phase de conception que lors du processus d'évaluation et de sélection.
A.6 Conclusions et Travaux Futures
Dans cette thèse, nous introduisons une approche quantitative pour sélectionner des contremesures
de sécurité optimales basées sur l'indice RORI, ce qui permet de fournir une réponse par rapport
à la taille de l'infrastructure en évaluant des solutions individuelles et combinées contre l'absence
d'action.
Notre solution est divisée en deux parties: dans un premier temps, l'évaluation des con-
tremesures individuelles, qui détermine les paramètres associés à l'intrusion ou l'attaque (p.ex.
l'ALE et AIV) et évalue l'indice RORI pour toutes les solutions individuelles; et dans un second
temps, l'évaluation des contremesures combinées, qui détermine les paramètres associés aux so-
lutions combinées (p.ex. l'ARC et le RM) et évalue l'indice RORI pour toutes les combinaisons
possibles des mesures de sécurité. En conséquence, notre modèle est capable de classer et sélec-
tionner la ou les contremesures qui oﬀrent le plus grand bénéﬁce à l'organisation.
La combinaison de deux ou plusieurs politiques de sécurité représente généralement une plus
grande couverture de la surface du risque et oﬀre ainsi un niveau plus intéressant d'atténuation du
risque. Cependant, il est important de noter qu'une valeur supérieure d'atténuation du risque ne
débouche pas toujours sur un indice RORI plus élevé, ni que la solution la moins chère est toujours
la plus intéressante. Plusieurs paramètres sont pris en compte aﬁn de choisir la solution qui oﬀre
leur meilleur ratio coût-eﬃcacité.
Diﬀérents cas d'usages ont été donné tout au long du mémoire de thèse pour montrer l'applicabilité
du modèle (c.-à-d. un service de transfert d'argent mobile, où des attaques sont eﬀectuées contre
les utilisateurs du système ; un processus de contrôle d'infrastructure critique, où des attaques
sont eﬀectuées contre une barrage ; et un système de jeux olympiques, où des multiples attaques
aﬀectent le système d'information).
Les travaux futurs se concentreront à considérer l'interdépendance entre les contremesures
(p.ex. comment l'application d'une contremesure peut aﬀecter l'eﬃcacité des autres), la gestion
des conﬂits que peuvent apparaître lors de l'implémentation des contremesures, ou l'adaptation
du modèle RORI à un environnement dynamique (incluant des paramètres dynamiques tel que le
temps de réaction et de récupération, la puissance de la contremesure, etc).
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MMTS Inference Rules
T
his appendix presents inference rules based on the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL),
which are used to infer relationships among SIEM operations. These rules can be extended
towards ﬁrst order logic, and follow the formalism used in equation B.1.
The intended meaning can be interpreted as: whenever a condition deﬁned in the antecedent
holds, a condition deﬁned in the consequent must also hold. Some conditions that can not be
expressed in OWL, can be expressed by using SWRL rules or by deploying SWRL queries. These
rules are written in terms of classes, properties and OWL individuals.
Antecedent(?x, ?y) ∧Antecedent(?y, ?z)→ Consequent(?x, ?z) (B.1)
The formalism uses parenthesis ()" to encapsulate the arguments of the expressions (e.g.,
individuals, data values or variables referring to them). The AND symbol “∧ ” is used to combine
two or more atoms. The arrow “→ ” separates the antecedent part of the rule from its consequent
part and deﬁnes the resulting atom of the rule. variables are represented by question marks ?".
Predicates that take one or more arguments and evaluates to true if they satisfy the condition are
expressed by the qualiﬁer swrlb".
The following rules have been proposed to improve the detection and reaction process in the
Mobile Money Transfer Service over diﬀerent attack scenarios.
B.1 Traﬃcking Collection
In the Mobile Money Transfer System, an mWallet can be credited by using various loading means
such as a credit card, a bank transfer, a transfer from another mWallet, a payment through a pay-
ment intermediary. An mWallet which is credited by many diﬀerent entities with several loading
means may be a dealer's account used to collect payments related to his traﬃcking. Such a case
should be detected. Once this rule is implemented in a SIEM it should be possible for the user to
adjust the considered parameters, such as the number of loading means, the number of transfer
senders, the loading means considered, the slide of time considered.
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Analyser(?a) ∧ User_Account(?x) ∧ User_Account(?y) ∧ User_Account(?z)
Trans_Amount(?ta) ∧ Trans_Amount(?tb) ∧ is_credited_with(?x, ?ta) ∧
is_credited_by(?ta, ?y) ∧ is_credited_with(?x, ?tb) ∧ is_credited_by(?tb, ?z)
Event_Frequency(?ef) ∧ Event_Threshold(?et) ∧ swrlb : greaterThan(?ef, ?et)
∧Trafficking_Collection(?e)→ generate_event(?a, ?e) (B.2)
B.2 Hiding user
Generally, a personal account is used in face to face payments as well as for remote payments. An
account used only for remote transactions can therefore be a sign of suspicious activity. This rule
requires studying an account's behaviour during a certain period of time. It should be possible for
the user to set this parameter.
Analyser(?a) ∧ User_Account(?x) ∧Remote_Trans(?rt) ∧ is_performed_by(?rt, ?x)
Event_Frequency(?ef) ∧ Event_Threshold(?et) ∧ swrlb : greaterThan(?ef, ?et)
∧Hiding_User_Identity(?e)→ generate_event(?a, ?e) (B.3)
B.3 Scams
In some types of frauds, a crook tricks persons into sending him or her some money. Generally,
the money is withdrawn very shortly after it is received. The repetition of this pattern can be a
sign of fraudulent activity and it should be detected. The slide of time considered, the number
of repetitions and the time separating reception and withdrawal of money are parameters that
should be modiﬁable. The number of diﬀerent money senders is also a relevant parameter as scams
usually target a wide range of persons.
Analyser(?a) ∧ User_Account(?x) ∧ Trans_Amount(?ta) ∧ Trans_Time(?t1)
Trans_Time(?t2) ∧ is_received_by(?ta, ?x) ∧ is_received_at(?ta, ?t1) ∧
is_withdrawn_by(?ta, ?x) ∧ is_withdrawn_at(?ta, ?t2) ∧ swrlb : greaterThan(?t2, ?t1)
Event_Frequency(?ef) ∧ Event_Threshold(?et) ∧ swrlb : greaterThan(?ef, ?et)
∧Scam_Detected(?e)→ generate_event(?a, ?e) (B.4)
B.4 Virtual money creation/destruction
Within the Mobile Money Transfer System, a certain amount of virtual money is authorized to
circulate. This amount has to be controlled strictly to avoid any money creation and destruction.
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The amount should remain constant at all time and any change should be detected by the SIEM.
B.5 Account takeover
If a mobile phone is stolen from its legitimate user and is used by the thief to make money transfers
it is very likely that the thief's behaviour will greatly diﬀer from the original user's one. In order to
detect such a case, it should be possible for a SIEM to learn during a certain period of time what
are the user's habits and his general behaviour. This learning stage result is a proﬁle which can
be used to detect unusual behaviour. For example, the SIEM will raise an alarm if many transfers
are made abroad while the client seldom travels.
B.5.1 Account Takeover by Number of Transactions
MMTS_Account(?x) ∧Analyser(?a) ∧ Trans_Rate(?tr) ∧ has_trans
_rate(?x, ?tr) ∧ Threshold_Rate(?th) ∧ swrlb : greaterThan(?tr, ?th) ∧
Account_Takeover_Attack(?z)→ is_affected_by(?x, ?z) ∧
generate_event(?a, ?z) (B.5)
In Equation B.5, the system detects that a user account (x) has a current transaction rate (tr)
greater than the predeﬁned threshold rate (th) and therefore, it is assumed that the account (x) is
aﬀected by an account takeover attack (z) and an event is generated accordingly by an analyser (a).
B.5.2 Account Takeover by Amount of Transactions
MMTS_Account(?x) ∧Analyser(?a) ∧ Trans_Amount(?ta) ∧ has_trans
_amount(?x, ?ta) ∧ Threshold_Amount(?th) ∧ swrlb : greaterThan(?ta, ?th)
∧Account_Takeover_Attack(?z)→ is_affected_by(?x, ?z) ∧
generate_event(?a, ?z) (B.6)
Similarly, in Equation B.6, the system detects that a user account (x) has a current transaction
amount (ta) greater than the predeﬁned threshold transaction amount (th) and therefore, it is as-
sumed that the account (x) is aﬀected by an account takeover attack (z) and an event is generated
accordingly by an analyser (a).
B.6 Employee complicity
It can also be interesting to detect whether employees are complicit with fraudsters. To detect
such a case, we may consider a rule which identiﬁes employees that have opened a certain number
of accounts suspected in fraudulent activities.
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B.7 Denial of Service
An increment on the number of connections performed in a period of time without sending an ac-
knowledgement to complete the connection or a huge load of transactions for an irrelevant amount
can be interpreted as a Denial of Service attack.
B.7.1 DoS without Acknowledgement
Analyser(?a) ∧ User_Account(?x) ∧ User_Account(?y) ∧Denial_Of
_Service(?z) ∧ Trans_Without_Ack(?tr1) ∧ Trans_Without_Ack(?tr2)
∧Trans_Time(?t) ∧ is_performed_by(?tr1, ?x) ∧ is_performed_at(?tr1, ?t)
∧is_performed_by(?tr2, ?y) ∧ is_performed_at(?tr2, ?t) ∧ Event_
Frequency(?ef) ∧ Threshold(?th) ∧ swrlb : greaterThan(?ef, ?th)
→ generate_event(?a, ?z) (B.7)
In Equation B.7, the system detects that several user accounts (x,y) have initiated transactions
(tr1, tr2) with the Mobile Money Transfer System at time (t), but none of the transactions have
been acknowledged. Since the event has occurred in a frequency greater than a predeﬁned thresh-
old, it is assumed that the system is aﬀected by a Denial of Service attack (y) and an event is
generated by an analyser (a).
B.7.2 DoS with Transactions for less than 1 Euro
Analyser(?a) ∧ User_Account(?x) ∧ User_Account(?y) ∧DoS_Attack(?z)
∧Transaction(?tr) ∧ swrlb : lesserThan(?tr, 1) ∧ Trans_Time(?t)
∧is_performed_by(?tr, ?x) ∧ is_performed_by(?tr, ?y) ∧ is_performed
_at(?tr, ?t) ∧ Event_Frequency(?ef) ∧ Threshold(?th)
∧swrlb : greaterThan(?ef, ?th)→ generate_event(?a, ?z) (B.8)
Similarly, in Equation B.8, the system detects that several MMTS user accounts (x,y) have
initiated transactions (tr) with the Mobile Money Transfer System at time (t) for an amount of
less than one euro. Since the event has occurred in a frequency greater than a predeﬁned threshold,
it is assumed that the system is aﬀected by a Denial of Service attack (y) and an event is generated
by an analyser (a).
B.8 Conclusions
The rules mentioned above rely on three common points. First of all, it is required to study
transactions during a certain span of time. Secondly, for each event it is necessary to consider
multiple parameters. Thirdly, they require a wide range of logical operators. Fourthly, these rules
may require using data from diﬀerent logs. Lastly, it should be possible for the operator in charge
of surveillance to modify some parameters of rules in order to better target his or her analysis.
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URI General Structure
C.1 URI Scheme
A URI always begins with a scheme name that refers to a speciﬁcation for assigning identiﬁers
within that scheme [BLFM05]. The URI syntax is therefore a federated and extensible naming
system where each scheme's speciﬁcation may further restrict the syntax and semantics of identiﬁers
within that scheme. Scheme names consist of a sequence of characters beginning with a letter and
followed by any combination of letters, digits, plus sing (+), period (.), or hyphen (-), as shown in
Listing C.1
Listing C.1 - URI Scheme
scheme = ALPHA \*(ALPHA/DIGIT/+/./−)
e . g . , f t p : // example . org / aDirec tory / aF i l e
mai l to : name@example . org
l d a l : // ldap . example . org
t e l :+1−816−555−1212
http ://www. s i t e . com
Schemes are case-insensitive, but its representation should only produce lower-case scheme
names for consistency. More details on the designing of URI schemes can be found in [MAZP99].
C.2 URI Authority
The authority element is located after the URI scheme and is preceded by a double slash (//) and
terminated either by the next slash (/), question mark (?), sign number (#), or by the end of the
URI. The governance of the name space deﬁned by the reminder of he URI is delegated to the URI
authority. This latter has three components: user information, host and port, as shown in Listing
D.4
Listing C.2 - URI Authority Syntax
author i ty = [ u s e r i n f o @] host [ : port ]
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C.2.1 User Information
The userinfo element consists of a user name, and optionally, scheme-speciﬁc information about the
way to get authorization o access a resource. Such element, if present, is followed by a commercial
at-sign() that delimits it from the host. Listing C.3 shows the user information generic syntax.
C.2.2 Host
The host element is identiﬁed by an IP literal encapsulated with square brackets, an IPv4 address
in dotted-decimal form, or a registered name (Listing C.3).
C.2.3 Port
The port element is designated by an optional port number in decimal following the host and
delimited from it by a single colom (:) character (Listing C.3). Default ports may be deﬁned
by schemes. For instance, http scheme deﬁnes a default port 80. However, in order to prevent
redundancy, URI port components and its delimiter (:) should be omitted if port is empty or if its
value is the same as that of the scheme's default.
Listing C.3 - URI Authority Components
u s e r i n f o = *( unreserved / pct−encoded / sub−de l ims / : )
host = [ IP− l i t e r a l ] / IPv4−address / regu la r−name
port = :*DIGIT
e . g . f tp ://[ < user >[:<password >]@]<host >[:<port >]/<uri−path>
C.3 URI Path
The path element contains information that is usually organized in hierarchical form. Such in-
formation, along with data in the non-hierarchical query component, serves to identify resources
within the scope of the URI's scheme and naming authority (if any). The path consists of a se-
quence of path segments separated by a slash (/), and terminated either by the ﬁrst question mark
(?), sign number (#), or by the end of the URI.
Depending upon the path in the URI, certain rules may apply. For instance: if a URI contains
an authority component (path-abempty), the path component must begin with a slash (/) or be
empty. Otherwise (path-absolute), the path cannot begin with two-slash characters (//). Listing
C.4 shows these rules.
Listing C.4 - URI Path Rules
path−abempty = beg ins with / or i s empty
path−abso lu t e = beg ins with / but not with //
path−noscheme = beg ins with a non−co lon segment
path−r o o t l e s s = beg ins with a segment
path−empty = zero cha ra c t e r s
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C.4 URI Query
The URI query element is generally used to carry identifying information in the form of key=value
pairs. The query component is indicated by the ﬁrst question mark (?) and terminated either by a
sign number (#), or by the end of the URI. The general syntax of a URI query is shown in Listing
C.5
Listing C.5 - URI Query Syntax
query = *( pchar / "/" / ?)
C.5 URI Fragment
The fragment element of a URI allows indirect identiﬁcation of a secondary resource (e.g., subset
of a primary resource, some view of representations of the primary resource, other resources) by
reference to a primary resource and additional information. A fragment identiﬁer is indicated by
the presence of a sign number (#) and terminated by the end of the URI. Listing C.6 shows the
general syntax of a URI fragment.
Listing C.6 - URI Fragment Syntax
query = *( pchar / "/" / ?)
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Appendix D
Use Case
Implementation: PyOrBAC for the MMTS
Scenario
This section provides an implementation of the MMTS Scenario (described in Section 5.1) using
the OrBAC formalism to deﬁne the roles that subjects, actions, and objects play in the MMTS
infrastructure.
D.1 System Architecture
The MMTS demonstrator is composed of three modules: The MMTS Simulator module, the Detec-
tion & Correlation module, and the Decision Support & Reaction module; this latter implements
our countermeasure selection process (Figure D.1).
The following subsections detail each module of the system architecture as well as a typical
use-case scenario.
D.1.1 MMTS Simulator
It is a module composed of four elements: a model of the User Behaviour, the Front Oﬃce, the
AMS, and the Security Database, whose mission is the management of the user accounts and the
generation of artiﬁcial logs [Con11,GHA+12,JTT10].
 User's Behaviour Model: This element models the user's behaviour and creates labels to
describe the reality about the fraudulent or non-fraudulent nature of a transaction.
 Front Oﬃce (FO): This element is in charge of the user authentication; proﬁle management
(password change, user information, etc.); interface between the AMS and the users (balance
consultation); transfer of transaction requests to the AMS and logs generation.
 Account Management System (AMS): The main functionalities of this module are:
Logs generation; database consult; acceptance and/or denial of transactions.
 Security Database: It contains all the security information related to MMTS users (thresh-
olds, block- ed accounts, activated/deactivated accounts, number of transactions within a
period of time, etc). The FO and AMS elements consult the security database to guarantee
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Figure D.1 - MMTS Use Case Service Architecture
the authentication functioning and the management of transactions.
D.1.2 Detection & Correlation Module
It is a framework in charge of receiving and analysing the logs provided by the detection module
in order to correlate abnormal behaviours that can be interpreted as intrusions or attacks. The
correlation engine feeds the Decision Support and Reaction module with correlated alerts that
activate attack contexts.
This module is composed of two elements: the GEventeneric Event Translation (GET) Frame-
work, and the Security Probes, that are in charge of receiving and analyzing the logs provided by
the detection module in order to correlate abnormal behaviors that can be interpreted as intrusions
or attacks [CCCR07,CDER09,FCR09] .
 GET Framework: It is in charge of gathering the data provided by the FO and by the
AMS, of parsing their content (using the Adaptable Parser technology) and of normalizing
the data ﬁelds to a common representation, to translate the messages to a format which is
suitable for further processing;
 Security Probes: These components are capable of performing sophisticated cross-layer
data correlation for the recognition of complex event patterns in the data ﬂow. Patterns that
are to be detected are described by means of Finite State Machines that are executed on
top of an event-based platform. Alerts generated by the Security Probes are then fed to the
PyOrBAC module, which is in charge of attack analysis.
D.1.3 Decision Support & Reaction Module (DS&R)
The DS&R module of ﬁve elements: The PyOrBAC Engine, PyOrBAC Agent, XOrBAC, Return
On Response Investment (RORI) and the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), whose main function is
to evaluate, select and implement optimal security policies to react over intrusions and/or attacks
176
D.1. System Architecture
[Con11c, Con12a, GDJ+12, GDJC12]. Figure D.2 shows the general architecture of the DS&R
module.
Figure D.2 - General Architecture of the DS&R Module
 PyOrBAC Engine (Policy Management): This element has the following functions:
deﬁnition of security policies and diﬀerent OrBAC elements (roles, activities, views, etc);
dynamic generation of security policies through the use of contexts which allow the system
to react more rapidly to any change; conﬂict management; and conﬁguration of external
systems called associated components.
 PyOrBAC Agent (Policy Activation): This element is in charge of translating the
security policies that are received by the Engine and to conﬁgure these policies in the Policy
Enforcement Points -PEP- (e.g., Security Database).
 XOrBAC: it is an XML modeling of the PyOrBAC implementation that provides XML
schema to structure the data storage and communications between the PyOrBAC Engine
and Agent. Through the XOrBAC ﬁle, the PyOrBAC Agent receives the commands sent by
the Engine regarding the security policies that should be activated or deactivated in a given
Organization.
 Return On Response Investment (RORI): it is a cost sensitive model that allows the
evaluation of individual and multiple countermeasures by considering parameters associated
to the intrusion or attack (e.g., Annual Loss Expectancy, Annual Infrastructure Value), as
well as parameters associated to the proposed solutions (Countermeasure Cost, Risk Mitiga-
tion). As a result, the selected alternative is the one that provides the highest beneﬁt to the
organization (i.e., the highest RORI index).
 Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): it is implemented by the Security Database of the
monitored scenario. The database is modiﬁed by the PyOrBAC Agent according to the
security policies that are proposed by the PyOrBAC Engine in order to mitigate the attacks.
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D.1.4 Use-Case Scenario
Figure D.1 depicts a typical use-case scenario where a regular user (a mobile subscriber who has
an account with the Mobile Money Transfer Service) connects to the MMTS platform through the
Front Oﬃce, using for this a phone number and its associated PIN code (1). The Front Oﬃce
validates the user's credentials by checking up with the information stored in the security database
(2). Similarly, the Account Management System (AMS) veriﬁes the rights for users to perform
transactions by consulting the database (3). A log is generated for each activity performed by each
user (4).
The Alert Correlation Engine receives the logs generated in the MMTS Simulator (5) and
provides alerts that indicate intrusions or attacks to the Decision Support and Reaction module
(6). In case of attack, the alerts received by the PyOrBAC Engine are evaluated and the diﬀerent
security policies associated to the given attack are enforced by the PyOrBAC Agent (7). This
latter injects the new security rules into the database, so that they are considered to authenticate
users and grant permissions/prohibitions to perform transactions in the MMTS platform (8).
As a result, transactions are properly performed in a default scenario (when no attack is de-
tected), and they are prohibited or restricted in a scenario of attacks.
D.2 Modelling MMTS Entities in OrBAC
Following the OrBAC formalism, we model `MMTS' as the central organization, from which all the
required deﬁnitions are done. Table D.1 summarizes the abstract entities (e.g., role, activity, view),
as well as the concrete entities (e.g., subject, action, object) deﬁned for the MMTS organization.
From Table D.1, a subject (e.g., s1) executes an action (e.g., connect) over an object (e.g.,
mmts_platform). In addition we deﬁne a set of contexts (conditions/constraints) that must be
held to activate a given security rule.
In the MMTS organization, subjects (e.g., s1, s2, ..., s10) are empowered in the role MMTS_USER.
Similarly, the actions `connect', `d_auth', and `account_surv' are considered in activities CON-
NECT2MMTS, DOUBLE_AUTH and SURVEILLANCE respectively.
The actions `n_emit_tr7', `n_rcv_tr20', `min_rcv_0', `max_rcv_100' `min_emit_0', and
`max_emit_100' are considered in the NORMAL_TR activity by the MMTS organization. In
addition, the objects `mmts_platform' and `*' are used respectively in views PLATFORM and
ANY.
D.3 MMTS Execution Context and Attack Reaction
The following subsections describe two MMTS contexts: default context and attack context.
D.3.1 Default Context
It is a nominal context in the MMTS organization, that is always activated by default (in the
absence of attacks). A default context has the lowest priority on the system (equals to 1), meaning
that an attack context is always treated with a higher priority.
Listing D.1 shows the abstract security rules that apply by default to all MMTS subjects. The
negative sign (−) indicates a prohibition, while the positive sing (+) indicates a permission for a
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Table D.1 - Deﬁnition of MMTS Entities
Entity Description
Role
MMTS_USER It regroups MMTS users with the same rights and privileges
Activity
CONNECT2MMTS Connecting to the MMTS platform
SURVEILLANCE Setting the user account under surveillance
DOUBLE_AUTH Requesting double authentication
NORMAL_TR Executing transactions in a normal scenario
N_NORMAL_TR Executing transactions in a scenario different to the one by
default
AT_TR Executing transactions in an Account Takeover Attack (AT) scenario
View
PLATFORM It provides a view of the MMTS platform
ANY It provides information of any entity
Subject
s1,...,s10 Subjects of the MMTS platform
Action
connect It models the process of connecting to the MMTS platform
d_auth It requests the user's PIN and birth date
account_surv It activates account surveillance
n_emit_tr7 Maximum 7 transactions to emit per day
n_rcv_tr20 Maximum 20 transactions to receive per day
min_rcv_0 Minimum 0,01 euros to receive per transaction
max_rcv_100 Maximum 100 euros to receive per transaction
min_emit_0 Minimum 0,01 euros to emit per transaction
max_emit_100 Maximum 100 euros to emit per transaction
max_emit_30 Maximum 30 euros to emit per transaction
Object
mmts_platform It models the MMTS platform as an object accessible by users
* It models the notion of `all users'
role to perform an activity over a view in a given context.
Listing D.1 - Abstract Security Rules in a Default Context
+,MMTS,MMTS_USER,CONNECT2MMTS,PLATFORM, Dft_ctx
+,MMTS,MMTS_USER,NORMAL_TR,ANY, Dft_ctx
−,MMTS,MMTS_USER,SURVEILLANCE,PLATFORM, Dft_ctx
−,MMTS,MMTS_USER,DOUBLE_AUTH,PLATFORM, Dft_ctx
The security rules shown in Listing D.1 grants the permission to all users of the MMTS to
connect to the platform and perform normal transactions to any MMTS object. It also deactivates
the surveillance and the double authentication of the user account. This derives the hold predicate
shown in Listing D.2.
Listing D.2 - Hold Predicate for a NORMAL_TR Activity
Hold (MMTS,− ,− ,− ,Dft_ctx ) <− True
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The predicate shown in Listing D.2 holds for all MMTS subjects. From the abstract security
rules shown in Listing D.1, we derive concrete security rules using the derivation rule deﬁned
in [Mie05]. An example of these rules is shown in Listing D.3.
Listing D.3 - Concrete Security Rules for Subject `s1'
+,MMTS,MMTS_USER,CONNECT2MMTS,PLATFORM, Dft_ctx
Empower(MMTS,MMTS_USER, s1 )
Consider (MMTS,CONNECT2MMTS, connect )
Use (MMTS,PLATFORM, mmts_platform )
Hold (MMTS, s1 , connect , mmts_platform , Dft_ctx)<− True
−> Is_permitted ( s1 , connect , mmts_platform )
The example shown in Listing D.3 indicates that subject `s1' (empowered in the role MMTS_user),
is granted the positive authorization to perform the action `connect' (considered in the CON-
NECT2MMTS activity) to the object `mmts_platform' (used in the PLATFORM view) in a de-
fault context.
D.3.2 Attack Context
It is a prerequisite context that triggers the selection of countermeasures. The Attack context is
held if an MMTS subject has the AT attribute set to true. This context has some countermeasures
associated to the type of attack with a priority deﬁned by the RORI index (proposed in Equation
3.2), meaning that, the context with the highest priority is selected to react over a given attack. As
presented in [GDJ+12], several attack scenarios may occur in the MMTS platform (e.g., Account
Takeover, DoS, Money Creation/Destruction, etc); we select the Account Takeover Attack to
explain the attack context in this section.
An account takeover is a password-based attack that exploits vulnerabilities on the user's side
and steals the mobile user account to perform transactions in favour of the attacker. The complete
evaluation process for this attack is described in Section 5.1. Results show that the optimal solution
to implement is to reduce the transaction amount and to activate double authentication process
(a combination of countermeasures C4 and C8).
Before deﬁning the security rules to be applied in an Account Takeover Attack, we introduce
two new OrBAC entities:
 AT_TR: An activity of the MMTS organization that regroups actions that activate a given
countermeasure. In this use case, the action max_emit_30 is considered in the AT_TR
activity.
 N_Normal_TR: An activity of the MMTS organization that regroups actions that will
deactivate some parameters of the NORMAL_TR activity in an attack scenario. In this use
case, max_emit_100 is an action considered in the N_Normal_TR activity.
Listing D.4 shows the security rules that apply to all MMTS users after detecting an Account
Takeover Attack. Each security policy is associated to a particular countermeasure that results
out of the previously described evaluation.
Listing D.4 - Abstract Security Rules for an Account Takeover Attack
−,MMTS,MMTS_user ,N_NORMAL_TR,ANY,AT_ctx (C4)
+,MMTS,MMTS_user ,AT_TR,ANY,AT_ctx (C4)
+,MMTS,MMTS_user ,DOUBLE_AUTH,PLATFORM,AT_ctx (C8)
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The security rules shown in Listing D.4 deactivates particular parameters of a normal transac-
tion by prohibiting the execution of some actions of the NORMAL_TR activity (this actions are
grouped in a new activity N_NORMAL_TR). It also grants the permission to MMTS users to
perform limited transactions (AT_TR) over any MMTS subject (C4) previous connecting to the
platform using a double authentication method (C8) in an Account Takeover context (AT_ctx).
The priority for the AT context is equal to 33,87 (the resulting RORI index for the combined
countermeasure), which is higher than the one set by default.
The derived predicate for an AT_TR activity is shown in Listing D.5.
Listing D.5 - Hold predicate for activity AT_TR
hold (MMTS, s ,− ,− ,AT_ctx) <− s . a t t r i bu t e (AT)=True
If for instance, PyOrBAC Engine receives an alert indicating that subject `s2' is under an
Account Takeover attack, the AT attribute of `s2' will be set to `True'. As a result, `s2' is held by
the AT_ctx, which derives the concrete security rules expressed in Listing D.6.
Listing D.6 - Concrete Security Rules for an Account Takeover Attack
I s_proh ib i t ed ( s2 , max_emit_100 , * ) (C4)
Is_permitted ( s2 ,max_emit_30 , * ) (C4)
Is_permitted ( s2 , d_auth , mmts_platform ) (C8)
Notice that the default context is still held by subject `s2', therefore the concrete security rules
expressed in Listing D.7 also apply to subject `s2':
Listing D.7 - Concrete Security Rules for a default context
Is_permitted ( s2 , connect , mmts_platform )
I s_proh ib i t ed ( s2 , s u r v e i l l a n c e , mmts_platform )
I s_proh ib i t ed ( s2 , d_auth , mmts_platform )
Is_permitted ( s2 , min_emit_0 , * )
Is_permitted ( s2 , max_emit_100 , * )
Is_permitted ( s2 , min_rcv_0 , * )
Is_permitted ( s2 , max_rcv_100 , * )
Is_permitted ( s2 , n_emit_tr7 , * )
Is_permitted ( s2 , n_rcvt_tr20 , * )
As a result, transactions are restricted to a maximum of 30,00e (C4), previous a double
authentication of subject `s2' (C8), in an Account Takeover Attack.
D.4 Discussion
Combined attacks require a greater analysis and a higher amount of information to determine their
volume and the coverage of the proposed countermeasures. The two case studies show the appli-
cability of our model and the operations required to evaluate and select optimal countermeasures.
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Our countermeasure selection model is integrated within an OrBAC formalism for the Mobile
Money Transfer Service scenario. As a result, security policies are deﬁned for the MMTS orga-
nization in a default and an attack context, which allows the deﬁnition of abstract entities (e.g.,
role, activity, view), as well as concrete entities (e.g., subject, action, object), making it possible to
perform transactions in a default scenario (when no attack is detected), and to prohibit or restrict
them in a scenario of attacks.
In a scenario of multiple attacks, it is possible that the optimal countermeasure for one at-
tack enters in conﬂict with other countermeasures already deployed on the system or those pro-
posed to mitigate other attacks. To solve conﬂict problems, we follow the approach proposed
by Thomas [Tho07], using contexts to dynamically update security policies in particular circum-
stances. For instance, an operational context is said to be active in the absence of attacks or
intrusion characterizing a threat. Other contexts deﬁne additional security rules to be applied
when a threat or an intrusion is detected and speciﬁes new security mechanisms to counter the
detected threat. These security rules generally correspond to permissions (positive authorizations),
prohibitions (negative authorizations) and obligations (constraints or restrictions).
Conﬂicts in the OrBAC model originate if a concrete permission (i.e., Is_permitted) and a con-
crete prohibition (i.e., Is_prohibited) are derived for the same subject, action and object [Mie05].
In the example described in Section D, two security rules are in conﬂict: the ﬁrst one grants
permission to all MMTS users to connect without double authentication (default context), however,
the double authentication is activated for users that hold the AT context (AT_ctx = true). The
second one, grants the positive authorization to emit transactions for a maximum of 100e (action
`max_emit_100') to all MMTS subjects in a default context, however, this action is prohibited
for users that hold the AT context, and a new action (`max_emit_30') is granted.
To solve these conﬂicts, the rule with the highest priority (highest RORI index) overrides those
with the lowest priority context. As a result, since the AT context has the highest priority, we
enforce the rules associated to this context and delete those that are in conﬂict and that have been
implemented in the default context.
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